

# JACKSON

*Journal*

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Victory  
Starts Here



**TRADITION ★ TRAINING ★ TRANSFORMATION**





# Jackson Journal

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The Jackson Journal is a professional journal that provides a forum for original thought and discussion on all aspects of training and leadership as they pertain to Initial Military Training. The views expressed in the Jackson Journal are those of the Authors, not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. The content does not necessarily reflect U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official U.S. Army publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy of the articles they provide. The Jackson Journal reserves the right to edit material.

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# *From the Commanding General*

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John Wooden, legendary basketball coach of the UCLA Bruins' teams that won 10 national championships between 1964 and 1975 once said *"It's the little details that are vital. Little things make BIG things happen"*. Two articles in this issue highlight the importance of that "attention to detail" mentality and the profound impact that it has on training and leading Soldiers.

LTC Nick Crosby's article titled "Discipline Starts with Rolling Socks" highlights the many opportunities throughout a training day where leaders can reinforce the concept of discipline in their Soldiers while simultaneously improving their Soldiers training skills and confidence. LTC Steven Delvaux and CPT Jason Albrecht article titled "Taking Care of Soldiers" focuses on those daily tasks outside of training that leaders are responsible for. When well thought out and executed, these daily tasks significantly improve Soldiers morale and ability to focus on training, but if neglected can have the opposite result.



Two other articles in this issue discuss the need to reexamine what is taught in BCT, I am interested in your ideas and thoughts on this topic. Discuss this issue among your peers and with your chain of command. To become the Preeminent Training Center in the Department of Defense we must model and lead the way in the conduct of Initial Entry Training; constantly reviewing the relevancy of what is taught in BCT is one step in that direction.

Also included in this issue is a superb article written by COL (R) Jeffrey Sanderson titled "Three Rules of Tactical Combat". COL (R) Sanderson was awarded the Silver Star for his actions in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Each of his three rules of tactical combat are applicable in some fashion to the training we conduct here at Fort Jackson, especially in Victory Forge, our culminating Field Training Exercise (FTX).

Encourage your leaders at all levels to read the Jackson Journal and submit articles for future publications. One of the best ways to become an expert in our profession is to turn your thoughts and ideas into the written word. I am especially interested in your thoughts on how we can best incorporate the concepts of the Army Learning Model (ALM) to improve our training.

As the 45th Commanding General of the USATC and Fort Jackson I am thankful for your extraordinary service and humbled by your professionalism as we strive to become the Preeminent Training Center in all of DOD.

## **Victory Starts Here!**

Bryan T. Roberts  
BG, USA  
Commanding

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# *Post Command Sergeant Major*

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Passion and Pride, these are more than words when relating to our mission here at Fort Jackson! If the right amount of emphasis is placed across our force by leaders, we will indeed become the premier Training Institution across our Military Forces.

Pride starts with our reception and integration programs and is initially based off the internal esprit-de-corps of each of our organizations. It is the pride of the unit crest, the Battalion Motto, and the Brigade Colors. It is knowing that we are a country at War and having the understanding that every ounce of military technical and tactical competence that is taught to our Trainees may make the difference between life and death in a matter of just a few short months! Pride is wearing the uniform of a United States Soldier, Marine, Airman, or Sailor and earning your paycheck every day. Pride is making our military environment better at the end of every day.



Passion is the internal fire that sparks us to conduct PT every day; it makes us want to be better than what the minimal standards outline. Passion is believing in the mission, understanding that the Armed Forces are bigger than us. To be passionate also means to be resolved that every member of our forces and their family members are treated with respect regardless of race, color, creed or religion.

At the end of your tour here I want all of you to look back and say to yourself; Yes, I did make a difference, Yes, I did leave my mark, Yes, the future of our Armed Forces is better for what I did yesterday.

## **Victory Starts Here!**

Kevin R. Benson  
CSM, USA  
PCSM



## Discipline Starts with Rolling Socks

LTC Nick Crosby

*Discipline may be the one necessary attribute we teach Soldiers to create a safe, orderly, and positive learning environment in Basic Combat Training. But how do we achieve discipline, maintain it, and ensure the newly transformed Soldier continues to adhere to it? Military discipline can be characterized as a mental attitude and state of training which requires mandatory compliance under all conditions. Military discipline also involves the consideration of performance/actions of Soldiers, involving rules that govern attitude, behavior, and decisions that fall within the parameters of the Army values both on and off duty. Inherent to the Basic Combat Training mission of transforming Soldiers revolves around this concept of forming discipline.*

### So what is discipline?

Some common definitions of discipline include:

1. Training to act in accordance with rules.
2. Training an activity, exercise, or a regimen that develops or improves a skill.
3. Punishment inflicted by way of correction and training; adversity.
4. Behavior in accord with rules of conduct; behavior and order maintained by training and control.

### When do we start instilling discipline in Soldiers?

Discipline transformation starts when the Soldier's foot hits the ground off of the bus in the company area. That box of Drill Sergeants that surrounds a dazed and confused group of new Soldiers as they scramble to find their platoon and realize they left a bag, or dropped their headgear can be a significant emotional event. As basic training cadre we assume civilians have not been exposed to the level of discipline required to be successful as a Soldier. Drill Sergeants acting on this assumption, quickly begin to provide direction, create order, and form that first company formation; a new recruit's first exposure to military discipline.

A feasible conclusion can be drawn that the first few days at basic combat training are not the most pleasant ones, but sometimes are the most memorable and significant to transforming a civilian into a disciplined Soldier. The ground work for discipline must be an established, well regimented process that is constantly reinforced through means that deter continued non-adherence to the standard. The goal is to modify the unacceptable behavior or improve the performance to create the desired disciplined outcome. The goal is not to constantly punish the Soldier in the initial phase of transformation, but to more strongly coerce the Soldier into correcting the problem. The total control environment that is maintained throughout “Red Phase” is essential to cultivating this disciplined culture and forwarding each individual’s developmental growth towards becoming a Soldier. At first, Soldiers are forced into a process and system of rules that they are not used to obeying. Typically, common techniques used to achieve conformity are yelling, corrective action, negative counseling, and administrative punishment for most infractions, but there are positive alternatives that compliment the negative reinforcement.

*This seems like an idealistic answer, but discipline can be as simple as rolling socks.*

*How do I instill discipline?*

This seems like an idealistic answer, but discipline can be as simple as rolling socks. One might be bold enough to say that Soldiers rolling their socks is as important as reciting the Soldier’s Creed; although the creed is another primary example of discipline. The daily regimen

that Soldiers need from the moment their feet hit the linoleum in the morning must continue throughout the day to attain the discipline the Army strives to achieve at Basic Combat Training. This takes an extreme amount of work from not only the Soldier, but the Drill Sergeants, First Sergeants, and Commanders as well. There are so many opportunities we need to consider to reinforce the regimen that are sometimes squandered due to oversight or shifting of priorities. A few common areas are:

- Posted morning checklist – making bed to standard, pre-physical training hygiene, clean bay, take out trash, etc.
- Accountability formation – reporting, drill and ceremony, Soldier’s Creed, paying respect to colors
- Physical Readiness Training – adherence to proper form, maintaining formation and position, company displays, using mottos after each exercise, etc.
- Post-PRT checklist – personal hygiene, change into duty uniform, and put wall locker in order in compliance with display guide sheet, clean latrines, etc.
- First Formation – reporting, drill and ceremony, company mottos, Soldier announce schedule for the day, etc.
- Soldier Fueling (DFAC) – orderly entry into building, process through feeding line, technique for seating at tables, eating instructions, clean area after consuming meal, exiting the DFAC, formation outside waiting for entire platoon, etc.
- Recovery from training checklist – securing dirty clothes in proper location, clean required equipment, check equipment for following day training, bay leader reviews schedule with bay, receive mail technique, personal hygiene, etc.

- Rifle Drills – executed 20 times a day, rifle disassembly/assembly, functions check, etc.

The art of rolling socks (and other seemingly menial basic combat training tasks) can and do have a direct impact on a Soldier's attention to detail when setting up his Fighting Load Carrier (FLC) and preparing his equipment prior to exiting a Forward Operating Base. A morning regimen of making a bunk with hospital corners, spacing hangers, arranging a display, ensuring locks are secured to the appropriate drawers, folding underwear and rolling socks to standard is a precursor to Pre-Combat Checks (PCCs). The morning display routine builds the necessary foundation for cleaning magazines, stretching springs, inspecting spot welds, loading the last three rounds as tracers, and rotating out the top round (chambered at the clearing barrel several times) to avoid stoppages. The Army functions off of routines, checklists, load-plans, inspections, and systems. Soldiers and Leaders must have the discipline to accomplish each of these requirements prior to commencing on a combat patrol, or simply starting a HMMWV.



rewards techniques, and even goals we establish for Soldiers every day; we must be disciplined. Some Soldiers take advantage of inconsistencies or contradictions between authority figures and use these differences against the cadre to challenge limits or boundaries to see how much they can act outside of the allowable disciplinary parameters. Other Soldiers become frustrated with the lack of consistency and lose interest in executing the task to standard; where the standard seems to vary between trainers. These groups either require or seek consistency to reinforce the desired outcome of a disciplined Soldier.

Discipline is also hard to maintain when things continue to change. Predictability in any organization is not only expected,

in most cases it is demanded. It is imperative that training schedules, meetings, training, and even a Drill Sergeant's mood establish a disciplined regimen. When a daily regimen changes it is disconcerting to Soldiers and can slow the discipline

transformation. A daily inspection of the Soldier's wall locker to ensure socks are rolled to a specified length and positioned in accordance with a diagram is both consistent and predictable. It can be a powerful tool if used appropriately to instill discipline starting the Soldier's day.

*What are some ways to achieve discipline?*

**1. Maintain Consistency and Predictability:**

Although each Drill Sergeant and Command Team has different techniques in dealing with situations, we all follow TRADOC Regulation 350-6, specifically chapter 2-5: Corrective Training and Corrective Action procedures. We must be persistent and consistent in our approach to application of rules, punishment/

**2. Find Out Why the Soldier is Undisciplined:**

Taking the discussion to the next level, if a Drill Sergeant takes the time to analyze why, rather than just judging the action itself, they might be closer to figuring out the Soldier's lack of desire or inability to adhere to the standard. It may be determined the Soldier did not understand

the instruction period nor feel comfortable asking for assistance. A Drill Sergeant's demeanor during initial instructions should be different than periods scheduled to reinforce the training, such as concurrent training and testing periods. Typically when Drill Sergeants become aware of those Soldiers who did not understand the instruction, a different conversation occurs than previously exercised. On most occasions, there is something else going on with the Soldier rather than pure disrespect or purposeful disobedience. Maybe the Soldier is mad at something else entirely, and this is how they handle it. A skilled Drill Sergeant can identify these indicators and then apply/guide appropriate means to attain the disciplined behavior.

**Taking the discussion to the next level, if a Drill Sergeant takes the time to analyze why, rather than just judging the action itself, they might be closer to figuring out the Soldier's lack of desire or inability to adhere to the standard.**

***3. Emphasize and Praise Good Behavior / Correct and Discourage Poor Behavior:***

There is so much emphasis and guidance on regulating poor discipline sometimes we forget that reinforcing the good behavior can be just as effective. If the action does not cause harm to the good order and discipline of the unit, then an effective disciplinary approach should involve praising good behavior and possibly rewarding it. Several simple reward opportunities exist that are not considered or practiced in Initial Entry Training because they are thought of as ineffective or senseless. Rewards that have been successful include: sitting with a Drill Sergeant for a meal; unit poker chips, coins or certificates of achievement;

individually reciting the Soldier's Creed to the unit, allowing your company high marksman to carry an M4 throughout the remainder of Basic Combat Training, or just a good pat on the back to reaffirm the Soldier has met the standard to name a few. Many of the previous examples cost the training unit pennies or seconds in time, while producing immeasurable and long lasting results.

Now to the inevitable bad behavior and corrective action techniques that must be implemented in order to maintain good order and discipline. When a Soldier does not conform to the standard, consequences must be immediate – or as fast as the appropriate disciplinary action can be processed. An overused form of corrective punishment commonly applied to Soldiers for minor infractions or deviation from disciplined actions in the initial phase of transformation is the use of UCMJ. This is not to be confused with use of the UCMJ for egregious violations nor blatant disrespect towards the cadre. Discouraging purposeful poor behavior starts with immediate reprisal to deter further similar actions not only in the affected Soldier, but their peers as well. Correcting or discouraging behavior starts with reiteration of the standard and an explanation of the violation. If the Soldier continues the undesired behavior, corrective training or corrective actions are appropriate. Suitable counseling needs to accompany the poor behavior to maintain a catalog of events that may lead to some form of UCMJ and/or separation. In the majority of situations a graduated response is sufficient to correct the deficiency in discipline and get the Soldier back on the path toward transforming into a United States Army Soldier. Our society and culture are based off of a simple premise, “ensure the punishment matches the crime”.

#### 4. *Discipline Yourself to Maintain Composure:*

Soldiers frequently enjoy seeing cadre, especially Drill Sergeants, lose their temper. The exploding Drill Sergeant can be interesting to watch, but often loses impact if used too often or not in the appropriate setting; a total loss of discipline. When Soldiers see this loss of control/discipline it is usually chalked up as a victory for them. The most disciplined action/reaction a Drill Sergeant can exercise in dealing with Soldiers is to remain calm and in control, and if necessary, step away from the situation and tap out to a fellow Drill Sergeant (only

can be implemented depending on the situation and/or the Soldier's performance. The main objective in developing military discipline is to progress towards a successful combined or team activity. The slow and steady indoctrination of Soldiers to internalize the code of the military is essential in this developmental process. They must be taught to internalize the military code and Army values so when presented scenarios they are disciplined to choose the correct course of action. A Soldier must be proud of what they do when no one is watching, not because someone has told him to, but because of the pride and discipline inside him.

recommended in extreme circumstances). During this brief break, trainers can reassess the situation, gather themselves, and develop an appropriate consequence before taking action. Soldiers constantly test the discipline process and generally take advantage of a tired, frustrated, or emotionally invested cadre member; do not give them this opportunity. If a cadre member does find themselves caught up in this scenario help them out. A disciplined Drill Sergeant, leading through example, is probably the best instrument to transform Basic Combat Trainees into Soldiers.

Each day at basic combat training must be devoted to cultivating confidence and developing each Soldier's self-discipline. Providing direct applications, realistic scenarios, and appealing to their sense of reason assists in the inculcation of discipline. The method of reward and punishment are appropriate tools that

A Soldier's career is a demanding profession. A Soldier must gain physical strength, endurance, knowledge, esprit de corps, and discipline quickly during their ten weeks at basic combat training. Day by day, minute by minute from morning to night, Soldiers are pushed to do more than their bodies and minds are used to. Soldiers are disciplined when they understand and live the Army values, think and be the Soldier's Creed, and fight as Warriors to win our nation's wars. Their country depends on them for her very survival. ***As simple as it may sound, a Soldier's survival in battle and success on the battlefield can depend upon their ability to understand the importance of properly rolled socks.***

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LTC Nick Crosby is the Commander of 2nd Battalion, 13th Infantry Regiment, 193rd Infantry Brigade.

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## NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

**THE CHOICE** of non-commissioned officers is also an object of the greatest importance; the order and discipline of a regiment depends so much upon their behavior, that too much care cannot be taken in preferring none to that trust but those who by their merit and good conduct are entitled to it. Honesty, sobriety, and a remarkable attention to every point of duty, with a neatness in their dress, are indispensable requisites; a spirit to command respect and obedience from the men, an expertness in performing every part of the exercise, and an ability to teach it, are absolutely necessary; nor can a sergeant or corporal be said to be qualified who does not write and read in a tolerable manner.

**INSTRUCTIONS** for the Sergeants and Corporals. It being on the non-commissioned officers that the discipline and order of a company in a great measure depend, they cannot be too circumspect in their behavior towards men, by treating them with mildness, and at the same time obliging every one to do his duty. By avoiding too great familiarity with the men, they will not only gain their love and confidence, but be treated with a proper respect whereas by contrary conduct they forfeit all regard, and their authority becomes despised.

Each sergeant and corporal will be in particular manner answerable for the squad committed to his care. He must pay particular attention to their conduct in every respect; that they keep themselves and their arms always clean; that they have their effects always ready, and put where they can get them immediately, even in the dark, without confusion; and on every fine day he must oblige them to air their effects.

**Major-General Friedrich Baron von Steuben,  
Revolutionary Drill Manual, 1794**

# Stating the Obvious: “Certified Basic”

By CPT Joseph W. Payton

*What does it take to produce a “Certified Basic” Soldier? Most would immediately run to the program of instruction (POI) and begin spouting off all of the lessons that comprise the current modules. This seems like the appropriate response; however for those that are veterans of Basic Combat Training, it would most likely provide a vague and subjective guide. While the POI does address much of what we expect out of our Soldiers upon arrival at the first unit of assignment, there are certainly adjustments that can be made which would ensure that Basic Combat Training produces a “Certified Basic” U.S. Army Soldier.*



## It Starts with the Drill Sergeant

Years ago, Drill Sergeants shared the responsibilities of training Soldiers with “the committee” which consisted of range cadre and other subject matter experts (SMEs) on particular skills. In recent years, the concept of teaching by committee has disappeared resulting in the Drill Sergeant taking sole responsibility for the training of their Soldier. There is definitely a positive aspect to having the Drill Sergeants as the primary and only trainers; however, there is one notable issue with regards to the transition from teaching by committee to Drill Sergeant focused training—the Drill Sergeant School POI does not contain a module dedicated for training the trainer. It perfectly gives Drill Sergeant

Trainees instruction on all BCT tasks, but it does not follow the task proficiency training with instruction and rehearsals on how the Drill Sergeant should train the tasks.

The U.S. Army Drill Sergeant School should produce Drill Sergeants that are ready to train on all POI tasks upon arrival to their Basic Combat Training Company; however, once Drill Sergeants report to their unit, the unit must train and certify the Drill Sergeants in order to ensure that they are able to train the Soldiers on the POI lessons. If Basic Combat Training units are to continue training with the idea that the Drill Sergeants are the SMEs, then considerations must be made to adjust the U.S. Army Drill Sergeant School POI so that it produces SMEs in the content areas. One idea is that each Drill Sergeant should be a Master Trainer equivalent in a particular content area (i.e. Modern Army Combatives (MAC) Level III, Master Resilience Trainer (MRT), Master Fitness Trainer, Master Driver, Rappel Master, etc...). At a minimum, all Drill Sergeants should be certified to instruct each Basic Combat Training content area and they should arrive to their BCT unit with the following certifications which ensures that they are fully ready to contribute to the training mission:

**What's In & What's Out**

- Modern Army Combatives (MAC) Level II
- Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST)
- Combat Life Saver (CLS)
- Mail handler
- Ammunition Handler (Hazmat 67)
- Confidence Obstacle Course (CFOC)
- Conditioning Obstacle Course (CDOC)
- Rappel Master/Mountaineering (Confidence Tower/Swiss Seats/Rappelling/Knot tying)
- Casualty Assistance Officer (CAO)/Casualty Notification Officer (CNO)
- Army Standard License for (HMMWV, LMTV, Bus, 1-ton, M113 trailer, and Pot Belly Stove)

**BCT POI Adjustments**

The current BCT POI is comprised of 18 modules (A-R). While some of the lessons contained within are important for Soldiers to know, they are not expedient for the Soldiers during Basic Combat Training. Remember, the intent is that we are producing Soldiers who are “prepared to contribute as a member of a team upon arrival at their first unit of assignment” (TRADOC Regulation 350-6). The following modifications to the POI closely resemble the STP 21-1-SMCT Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks Warrior Skills Level 1 May 2011. Making these changes would reduce the number of modules to 10 (A-J) and would include the following topics:

- A. Administrative/Support Time
- B. Physical and Mental Readiness
- C. Drill and Ceremonies
- D. Shoot
- E. Move
- F. Survive
- G. Communicate
- H. Adapt
- I. Field Training Exercises
- J. Enhancement Training

It is important to highlight some of the key additions, subtractions, and modifications to the BCT POI.



**Additions:**

- Army History
- Driver’s Training included in module E. Move. All Soldiers obtain an Army standard license for a M998/M1097 HMMWV
- Mountaineering (i.e. knot tying)
- Running Fundamentals
- Basics of Anaerobic/Aerobic Exercise
- Introduction to Basic Nutrition


**Subtractions:**

- ARM 1 – Combat Equipment Familiarization Fire (EST 2000)
- ARM 4 – Engage Targets with an M68 CCO (day) and AN/PAQ-4 (night)
- Army Personnel Recovery
- BRM 2 – Range Procedures and Marksmanship Fundamentals I
- BRM 6 – Field Fire I (75/175/300 meter)
- Code of Conduct/Civilian Corps Creed
- Composite Risk Management for BCT
- Global Assessment Tool (GAT)

- Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP)
- SARDOT/SARNEG
- Pugils (from Combatives training)

**Modifications:**

- BRM 9 is no longer Practice Record Fire I and Practice Record Fire II is now Record Fire I
- BRM 10 is now Record Fire II
- Initial physical fitness assessment done upon reception - Day 0
- The 1-mile run assessment in PRT would become the 1-1-1 Assessment, testing the Soldiers on 1 minute of push-ups, 1 minute of sit-ups, and a 1 mile run. Soldiers not meeting the established standards are recommended for separation under Chapter 11 Failure to Adapt.
- APFT standards should be the same for all Soldiers on first enlistment (17-21 yrs age group standards); waivers/exceptions may only be granted for prior service Soldiers.
- There is no "D" ability running group for Soldiers. Trainees meeting the current D-Group Standard should be immediately separated
- AGRs should be ran at a prescribed pace to a specified distance which builds (either in length or pace) each week



- CDOC is counted as a PRT event
- Red Phase APFT requirements:
  - Soldiers scoring less than 15 points in any of the three APFT events will be separated under Ch. 11
  - Soldiers scoring 15-19 points in any of the three APFT events will be New Started to day 1 of Red Phase
- White Phase APFT requirements:
  - Soldiers scoring less than 20 points in any of the three APFT events will be separated under Ch. 11

- Soldiers scoring 20-29 points in any of the three APFT events will be New Started to day 1 of White Phase
- EOC APFT requirements:

-Soldiers scoring less than 39 points in any of the three APFT events will be separated under Ch. 11 (after a second score of EOC APFT)

-Soldiers scoring 40-59 points in any of the three APFT events will be sent to FTU for a period of no more than 14 days. If minimum APFT Standard of 60 points in each event is not achieved, then Soldier is separated under Ch. 11

- Minimum Physical Fitness standards:

-Score 180 on APFT (minimum 60 points in each event)

-Run 4 miles in 36 minutes or under

-Conduct four tactical foot marches totaling 40 KM

- ARM 3 - Zero an M68 CCO and an AN/PAQ-4 is conducted at the EST 2000

- Combatives instruction changes from 22.0 hrs to the full MAC Level I certification (40 hours)

**The Minimum Standard**

Obviously, the above lists are not comprehensive, but they represent the direction of change necessary to produce quality Soldiers that are ready to serve upon completion of Basic Combat Training. At a minimum, when a Soldier completes basic training, they should have the following qualifications / proficiency:

- Physically fit
  - Passed the APFT on the 17-21 age group scale (exception granted to prior service Soldiers)
  - Completed all obstacle courses (TDC, CDOC, CFOC) and Confidence Tower
  - Completed all Foot marches

- Completed 4 miles in 36 minutes or under
- Certified on Move tasks:
  - Achieved standard during Dismounted land navigation (day and limited visibility)
  - Completed MUDF
  - Demonstrated proficiency Urban Operations
  - Completed Buddy Team LFX
  - Obtained Army Standard License for M998/M1097
- Certified on Survive tasks
  - CLS Certified
  - MAC level I Certified
  - Completed CBRN Chamber
  - Demonstrated proficiency in Mountaineering (knot tying)
- Certified on Shoot tasks
  - Qualified on individually assigned weapon (using iron sights and standard qualification table)
  - Completed live hand grenade throw
  - Achieved standard on HGQC
- Certified on Communicate tasks
  - Placed SINGARS into operation, sent and received transmission
  - Demonstrated proficiency with visual signaling techniques
- Certified on Adapt tasks
  - Demonstrated seven Army Values
  - Passed all knowledge tests with a minimum score of 70%

**The Decision Point**

The suggested changes to the BCT system is no different than any other idea on the drawing table in that it must run through the filter of reality. Anyone reading this may have quickly dismissed the notion that the Drill Sergeant School POI would change so that all Drill Sergeants it produced have a Master Trainer equivalent skill. Where would the time come from to do this?

Also, incorporating mountaineering, MAC Level I, and Driver’s training into the BCT POI would definitely require some significant adjustments; not to mention, the heavy resource requirements that are associated with those changes. While these obstacles and the many more that are unstated are real constraints, decision makers must determine what is important: do we continue to train in a way that may or may not produce a quality product or do we do the homework and make the sacrifices that are necessary for us to provide Soldiers that are truly ready to serve wherever they go.



The fact of the matter is our current Soldier-making-program does not fully achieve the desired results of producing Soldiers that at the end are ready and able to perform in changing operational environments. The nation is our customer and the demand for a high-quality product from our Basic Combat Training factory is what is expected. No longer can we operate, using eye-catching commercials and ads that convict us of false advertisement. Our country is not paying for a civilian draped in a Soldier’s uniform with a Soldier’s conversational knowledge base; our country has placed an order for one thing, and that is what we owe her—A U.S. Army Soldier: “Certified Basic.”

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*CPT Joseph Payton is the Aide-de-Camp for the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training Center and Fort Jackson. Previously he served as the Commander of Delta Company, 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment, 165th Infantry Brigade.*

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# Three Rules of Tactical Combat



COL (R) Jeffrey R. Sanderson

**T**here are three rules of tactical combat. Regardless of whether you are leading an invasion force, trading beads with the village chief, or training for combat operations, those who master the tactical rules of combat are those who best accomplish their mission while caring for their Soldiers and live long enough to reflect and then write articles about their combat experiences.

The interesting thing is these are also 'life' rules that apply to your everyday job, your relationship with your family, and your personal monetary affairs. For those who are looking for a level of Zen-like sophistication, I am sorry to disappoint. These are simple, easy to remember, practical combat tips. First, see the enemy before he sees you. Second, make contact with your enemy with the smallest amount of your combat power possible. Finally, when the time arises, execute precise fire distribution and control.

Seeing the enemy before he sees you is the first critical task. It requires a combination of intellect, reconnaissance, and common sense. We must 'see' the enemy first and foremost in the mind of the commander and his subordinate commanders. The Commander must visualize where the enemy is located, what the enemy is doing, and why he

is doing it. He must then be articulate enough to describe this to his subordinate commanders. Once this is complete, he can then work with his commanders to determine a good plan for getting to and killing or neutralizing his enemy. It requires the intellectual capacity and the energy to seriously 'think' about the enemy, his capabilities, his timelines, and then make an educated guess as to his whereabouts and intentions. Sometimes we will guess wrong, but moving forward without making an educated guess is dumber than even the Army's creation of the bureaucracy known as IMCOM, and that is really dumb.

As we do this, we must always remind ourselves never to over or underestimate our opponents. Often our greatest sin in this specific category is one of combat arrogance, when we assume we are the greatest fighting force in the history of the world, we have 'been there and done that' and we are the center of the warrior's world. One of the first lessons you learn in a firefight is that a combat patch and Ranger tab does not stop, or even slightly hinder, enemy bullets. We may be that force, but arrogance has been the death of far too many an American Soldier. The doctrinal process describing all above is called Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield or IPB. If we fail to think before

we move, we deserve the whipping we get. IPB is a systematic way of thinking about the enemy. Even if you don't agree with the methodology, the critical piece again is to think about the enemy.

Beyond seeing the enemy in your mind's eye and making educated guesses, we must now conduct reconnaissance. If you can't 'feel' the terrain from a paper map or a flat screen then I encourage you to seek other employment. Terrain still counts and map reading remains the fundamental leader skill. If you are idiot enough to allow your Global Positioning System to lead you to the enemy then, once again, you deserve what you get. Your GPS doesn't understand inter-visibility lines, elevation, depression, curves, good hiding places, nor does it account for the magical military concepts of cover and concealment. So, the first reconnaissance always starts with a map. If the Army doesn't provide you the detail you require in a map and it's your area of operations, then build your own. See the possibilities. Patton once said that "Time spent in Reconnaissance is never wasted" and he had it right. In most of our doctrinal manuals we spend a great deal of time on the 'if time permits' solution as opposed to 'make the time solution' to conduct reconnaissance. Go as far as you can safely go and look as far as you can look. Today, we have the capability to fly a drone over the enemy and see what he is having for breakfast. We have unbelievable night capabilities and hand held devices which can see nametapes on uniforms at five kilometers. Not using, or not making the best use of, all our equipment irritates me. I would love to be able to anoint you with special reconnaissance gifts allowing you to stay in your sanctuary TOC located deep within FOB land, but alas that is not possible. If you really want to know what the enemy is doing you have to go and look. By the

way, it's a safe bet that he is looking at you even as you prepare to execute your reconnaissance.

The final criteria required for assisting you in seeing the enemy is common sense. We have all seen 'maneuver heroes' who would pull off tremendous feats in the maneuver box and accept risk on each and every occasion. However, when we transitioned to the live fire, they appeared to have lost their appetite for risk. Common sense took over and they realized live bullets were a game changer. Ninety percent of our enemies will always operate in their best interest. Their leaders and commanders will do their very best to accomplish their missions while looking out for the best welfare of their Soldiers. Don't get me wrong, I have killed many with a 7.62mm coaxially mounted machine gun and vividly remember a night where the enemy was not falling as they should have, but rather exploding when hit. They were wearing explosive vests and were intent upon a suicide style attack. While this does exist and while it can be catastrophic when it does occur, it is not the norm for our present day warfare nor do I believe it is for the future. Further, if it is impractical



as a potential tactical solution then I encourage you to discount it as an enemy capability. In essence, make an educated guess and then take the time to study the enemy's escape routes.

Ideally, the theater commander sees the enemy well before we even get close, and Commanders at all levels are working overtime to 'see' the enemy within their designated areas. At the tactical level, we make the decision to pull a trigger. Ideally, we see the enemy with some form of optics before we see them with the naked eye and preferably we have some level of reconnaissance professional who is guiding us to the target.



In summary, 'seeing' the enemy starts between the Leaders ears, involves the ability to make an educated guess, and to use common sense without over or under estimating our enemies. If we fail to see the enemy, we tend to blunder quickly into enemy fire, grow frustrated because we have surrendered the initiative, and watch our casualties rise. Tactical combat is for thinkers and those who fail to 'think' make dangerous leaders.

From seeing the enemy first, we transition to making contact with the minimal amount of combat power possible. We do this for one simple reason, because it 'preserves' tactical options. What we seek is to make direct fire contact with

our enemy with the number 1. We seek to engage with one Soldier or one combat vehicle. Our enemy wants to draw as many of us as possible into his initial first blow. He seeks surprise, shock, and confusion within our ranks and the more of us he can draw into the first volley then good for him. Years ago, across the Army, we spent a great deal of time teaching our young leaders to 'bound' into contact in order to mitigate this possibility.

Direct fire contact is only one form of contact with the enemy. Most tacticians agree there are six other forms of contact with our enemy to include; visual, direct fire, chemical, obstacle, aircraft, and electronic warfare. Further, many current tacticians have developed a methodology regarding a potential eighth form of contact which is civilians and their potential status as

friend of foe. Under all circumstances and conditions, it is in our best interest to make contact with the enemy on our terms, and central to those terms is the ability to preserve our maneuver options by making contact with only the minimal amount of friendly combat power. I argue that to win the tactical fight, you must first win visual contact.

I am leery to even speculate how many Soldiers throughout the ages have died because they mistakenly thought they could fight a battle from the column formation. Death becomes those who are stupid enough to fight from a formation. Formations are for movement. Movement is when we don't expect enemy contact and are simply moving from point A to point B. Maneuver is in direct relation to

the enemy. Movement and maneuver are different words with completely different meanings, implications and connotations.

Somewhere long ago, probably in the basement of Building 4 at Fort Benning or Boudinot Hall at Fort Knox, somebody came up with the doctrinal term of movement techniques. In reality they start as movement techniques but escalate based upon the threat to maneuver techniques. We can use a column formation and the traveling movement technique because we don't see a viable enemy threat. If we think we are likely to encounter then enemy then we can use the often maligned traveling over watch technique, and when enemy contact is expected (the way we normally want it) then we need to use the bounding over watch technique. Often I have seen leaders cling to formations thinking that staying in formation gave them a semblance of control, and unfortunately I have also seen the casualties that come from this thinking.

This does not preclude a larger formation from having a lead unit in a wedge executing the traveling over watch movement technique while all those following are in column using the traveling technique. Arguably, at the battalion level the advance guard platoon makes contact first and with good reporting allows and enables follow on companies to remain in column/traveling for extended distances before they transition to bounding ideally into the enemy flank or rear. The same concept works all the way to platoon level with multiple squads. Critical to tactical thinking is the ability to preserve our combat power for decisive effect. Many will foolishly argue that any unit in direct fire contact with the enemy is obviously the main effort. They further argue that the lead unit is therefore the main effort. A

main effort is a force designed to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy and achieve tactical victory for us, and it is usually the element well behind those first in contact.

Central to any tactical discussion are the actions of a lead unit in contact. Taking point is hard work and we cannot reasonably expect to use the same troopers again and again. While I am a big fan of Average Joe, working the point for any outfit at any level requires a unique skill set. Those who undertake this work must possess exceptional powers of observation noticing when things look right and more importantly when they don't. We also know that those in the advance formation must win visual contact and be prepared to quickly shape any direct or obstacle contact. This is especially true with regards to the enemies extended use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). We must see them before our enemy has the opportunity to detonate them and escape back into the populace.

If we face a direct fire threat our lead unit must accomplish three critical tasks. First, they must 'fix' the enemy and not allow the enemy (regardless of their size) to move or reinforce internally. If we are successful at this critical task, we have generally limited the enemy's ability to move and have attempted to box them. At this point we retain a wide variety of options including the ability to use indirect fires and force the enemy onto the horns of a dilemma by dying from indirect fire if they expose themselves, or dying from direct fire if they don't. Conversely, if we fail to properly shape this critical first contact, then the enemy will move immediately to the best defensive position and we will pay dearly for allowing him to move without punishment. Secondly, the advance force must place enough pressure (accurate direct fire combined with suppressive fire



and indirect fire) to allow follow on forces into the fight unimpeded. If a follow on maneuver force is taking fire, casualties, or is hindered on its way to the fight then the advance will have failed. Finally, the advanced force must never commit the most egregious error in combat which is to break contact. Once we know where our enemy is located, we must box him in, and then maneuver to kill him.

On the subject of breaking contact, I admit that there are tactical occasions when U.S. Soldiers would need to break contact with the enemy, but I argue those occasions are so infrequent that they we should not train them; nor should we allow any discussion of a 'break contact drill' or any type of this training to enter into our vocabulary. Each time we break contact with the enemy we embolden him. We cease to be the stalker and we forfeit the initiative. Ideally, we want the enemy to undergo break contact drills. My view is we almost lost a war in Iraq because of this passive mindset. Convoys would take direct fire and rather than immediately addressing the tactical problem, they would simply continue moving. Our failure to act resulted in a newfound courage in our enemy and when the convoy returned it took substantial casualties. Suffice to say, I am a fan of chasing them down and

killing them vice running away.

Finally, after you have successfully executed the first two tactical rules, you must bring firepower to bear. Those who best distribute and control their fires are winners. Lethality counts. It counts just as much now as it did in the days of Alexander and later the Roman Legions. Lethality begins with fire control. Leaders must have a tool to ensure their intent and will is carried out throughout the depth and breadth of their formation. Common fire control standards allow and enable decentralized lethality across a formation. Smart combat leaders don't even crank their engines before they have designated direct fire target reference points throughout their zone and/or area of operations.

First and foremost, we must be able to hit what we are aiming at. Although it is a simple principal it requires the utmost in leader attention and training. Tactical combat is not the place to discover we are poor marksman with whatever weapon or weapon system we are assigned. Of all the areas we concentrate on in our Army where leadership by example is critical, none is more important than here.

Leaders must be experts in their

weapons system. My experience is that leaders who are weak in this area (both marksmanship and all technical aspects of the weapon or weapons system) breed weak formations. So, while I admire physical fitness as a leader trait, I am far more concerned about a leader's technical weapons skills and ability to hit their targets. In essence, of all the skills, knowledge, and attributes we seek in our leaders, being an expert in all facets of weapons employment is my number one criteria. I am not saying we can't have it all, but I am saying this is the most underrated and important trait in our Army. Further, it can be difficult for a senior leader to discern if his junior leaders have the requisite technical and expert level weapons skills required in combat.

There are two major combat related reasons for this belief. First, leaders must fire in combat or our Soldiers generally won't. This is not to say that an American Soldier who turns a corner and sees his enemy face to face will not engage and kill, he will; however, the more ambiguity in a tactical situation the less likely a Soldier to fire. Ambiguity abounds in combat. While much has been written about the fact that Americans are de-sensitized to killing and it is a common belief in our system that we must train restraint, I argue the exact opposite. The more ambiguous the situation, the less likely our Soldiers will engage with direct fire. Remember, it is in our enemy's best interest to ensure ambiguity of all tactical situations.

Weapons' training is the most time consuming, the most costly, and the highest risk venture we execute in our Army. Weapons' training is hard, but it is the difference between victory and defeat. Each time a drawdown occurs; there are those who claim we can maintain our proficiency by using a wide variety of

lasers and executing force on force. They are wrong. Nothing simulates live fire. Much akin to the push up, the only way to get better at live fire is to live fire. This is the one area I beg future leaders to ensure they are not risk adverse.

Secondly, leaders mark targets. If a leader wants to mass fires, all he needs to do is shoot. All others will follow his lead. Leaders must be in a position to 'shape' first contact with the enemy. If they fail at this task (history is replete with examples of meeting engagements turning into major battles) they will ultimately fail at their assigned purpose. This requires leaders to be forward and be in a position to fire. Further, smart leaders will take the time to have a different ball to tracer mix than all others in their formation. This ensures all know where the leader is firing.

Although rare, a leader may decide he wants his formation in a 'weapons hold' status. In this case, his order is to not engage the enemy unless his Soldiers are threatened. The right of self-defense is fundamental and is never denied to a U.S. Soldier. In essence, if a Soldier is fired upon by the enemy, he will always have the right to return fire. This includes all situations, up to and including the famous Mosque scenario. If we ever get to the point where this is no longer the case, then the lawyers have won and the Republic has fallen.

More often than not, leaders will place their formations in a 'weapons tight' scenario where they will seek a positive identification of the enemy before engaging. This is a tough situation and by far the most complex to train; however, it is the most prevalent and most likely for the future and the situation that most demands our training attention. I am an adherent of the 3 block war theory and given recent

times and tactical battles it appears to have proven its value. Nowhere is fire distribution and control, with specific emphasis on a weapons tight situation, more important than in the 3 block war.

Finally, leaders can give the order to place their formation into a weapons free status. When this order is given it allows and enables our forces to conduct reconnaissance by fire. It is terribly destructive in execution, but it will accomplish its tactical purpose; however, the tactical purpose may not be worth it at the Strategic level and (in this case) a small tactical victory may not be worth the negatives at the strategic level. In any event, tactical leaders on the ground make the final decisions on their control status regardless of orders from higher.



The intent is to always mass direct fires, not to mass troops or combat vehicles. I am amazed at how we tend to mass bodies and vehicles. Modern weapons have the capability to kill effectively at extended distances. Our goal is to make maximum use of this standoff range. The Greek Phalanx is alive and well in tactics but it is decidedly different than that practiced

by Leonidas at the Hot Gates. He and his Spartans stood shoulder to shoulder and shield to shield in order to protect each other's flanks. Today we can serve the same purpose from a much greater distance. We do not need to stand shoulder to shoulder, in fact the converse is true with the more distance between us the better.

Clausewitz told us that everything in war is simple but the simplest things are difficult. In the paragraphs above I have set forth three rules of tactical combat that proved successful for me during my battles and engagements. They do seem simple when you write them down, but as with all things in war they are difficult in execution. Your battles and engagements will most assuredly be different than mine; however, many of the principals I laid out will be just as applicable to the Starship Trooper as they were to Alexander at Granicus.

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
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*Photographs taken by David Leeson from the Dallas Morning News*

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# LESSONS LEARNED

*THOSE GUYS who were in the first platoon in Vietnam stay with me. The years have faded, and the memories have faded. But I still remember what they did.*

*The young sergeants took care of me when I was a green lieutenant. They taught me the right things about how to say alive in combat.*

*After the big Gulf War parade ended, I walked over to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial to talk to Sergeant Stanton. I told him and all my Soldiers who perished, "Closure complete. The lessons learned in Vietnam were good ones. We did the job in the Gulf. " I didn't break faith with my guys.*

*The genesis of the victory in the Gulf was Vietnam. That's where it started. The commitments of the commanders in the Gulf were people who years ago said, "Never again. I will not let that happen to this army again."*

*What we learned in Vietnam we brought forward with us. If that saved the lives of thousands of Americans, and allied and Iraqi civilians, then the 58,000 who perished in Vietnam didn't die for nothing.*

*Brigadier General Joseph 'Keith' Kellog, 'The Circle', Al Santoli, ed., Leading the Way: How Vietnam Veterans Rebuilt the U.S. Military, 1993.*

# Maintaining Morale in BCT:

## “Taking Care of Soldiers”

*By LTC Steven L. Delvaux and CPT Jason Albrecht*

*All commanding officers and others in authority in the Army are required – to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical Well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.*

*(AR 600-20, 1-5, c, 4, d; Title 10, Section 3583, United States Code 10 USC 3853)*

Basic Combat Training (BCT) presents commanders with several unique challenges in accomplishing the command imperative imposed by the U.S. Statute cited above. The legal requirement to “promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge” undergirds all facets of Army leadership and is as relevant in BCT units as it is in any other unit in the United States Army. In laymen’s terms, this mandate essentially directs commanders to “take care of Soldiers.” The “Soldiers” that BCT commanders are charged with taking care of are, in fact, not even full-fledged Soldiers yet, but trainees who are almost completely at the mercy of the BCT cadre for the most basic of their “morale, physical Well-being, and general welfare” needs. These “needs” have a decided impact on BCT trainees’ quality of life and have the potential to greatly affect their performance and overall training experience. Given this importance and the legal requirement to provide for these needs, BCT commanders must understand the various challenges BCT presents to fulfilling trainees’ “morale, physical Well-being, and general welfare” needs and develop sound systems to ensure they are being met.

One of the biggest challenges BCT company commander’s face in carrying out this responsibility is the limited number of personnel assigned to a BCT company. While operational unit commanders have robust chains-of-command with multiple layers of NCOs and Officers to assist them in fulfilling this fundamental element of command, BCT company commanders must accomplish the same task with a skeletal TDA that consists of two officers (themselves and an executive officer), a 1SG, a Supply Sergeant and clerk, a training room NCO, and twelve Drill Sergeants (three per platoon). These eighteen personnel are often in charge of taking care of in excess of 200 trainees while simultaneously performing their BCT mission of transforming them from civilians to Soldiers. Even a BCT unit at full strength with no additional duties or taskings will have only one Drill Sergeant to care for up to 20 trainees at a time, far exceeding the span of control that leaders in operational units are required to exercise over their subordinates.

This challenge is further exasperated by the total control, restricted privilege BCT environment that denudes trainees of the free time and access to telephones, computers, and vehicles by which they could otherwise take care of themselves and solve some of the routine personal issues that arise during BCT. The majority of Soldiers in operational units are afforded ample time to take care of personal needs and possess the capacity to do so with minimal guidance and assistance from their chain-of-command. Our Army's newest Soldier trainees, however possess neither the time, the means, nor the experience, training, and understanding of Army systems needed to address the majority of their issues. This places a premium on the limited cadre present in a BCT company to be aware of their trainees' needs and to assist them in resolving their personal issues.

**Command Climate.** Unfortunately, many trainees are intimidated by their Drill Sergeants and BCT cadre who are not known for creating the most receptive and accommodating environment for trainees in BCT which tends to make them very reluctant to bring their issues to their cadre's attention. It is a great irony that, in an Army that prides itself on taking care of its own, we often do the poorest job of fulfilling this requirement with the nominal Soldiers who are most in need of our time and attention. Some cadre are not comfortable with what they see as "baby-sitting" trainees, having come from units where self-reliance is the norm. Others do not respond well to the restrictive BCT environment and seem to forget everything they've ever learned about leadership and "taking care of Soldiers." The psychological effects and results of the "Stanford Prison Experiment" are instructive and all BCT commanders should study them in order to understand the need to safeguard against creating an environment that could easily lead to trainee abuse and/or neglect. [In this experiment, 24 Stanford students were randomly selected to take on the role of guards and prisoners in a mock prison set up on the Stanford University campus. Scheduled to last two weeks, the experiment was terminated after six days as both guards and prisoners adapted to their roles more than had been anticipated. The guards became increasingly authoritative and ultimately subjected some of the prisoners to psychological torture. Many of the prisoners, meanwhile, passively accepted psychological abuse and, at the request of the guards, readily harassed their fellow prisoners who refused to fall into line and attempted to prevent the abuse.] Schofield's Definition of Discipline which declares that "the discipline which makes the Soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment" is a good starting point for guiding cadre behavior toward trainees. Simply honoring and living the Army Value of Respect – "treat[ing] others with dignity and respect while expecting others to do the same" – also goes a long way toward preventing an environment conducive to abuse and failing to fulfill the command requirement to "take care of Soldiers." Commanders should always keep in mind that today's trainees are our future leaders. Failing to take care of trainees' sets a poor example for our Army's newest, would-be Soldiers, and also retards the leadership development of our junior officer and NCO cadre who may forget what it means to truly "take care of Soldiers" and have to learn it anew when they return to the line. Ultimately, we must simply realize that "leadership is leadership." While trainees require stricter control and enforcement of discipline than more mature, seasoned Soldiers do, creating an environment in which treating trainees in a manner that we would not treat Soldiers in the Army and failing to take care of them is just wrong, anyway you slice it.

The shortage of cadre, total control environment of BCT, lack of discipline, experience, and maturity of most BCT trainees, and their reluctance to bring issues to the attention of cadre ultimately demands that leaders be at the top of their game in taking care of Soldiers to ensure that trainees' needs are being met. All of these factors create unique challenges for commanders in taking care of trainees in BCT and, if not

<sup>1</sup> Ensuring Soldiers are well-trained is arguably the most essential element of taking care of Soldiers but that is outside the scope and intent of this article which seeks to focus on "quality of life" type issues.

closely monitored, can combine to create a less than optimal training environment. Areas such as chow, mail, laundry, cleaning supplies, work orders, and pay are some of the areas of interest BCT commanders must pay special attention to as they can have a decided impact on trainees' morale, physical well-being, and general welfare. Cadre have to be ever alert to the needs of BCT trainees and commanders must establish good systems to help ensure those needs are being met in the variety of areas that affect the "morale, physical well-being, and general welfare" of trainees.<sup>1</sup>

### Chow



There is little argument that chow is one of the most important issues that affects trainees' morale and performance. Napoleon's observation that "an army marches on its stomach" is as true today as it was in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This fact is well-appreciated at Ft. Jackson which implemented the "Soldier Fueling Initiative" (SFI) two years ago. This initiative recognizes food as fuel that Soldiers need to complete the sometimes physically grueling tasks they are confronted with in Basic Combat Training. SFI seeks to ensure that the fuel trainees are provided is of high quality, matches their caloric requirements, and contains a good balance of protein, carbohydrates, fat, and other essential nutrients. The SFI also provides a variety of food choices and accounts for religious and dietary restrictions that vegetarians and various religions require.

With most Dining Facilities being contracted now and the SFI being a highly structured, programmed menu, there is little opportunity for commanders to weigh in on the type and quantity of food. Commanders do have several ways, however, in which they can influence the quality and presentation of meals in BCT. First, commanders should educate themselves on the vendor's contractual requirements and then conduct frequent inspections to ensure they are being met. Simple walk-throughs and observations will reveal if the main line and salad bars are being kept restocked, DFAC workers are responding promptly to trainees' requests, milk and juice stations are refilled as necessary, trainees are being given sufficient servings, and the facility is clean and sanitary. Commanders should also eat frequently in the DFAC and encourage their cadre to do the same to ensure that the food being prepared is of the highest quality. Cadre can always interface directly with the DFAC manager on any discrepancies they discover, fill out Interactive Customer Evaluation (ICE) feedback forms online or on provided ICE cards, or bring issues to the battalion chain-of-command for resolution with the contracting representative through the Directorate of Logistics.

Commanders also have other measures available to them to help influence the quality of trainees' dining experiences. One is choosing Meals-Ready-to-Eat (MREs) rather than "Hot A's" for ration cycles not eaten in the mess hall. Trainees overwhelmingly prefer MREs over Hot A's as MREs contain a greater variety and provide a more complete meal than Hot A's typically do. DFAC's are limited in what can be served in Hot A's and the serving size is often difficult to control resulting in the first trainees through the serving line getting too much and the last ones through getting too little or limited entrée choices. Commanders can also affect trainee chow by paying special attention to the environment within the Dining Facility during meals. TRADOC Regulation (TR) 350-6 prohibits cadre from depriving Soldiers of meals, restricting their meal choices, not giving them enough time to eat (a minimum of ten minutes), and unnecessarily disrupting the serving line. Leaders are directed to protect the dining time and recognize it "for the sole purpose of refueling to optimize performance."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> TRADOC Reg 350-6, para 2-6 (f), p28. Commanders need not read this (or anything else discussed in this article) as a mandate to "coddle" trainees and provide a relaxed, leisurely environment in the DFAC or elsewhere in BCT. DFAC's are on a tight schedule and trainees must be pushed through quickly. Drill Sergeants can still insist on discipline, restrict talking, and accomplish the task of refueling without coddling trainees.

### Mail

Anyone who has ever been deployed or otherwise cut-off from electronic communications with friends and loved ones knows the tremendous impact receiving a letter or “care package” from home can have on one’s morale. Trainees in BCT are no different. One needs only to observe a unit mail call and note the difference in looks on trainees’ faces between those who have received mail and those who haven’t to realize this truism. Unfortunately, Drill Sergeants can sometimes be very nonchalant in ensuring that mail call is carried out every day. Mail is power and some cadre wield it like a club, withholding it because of disciplinary infractions, making trainees do exercises to receive it, or simply forgetting to issue it at the end of a busy training day. Commanders must develop systems and provide oversight of mail delivery to ensure it is delivered promptly every day (including during field training). All cadre should be trained as mail handlers to ensure mail is being handled properly and that it is not delayed due to one Drill Sergeant’s absence. Most importantly, all cadre must be made to understand that receiving mail is a right, not a privilege, and that delaying its delivery or mishandling it is a crime subject to the UCMJ. Cadre acting as “mailmen” would be wise to adopt the unofficial “Postman’s Creed” and allow “neither snow nor rain nor heat nor gloom of night” to stay them “from the swift completion of their appointed rounds” when fulfilling their postal duties.

Recognizing the important impact that receiving mail has on morale, leaders who are truly concerned about the well-being of their Soldiers can take additional steps to ensure prompt and timely delivery of mail. Providing trainees with phone calls immediately upon arriving to the unit to inform loved ones of mailing addresses; sending out letters to Families within the first days of arrival with mailing addresses and encouraging loved ones to write; or even providing the mailing addresses to trainees while still at the reception station during the “Moment of Truth” are all measures leaders can take that will speed up the delivery of the initial pieces of mail. Commanders may also want to direct cadre to give trainees classes on how to properly label envelopes with return and sender’s addresses. In today’s digital era, many trainees have limited (or no) experience with “snail” mail and address labeling errors can result in returned mail and add delays in sending and receiving mail. Finally, commanders need to provide trainees opportunities to purchase stamps, paper, and envelopes and ensure systems are established for collecting trainees’ mail to send out.



### Laundry

The age-old quote that “time is of the essence” is readily accepted by anyone who has served in the Army for more than a day. BCT trainees with tightly controlled and managed schedules are especially appreciative of the truth of this maxim. While there is plenty of “hurry up and wait” time when trainees are waiting to conduct training, there is little discretionary time for them in which they get to decide how to spend it. While TR 350-6 mandates that all trainees be given “at least 1 hour of preparation time each day to take care of personal needs,” this is still precious little time to write letters, shower, get uniforms ready, or accomplish the myriad other personal tasks that must be completed every day.<sup>3</sup> In order to maximize the little personal time that trainees are afforded, commanders must work to ensure that a good laundry system is in place. Trainees can eat up a good chunk of their free time using the few working washers and dryers a unit may have if they have to do their own laundry.

<sup>3</sup> TRADOC Regulation 350-6, para 3-6 (a(2))

At Fort Jackson, all trainees are required to enroll in a contracted laundry turn-in service. Failing to ensure trainees are using this system wastes both their time and their money. In addition to scheduling laundry turn-in and pick-up times – and encouraging/mandating that all trainees use it – commanders must also establish a claims system to handle damaged and missing laundry issues and ensure that all trainees understand how to use it. This will require close cadre oversight as trainees are often hesitant to approach Drill Sergeants and will otherwise have to pay out of their own pocket to repair and/or replace the damaged or missing item. Cadre should follow-up after laundry has been returned and give trainees a specified amount of time and a procedure for filing claims. Leaders may also consider limiting the hours trainees may use the company laundry machines or restricting the items they may wash in them (e.g. physical fitness uniforms may be one of the exceptions you allow trainees to wash on their own) to further enforce use of the contracted laundry system.

### **Cleaning Supplies**

Another area that is prone to wasting trainees' time and money comes about as a result of not having a sufficient quantity of unit cleaning supplies available for them to clean the barracks. TR 350-6 is again clear in prohibiting units from "requiring or encouraging IET Soldiers to purchase common use items or common area cleaning supplies (to include toilet paper) with their own funds." If units do not have well-established systems for trainees to request and receive cleaning supplies though, they will do just that. Trainees' reluctance to notify Drill Sergeants of shortages and their desire to get the mission done and avoid corrective training/action for failing to do so will lead them to buying cleaning supplies with their own funds. Companies should have policies for requesting and receiving cleaning supplies and must ensure the policy is briefed and understood by the trainees. Commanders and First Sergeants should also conduct frequent inspections to confirm that the policy is being followed and to check the functionality of some cleaning supplies as brooms/mops which break frequently leaving trainees with inadequate equipment to accomplish the mission of keeping the barracks clean.

Maintaining cleaning supplies and equipment has a far greater importance than just saving trainees' money and time. The close, confined quarters of the "open bay" barracks that most BCT trainees live in places them at great risk for outbreaks of communicable illnesses. "Trainee crud" is a real threat and TR 350-6 contains a lengthy section (para 5-9) on recommended cleaning cycles and methods for helping control pests and containing the spread of illnesses that can have a serious negative impact on trainees' health. Making sure trainees have the needed cleaning supplies and equipment is thus as much a force protection issue as it is one of saving trainees money. Neglecting the overall hygiene of trainee barracks unnecessarily exposes them to illness which can disrupt the tight training schedule and prevent them from graduating on time. Commanders must ensure that they conduct regular inspections of living areas and cleaning supplies and put the "health" back in "health and welfare" inspections. A good cleaning supplies/equipment request system will also help trainees restock depleted stores and broken equipment while still maintaining good supply discipline. Supply sergeants and company executive officers should also maintain historical records of cleaning supply usage in order to be able to accurately forecast and reorder supplies for future cycles.

**Work Orders**

Ensuring the barracks' infrastructure is well-maintained is an equally important "quality of life" issue for trainees. There is no training value in taking a cold shower, having no heat or air conditioning, or not having properly functioning showers, sinks, toilets, etc. Once again, without a functioning battalion work order system to report and repair broken or malfunctioning HVAC, plumbing, or other barracks' infrastructure systems, trainees are too often willing to accept deficiencies as the norm, and may be hesitant to report them. Cadre who are not conducting regular inspections and/or are not finely attuned to trainee quality of life issues can easily remain ignorant of barracks' maintenance issues for several cycles. It is important to foster a command climate and environment in which

*Ensuring the barracks' infrastructure is well-maintained is an equally important "quality of life" issue for trainees. There is no training value in taking a cold shower, having no heat or air conditioning, or not having properly functioning showers, sinks, toilets, etc.*

cadre understand that the chain-of-command holds them accountable for the upkeep of their barracks and one in which trainees are briefed on the process for reporting deficiencies and are encouraged to use it.

As anyone who has worked with the Department of Public Works (DPW) knows, follow-up and remaining in close contact with DPW on submitted work orders is necessary to make any barrack's maintenance system work. Battalion Executive Officers must take an active role in interfacing between companies and DPW and have to hold Company Executive Officers and 1SG's accountable for monitoring submitted work orders and ensuring they are fixed in a timely manner. This is both a bottom-up and top-down system in which the entire chain-of-command plays an important role. Trainees and Drill Sergeants must report deficiencies up the chain-of-command as soon as possible and the senior leaders within the companies and battalion must monitor and ensure work orders are being completed by DPW in a timely manner.

**Pay**

Pay is near and dear to every Soldier's heart and can have a decided impact on a trainee's morale. Trainees receive minimal training in reading a Leave and Earnings Statement (LES), have little idea of what pay they are entitled to, and require a great deal of assistance in interpreting their LESs and fixing any pay deficiencies. Two of the most common pay problems experienced in BCT are delays in getting their initial pay and not receiving Basic Allowance for Housing. Both of these are typically a result of a trainee showing up at the Reception Battalion without the paperwork needed by Finance to process them into the Army pay system.

Commanders must closely review the Unit Commander's Financial Report (UCFR) during the initial pay periods a trainee is in BCT to ensure that all trainees pay is started and cadre must be specially attuned to trainee pay problems as trainees will often be slow to realize that they are not receiving all the pay they are entitled to. Further exasperating the problem is the lack of communication trainees have with loved ones back home who are often counting on their trainee's pay to pay bills. It is important that Welcome Letters and/or unit Facebook sites have unit contact information so that loved ones can contact the unit to help

resolve serious financial issues. The need to secure needed documents such as leases, marriage certificates, etc., will often require that trainees be given phone, fax, or internet privileges. Trainees in severe financial distress whose pay has been delayed for whatever reason may require assistance from Army Emergency Relief (AER) or an advance on pay if possible to help see them through until Finance is able to correct any errors. As anyone who has experienced pay problems knows, it is virtually impossible to focus on training or the task at hand – especially when loved ones at home are depending upon the money to put food on the table or keep a roof over their heads – until the pay issue is resolved.

### **Conclusion**


The wide scope of quality of life issues that BCT cadre must attend to constantly requires good systems and oversight from the chain-of-command. Personnel shortages and other BCT challenges do not relieve commanders of their legal responsibility to “promote and safeguard the morale, the physical Well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.” Regular trainee “sensing sessions” conducted by command teams at every level throughout the cycle are good ways to unearth problems that trainees are reluctant to identify to the chain-of-command or that cadre may have overlooked. Beyond the legal mandate and the fact that “taking care of Soldiers” is simply the right thing to do, commanders should recognize the opportunity to greatly enhance the performance of their trainees by ensuring their basic needs are being met. Quality training and a high quality of life go hand-in-hand. It is a time-honored adage in our Army that, “no one cares how much you know, until they know how much you care.” Trainees are much more likely to listen, pay attention to, and follow cadre who they trust, believe have their best interests at heart, and truly care about their success and well-being.<sup>4</sup> Finally, recognizing that today’s entry level trainees are our Army’s future leaders, modeling what it truly means to “take care of Soldiers” is an important part of the BCT mission of “transforming civilians into Soldiers.” By introducing them to one of the most important elements of leadership and command, we can begin the development of great Army leaders.

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***LTC Steven Delvaux is the Commander of 3rd Battalion, 13 Infantry Regiment, 193rd Infantry Brigade. CPT Jason Albrecht is the Commander of Delta Company, 3rd Battalion, 13th Infantry Regiment, 193rd Infantry Brigade.***

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<sup>4</sup> Over 20 years ago Drill Sergeant David Blouin wrote in “Sergeant’s Business” that “If a soldier knows you care about him, he’s more apt to work harder for you and the Army. The biggest thing I’ve learned as a leader...is to let a soldier know that you care for him, that you think a lot of him, and that you expect a lot from him.” Drill Sergeant David Blouin, in “Getting Back to the Basics.” Sergeants’ Business, Mar-Apr 1989, p. 5




# Auftragstaktik

**I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign....but simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations.**

**General of the Army Ulysses S. Grant,  
4 April 1864, instructions to General  
William Sherman, Personal memoirs  
of U. S. Grant, 1885.**

**Historically, military commanders have employed variations of two basic concepts of command: mission command and detailed command. While some have favored detailed command, the nature of operations and the patterns of military history point to the advantages of mission command. Mission command has been the Army's preferred style for exercising command since the 1980s. The concept traces its roots back to the German concept of Auftragstaktik, which translates roughly to mission-type tactics. Auftragstaktik held all German commissioned and noncommissioned officers dutybound to do whatever the situation required, as they personally saw it. Understanding and achieving the broader purpose of a task was the central idea behind this style of command. Commanders expected subordinates to act when opportunities arose.**



## Points to Ponder

LTC (R) Gerald Henderson

**W**e train a tremendous amount of Soldiers, regardless of the source; all will tell you that we train about half of all the Soldiers entering our Army and over half of the female Soldiers. With that training load comes a great deal of responsibility, a tremendous amount of synchronization, precision and unfortunately a great deal of friction. In all of this, we wade through the friction, urban myth, competition for resources and at the end of the ten week cycle, mamas and daddies from all over the nation show up here and are amazed at what we have accomplished in ten weeks, when they tried and failed to do the same thing in twenty years. We aspire to be the preeminent training center in the Department of Defense. That is a lofty goal, but one that is achievable with will, persistence, reflection, deliberate planning, cooperation and communication. I am not writing this article to specifically address that goal. I write it to discuss how we can become not only being the biggest training center, but edge us closer to being the best. I will tell you now that I don't have all the answers, in some cases all I have is questions or "points to ponder"

that through experience I know need to be openly discussed and resolved on a recurring basis.

The first topic involves our individual and collective responsibility to the principles of transforming civilians into Soldiers. One of the few paragraphs of TR 350- 6 that I choose to go back to and read periodically is the paragraphs describing the principles of transformation. The most telling part of those words is summed up in the sentences: "Immersion into the Army Profession of Arms embodies values, personal conduct, self-discipline, motivation, and task performance. Application of this critical concept ensures Soldiers learn through the example of everyone with whom they have contact and every activity in which they participate in or observe. Consistently and broadly applied, the IET environment will demonstrate the practical application of the Army Ethic and serve to establish the Army's standards for conduct, discipline, and relationships." This is an area in which I think we could grow. Many fail to understand that they have a part to play in setting these conditions. Our ability to

positively impact upon this process rests with every single individual, section and unit assigned to this installation. Obviously the focus of this writing is towards the Drill Sergeant and Company Commander, but it also speaks to each of us, no matter how distant we are from the training process, we have a responsibility to train through our example. So no matter if you are clerk in DHR, DFAC employee, CIIP employee, small arms repairman in the weapons pool or a supply clerk in a BCT Battalion, you are required to provide the Soldier with an example of what right looks like. Your attitude, competencies and example are what the Soldier uses to form his/her first and potentially lasting impression of Soldier, Civilian, contractor or even retiree and Family member. Think about that and ask yourself, do you make a difference, is your organization committed to this and if you aren't how do you go about changing that piece of our culture that you "own".

Related to this concept, but just as basic and just as critical is our understanding of our relationships to one another. If you ask yourself why Fort Jackson exists, hopefully you would answer with "to train Soldiers." An even more correct answer would be to "train and develop Soldiers, Sailors, NCOs, officers and civilians", because on a day to day basis, we do far more than just train basic combat training. When we enter into this concept, we look at that core task, we term those that provide services, supply, maintenance or care to those directly responsible for executing that core task with the relationship of "supporting" and those executing training as "supported." Seems pretty cut and dry and seems to make a great deal of sense, unfortunately it might not necessarily be understood or grounded into how we operate or how we view ourselves as related to others. Understood and acted upon, it keeps our focus and efforts

balanced, prioritized, synchronized and contributes to a healthy understanding of how we coexist. Without it, we struggle to do "routine things routinely." It shows up in friction, unwanted drama, and decisions that are elevated well above the desired "solved at the lowest level" possible. The majority of us on this installation are supporting, whether it's a staff member in the USAG, G - staff, 4/10<sup>th</sup> IN, hospital, NEC, MICC, CPAC, or other. We have important roles and functions, but none are more important than what we do in our linkage to supporting those that are training our force. Ask yourself within your organization, do your mission statements, goals, vision, services, budgets, operating hours, and prioritization reflect this



linkage. If the answer is no, then perhaps your organization lost its way, became focused on itself or higher and in doing so lost its relevancy. More so than words, this is about attitude, deeds and action. This is more about "the can do" than "the can't do" but make no mistake this is not quite as easy as it sounds. It takes mature and strong leadership. My experience with leading has proven that it is tougher going in supporting commands than it is supported commands and in the end if you ask the question "how are we doing" and can't accept the answer, then you are probably in the wrong line of work. That's the tough thing about being a supporter, you need alligator hide for skin.

The previous two points generally talk about the aspects of training support. I want to transition to training. Let me make one point early on, because I think we don't do ourselves justice sometimes. Training and training support are just flat out tough. They really are. We train extremely large numbers and we do so almost non-stop. We put a tremendous load on systems, facilities and infrastructure. We run a marathon, not a sprint and we have challenges that are unique to all other installations. One that is not different from any other training environment that I've ever been assigned, is how much freedom to maneuver is acceptable when instructors train students IAW with their respective course's program of instruction. We struggle sometimes when addressing how we balance a commander's or trainer's initiative and the adherence to the POI. Over the years we have shifted from one side of the pendulum swing back to the other. Let me say this now, one of the worst things that a leader can do in any environment is stifle or punish a subordinate leader's initiative. We all know the effects, it is one of the most damning, counterproductive and potentially lasting mistakes we can make. Let me also say that not having the same high standards throughout our ranks causes confusion, frustration within our command and does not meet the needs of our Army. As in all things, rightness lies somewhere in the middle.

Over the years, I have watched senior leader's, rightfully so, handle the issue very gingerly and almost always error on the side of a commander's freedom to choose a desired course of action within a relatively broad left and right limit. We have a great deal of "negotiables" but we also have "non-negotiable". Let's start with what I'd consider the one true, and rightfully so, non negotiable, that being the tasks that we teach. We don't choose what we teach, the Army does. When task selection boards as part of a POI review

are conducted, we have members that participate, but once selected we live by what we have agreed upon and we are steered by the needs of the operational Army and in some cases the Department of the Army. We train the task IAW the conditions and standards as outlined in the respective training support package, tied typically to our Common Skills Training Manual. Once Soldiers master that training and if time allows, we can change the conditions of the training task to take the training to a higher or more realistic level if the opportunity and desire exists.

So I've discussed the elephant in the room, now let's talk the semi-negotiables. For each training task and within the TSP there are lesson outlines, which serve as the instructor's template for teaching the task. They include things like motivational/instructional lead ins, historical examples and appropriate checks on learning. They are meant to ensure that no matter who teaches the class, the class will generally be taught to the same standard. They do however allow the instructor to put "themselves" into the effort. Instructors have the flexibility to inject their own personal experiences, choose current events to make a point as opposed to the provided historical example and to add to the instruction in a variety of ways of "personalizing" the instruction. What they can't do is take away from the instruction. This gives the individual instructor the opportunity based upon experience and competence to tailor the product to make it even better. In my experience this is what contributes to the selection of the typical instructors of the quarter/year.

Another semi-negotiable is the sequencing of what we teach. Within each Army course there is a course map, the course map serves as the proponent's example as how to best sequence the training tasks to achieve progression and achieve our crawl, walk, run training methodology. This is particularly critical

in physical readiness and marksmanship training. The course map is flexible however and if you think about how we lock in our training and then adjust at our T+1 training coordination meeting allows us to bend the sequence due to our limitations. While not necessarily a “positive example” of our freedom to maneuver, it does demonstrate that we cannot be a lock step, non thinking institution. In reality, this alone requires a great deal of thought, effort and initiative. In reality, no two training cycles will ever be the same. The time of year dictates the type of population that shows up, the weather, the size of fill, the stair stepped sequencing of companies, the constant turmoil of cadre transitions and the calendar itself all change variables so much so that every cycle becomes a “one of a kind.” If ever we were to encourage initiative, thought and flexibility, it takes place here.

One of the most significant negotiables that leaders have the greatest degree of initiative and latitude in planning training is when planning and conducting field training exercises. Commanders at every level have the opportunity to apply their knowledge and experience to tailor an exercise that incorporates realistic, collective training that allows for the integration, reinforcement and assessment of individual skills. Victory Forge, in particular, provides that culminating event that should pull all aspects of previous training into our cycle finale. Just my opinion, but this is one of the primary reasons that we have officers, particularly the very talented and experienced battalion commander population that we enjoy. If we are to set ourselves apart in terms of other training centers, this is our opportunity. This allows us to evaluate skills, leadership, values, teamwork in a tactical setting; to evaluate our cadre in

their training effectiveness and to add rigor and a sense of accomplishment in the Soldiers taking part of it. All builds to the Rites of Passage experience followed by graduation. Lastly, and sometimes this one is lost on us, the most significant negotiable by far is our commander’s determination on who becomes an American Soldier. There is no proponent, TSP, or outside influencer that makes that call. We do. That’s a broad brush of one of the biggest philosophical debates that we carry around with us day to day. One that is best fed by frequent, open and professional discussion. We all need to understand and embrace what we do within the left and right limits of acceptability.

Sometimes it’s easy to forget that our mission is typically tied to the training of an individual Soldier, not training teams, sections or squads or platoons. Many people have put a great deal of thought into what we do, why we do it and given us a degree of latitude to determine how we do it within the confines our fences. Sometimes it’s easy to forget that we have neighbors, that we have limitations that we all compete for the same AGR route, buses, weapons and ranges. Sometimes it’s easy to forget that we are inexplicably tied to one another, that one cannot exist without the other and that the reason has very little to do with our title or the patch that we wear. Sometimes we forget to think about why we draw a pay check although we’ll remember to avoid the PX on a Thursday. Sometimes we have to think rather than do and when we think, we quickly recognize that our success, whether individually and collectively is directly or indirectly tied to the quality of product that we produce, the American Soldier.

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*LTC (R) Gerald Henderson is the Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army Training Center and Fort Jackson*

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# ADP 6-22

## ARMY LEADERSHIP



**AUGUST 2012**

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**HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

## Foreword

Leadership is paramount to our profession. It is integral to our institutional success today and tomorrow. As we transition to meet the challenges of an increasingly complex and uncertain environment, our Army requires intelligent, competent, physically and mentally tough leaders of character. Decentralized operations require leaders at all levels that understand their environment, learn quickly, make sound decisions, and lead change. Because there are no predetermined solutions to problems, Army leaders must adapt their thinking, formations, and employment techniques to the specific situation they face. This requires an adaptable and innovative mind, a willingness to accept prudent risk in unfamiliar or rapidly changing situations, and an ability to adjust based on continuous assessment.

General of the Army Omar Bradley once remarked: “Leadership in a democratic army means firmness, not harshness; understanding, not weakness; generosity, not selfishness; pride, not egotism.”


His words continue to resonate today in both peace and war. This requires personal commitment, constant learning, self assessment, and passion for your Soldiers and units. Being a leader is not about giving orders, it’s about earning respect, leading by example, creating a positive climate, maximizing resources, inspiring others, and building teams to promote excellence. Along the way, you will make honest mistakes. You will face difficult decisions and dilemmas. This is all part of the process of learning the art of leadership. You must internalize the Army’s values, demonstrate unimpeachable integrity and character, and remain truthful in word and deed. Soldiers trust their leaders. Leaders must never break that trust, as trust is the bedrock of our profession.

My leader expectations are straightforward:

- Have a vision and lead change
- Be your formation’s moral and ethical compass
- Learn, think, adapt
- Balance risk and opportunity to retain the initiative
- Build agile, effective, high-performing teams
- Empower subordinates and underwrite risk
- Develop bold, adaptive, and broadened leaders
- Communicate—up, down, and laterally; tell the whole story

ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, describes our foundational leadership principles. I challenge each of you to study and build upon this doctrine to prepare yourselves, your peers, and your Soldiers to meet the challenges you are sure to face.

Army Strong!



RAYMOND T. ODIERNO  
GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY  
CHIEF OF STAFF

## ARMY LEADER DEFINED

1. Leadership, the lifeblood of an army, makes a difference every day in the United States Army. Since the formation of the Continental Army until today with Soldiers deployed around the globe, Army leaders have accepted the challenges before them. The United States Army has always had great leaders who have risen above hardships and have drawn on a range of leadership qualities to influence Soldiers, build units, and accomplish the mission.

2. Leadership is characterized by a complex mix of organizational, situational, and mission demands on a leader who applies personal qualities, abilities, and experiences to exert influence on the organization, its people, the situation, and the unfolding mission. Difficult and complex situations are the proving ground for leaders expected to make consistent timely, effective and just decisions.

*An Army leader is anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization.*

## PURPOSE OF LEADERSHIP

3. The Army requires leadership to make choices and establish unifying direction for the organization. Organizations have multiple sources to monitor and assess situations and provide input for decisions; however, a central leader must oversee and ultimately accept responsibility for the conduct of missions. Leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.


4. Leadership is a process of influence. Since first publishing leadership doctrine in 1948, the Army has consistently defined leadership as a process. This is significant because a process can be learned, monitored and improved. While personality and innate traits affect a process, the Army endorses the idea that good leadership does not just happen by chance but is a developable skill. A leader influences other people to accomplish a mission or fulfill a purpose. The means of influence include actions to convey motivation. Accomplishing the current mission is not enough—the leader is responsible for developing individuals and improving the organization for the near- and long-term.

## LEADERSHIP REQUIREMENTS MODEL

22. The Leadership Requirements Model conveys the expectations that the Army wants leaders to meet. A common model of leadership shows how different types of leaders work together and is useful for aligning leader development activities and personnel management practices and systems. One set of requirements consists of attributes of what leaders should be and know and the second is a set of competencies that the Army requires leaders to do. The single model organizes the disparate requirements and expectations of leaders at all levels of leadership. Figure 2. Army leadership requirements model

23. Leadership attributes are characteristics internal to a leader. Character is the essence of who a person is, what a person believes, how a person acts. The internalization of Army Values is one type of character attribute. Empathy is identifying and understanding what others think, feel and believe. Leaders of character who embrace the Army leader attributes and competencies will be authentic, positive leaders. While character relates to the internal identity of the leader, presence attributes relate how others see the leader and intellect relates to what abilities and knowledge the leader possesses to think and interact with others.

24. Leadership competencies are groups of related actions that the Army expects leaders to do—lead, develop and achieve. Core competencies are those groups of actions universal to leaders, across cohorts and throughout organizations.





## ***Ten weeks of Basic Combat Training: Where does Discipline fit in on your priorities?***

CPT Erik Johnson

**W**hat are your priorities as a commander? This is a question I have often asked myself ever since my first cycle training Soldiers here at Fort Jackson. Everyone has a different way of analyzing what they believe are the most important skills to teach their Soldiers in Training. Some commanders simply align or nest their priorities with those of their superiors. Others think back to what they remember as being important when they first entered the military. Some change their stance as they see cycles pass by and aren't happy with the product they create on graduation day. Some commanders haven't put much thought into priorities and instead give the same amount of effort to every task.

Along with trying some of these methods, I have asked a few of my closest friends what they think of the Soldiers who have recently graduated from IET. As close friends they don't sugar coat anything, and as commanders of various units ranging from MP, Armor, Engineer, and HHC companies they get to see the Soldiers I recently sent out into the Army. After talking together, they have all agreed that there are three things they want in their new Soldiers. They want Soldiers who are well disciplined, can keep up in Physical Training (PT), and have the basics of rifle marksmanship (BRM). Everything else they expect their junior leaders to teach their new Soldiers. After hearing this from them, I couldn't stop thinking about it for over a week, and how do I make sure that the Soldiers I

graduate are meeting my peers' expectations. PT and BRM seemed easy enough. They are testable skills that we can quantify which the Army and TRADOC have already given us minimum standards in which Soldiers in Training must meet in order to graduate. Simply enough, hit 23 out of 40 targets on qualification day in a reasonable amount of attempts, and score at least 50 points in each event on their end of cycle APFT or makeup test. Discipline, however, does not have an easy pre-laid out plan and test to ensure Soldiers meet a minimum standard. There is no TC 3-22.20 or TSP and POI to ensure Soldiers go through progressive training and meet the standards of discipline. Instead, the plan to instill discipline is left up to the companies and tasked to each and every Drill Sergeant on post.

After a recent CAAR, I pitched to my company an idea that was presented to the command teams. Skill x Will x Drill = Kill, with Kill being equivalent to the Soldier who is ready for war. After talking about this for a short time, I asked them if they thought there was a simple formula for Discipline. One of my Drill Sergeants jokingly came up with Pain x Fear x Repetition = Discipline. After a few laughs and a sharp look from my First Sergeant, he began to defend his position by explaining what he meant by Pain and Fear, and how it related to how he remembers first grasping discipline after getting tired of endless pushups and therefore

feared stepping out of line in front of his Drill Sergeants. This actually generated a lot of constructive discussion throughout the company, not only in this meeting but throughout the remaining cycle break.

Besides helping us look over how we instill discipline in our Soldiers and rework our programs, these formulas have also helped us reengage how we conduct training to ensure its effectiveness. The key ingredient to both formulas was the drill or repetition. A class on discipline and bay maintenance isn't anywhere near as effective as having every Soldier ready for a Drill Sergeant to inspect their bunks, wall lockers, and weapons every morning before first formation. Going through the instructional periods for drill and ceremony isn't as effective as ensuring the Soldiers march everywhere they go, to include the dining facility and the PT fields in the morning. The same goes for physical training, rifle marksmanship and the rest of the ten weeks of training. Our PT program is so effective because

Soldiers conduct it every day to the point that they memorize which exercise comes next. The repetition and sheer amount of training time ensures that Soldiers are performing to the desired level by the End of Course APFT.

The reason our BRM program is so effective every cycle is due to the fact that our Drill Sergeants spend so much time going over the fundamentals until qualification at BRM ten. Not only are there ten periods of BRM, which means at a minimum ten days of progressive training before qualification, but we begin training on fundamentals for a week before even going to the first range. Conversely, a reason I believe a lot of the training we conduct in BCT is not effective is due to the simple fact that we don't spend enough time

on each event. Quite simply, it is impossible to spend the same amount of time training each event to the same extent that we do on PT and BRM. The amount of training events that we cover between BRM ten and graduation is so overwhelming that many of the times we just go through the motions in order to check the block, or punch the ticket. We ensure that we hit the high points for training and make sure that everything is done safely, but are we really making sure that the training is effective?

Taking a look at previous units I have been in, a reflexive fire range is a fairly extensive training event when you add in all of the train up that goes with it. The training usually



begins after everyone qualifies on their assigned weapons, just like we do in BCT. Then the training progresses into Sergeants Time Training where individual squads will work on ready up drills and squad leaders are able to enforce proper techniques and safety when working with small numbers of Soldiers. This training eventually works its way up to company level training, at times going through days of dry fire and blank fire training on a range before the company Commander and First Sergeant validate the unit is ready for live rounds. Compare this to BCT where companies go to the Engagement Skills Trainer for one day and are firing live rounds downrange the next day. Training for one or two days on reflexive firing skills before conducting the live fire training is

extremely limited, especially considering these Soldiers have only been in the military for approximately four to five weeks.

The same considerations with training apply to the remainder of blue phase training. We push Soldiers through so much training in such a short amount of time that we lose a lot of the effectiveness of what we are trying to teach them. When Soldiers are exposed to hand grenades, buddy team live fire exercises, convoy training, and U.S. weapons all within a week of training, they cannot feasibly absorb



all of the information our Drill Sergeants are trying to teach. Each afternoon, leaders have to decide on whether or not they will conduct training and rehearsals for the following day and attempt to prepare their Soldiers for their next task, or whether they should retrain the Soldiers who had difficulties with the current day's training. Once again, we are losing out on the effectiveness of the training and in essence teaching young Soldiers bad habits without properly taking the time to correct their deficiencies.

Scheduling this much core training into a short time also has other negative side effects. As leaders are trying to decide whether to conduct rehearsals or retraining, they are missing out on other opportunities to develop their young Soldiers. At this point in BCT, these Soldiers in Training have finally begun to overcome the fear of interacting with Drill Sergeants. They are becoming curious about their future in AIT and the rest of their Army

careers. They have begun looking up to the Drill Sergeants as possible mentors rather than the guy in the funny hat who makes me do pushups. Unfortunately the opportunities that these factors present for development are in many cases wasted as Drill Sergeants are busy with the 1,001 tasks they have as leaders preparing for upcoming training.

This lack of time and increased tempo in training not only detracts from the Drill Sergeants conducting proper rehearsals and retraining, but it also takes away from time

they could be building upon the base level of discipline they created. As training in BCT is currently laid out, it certainly alludes to an idea that there are two priorities for Soldiers in Training. PT and BRM. These are the hard numbered, pass or fail tests where a passing score is required to move on. The training

throughout the remainder of the ten weeks have no clear priority to some commanders, which causes many to simply check the box.

***Maybe it's time to ask yourself and others around you- What are your priorities for a Soldier graduating from BCT?***

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***CPT Erik Johnson is the Commander of Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 13th Infantry Regiment, 193rd Infantry Brigade.***

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# **Risk.**

## **Attempt.**

**Comfort. Risk.**


**Both are enjoyable.**

**One we strive to create. One we try to minimize.**

**One can make us lazy. One can make us stronger.**

**When did you last risk failure?**

**When did you last leave your comfort zone?**





## *Understanding BCT Training Products*

*Thriso Hamilton Jr*

Programs of instruction (POI), training support packages (TSP), and lesson plans (LP) are a few of the documents linked to the Initial Military Training (IMT) environment. Unless you have benefitted from exposure to these documents, they are often misrepresented in definition, and under utilized in training. Commander's, executive officers, and in some cases our senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) leaders, within the Initial Entry Training (IET) environment, do not receive the benefit of attending Drill Sergeant School that prepares Drill Sergeants for training new Soldiers within a Basic Combat Training (BCT) unit. Drill Sergeants do, and are instructed and resourced from these training support packages and lesson plans. TSPs/LPs can be your best friend when used properly, or your worst enemy if ignored. Simply put, when used properly these documents assist trainers with instructing and developing the foundational skills expected of all Soldiers no matter where they are trained, or who the trainer may be. They set standards that are applicable to all Soldiers throughout the training base. The worst enemy statement becomes more relevant when conducting live fire and other high risk ranges when established safety measures are ignored or not enforced.

When I was a drill sergeant, more than two and a half decades ago, I didn't know what a TSP/LP was until about two plus

cycles into my tenure as a Drill Sergeant. Once discovered, I found it informative to have a document that set training standards expected of all Soldiers no matter the training event or unit of assignment. ***Following the TSP/LP didn't prevent me from using the techniques I learned in previous assignments, outside of TRADOC, in order to enhance the training experience of my Soldiers.*** What it did for me was set my right and left limits, and kept me focused on the desired outcome of the specific training event without creating my own standards. I also realized that training objectives and outcomes became clearer to my Soldiers through the creative reinforcement training that took place throughout the training cycle and not during the formal training event. The TSP/LP does **not** prevent leaders from creating techniques that support the TRADOC IET strategy within TRADOC Regulation 350-6. I challenge leaders to review chapter 3 because it discusses training and defines the tenets of this strategy.

Standards are a wonderful thing and the foundation of any successful training unit. Look at it this way. When you attend an officer education system (OES) or noncommissioned officer education system (NCOES) course, there are common standards that all students must meet regardless of branch or military occupational specialty (MOS). The Army values and core leadership attributes taught

to junior officers are the same regardless of their branch. Enlisted Soldiers that attend the warrior leader course (WLC) receive the same training based on the same standards no matter what region of the country they attend the course. Basic Combat Training standards should be no different; you cannot build a house without developing a strong foundation first. After you lay the foundation you can then add just about anything you want. If you build without a strong foundation the house may look good for a little while, but pretty soon deterioration will appear all over. This is an indicator that something is wrong foundationally. The bottom line is it will not last.

Basic combat training provides the foundation that all other skill sets and attributes can be built upon. When Soldiers leave their BCT units, no matter where they received their training, they are sent to different advance individual training (AIT) locations throughout the Army. Gaining units expect and deserve Soldiers that have met the standards established within the requisite TSPs/LPs. AIT units have a limited amount of time to reinforce tasks that Soldiers learned, to a common standard, in BCT. I know some leaders have the opinion that these training products are too restrictive and prevent a commander from exercising their creative instincts when training Soldiers. I beg to differ in that respect when you look at how best to provide all new Soldiers with a common skill set that introduces them to our Army. Operational units have an expectation that when Soldiers leave their initial entry training unit, they can perform a given set of warrior tasks and battle drills to a universal standard. Once commanders lead their units in building the foundation discussed earlier, they can put their creative cap on and develop events that challenge their Soldiers and put the skill sets learned to the test under strenuous conditions. BCT Commanders also have 40 hours of enhancement training time to reinforce/retrain

as they see fit. With that said, let's take a closer look at the training products you will utilize.

### ***Program of Instruction***

The POI is a requirements document that gives a general description of the course/ phase content, duration of instruction, and resources to conduct both peacetime and mobilization courses/phases. It provides a general description of the course or phase content, instruction methods and techniques, and a list of required resources to conduct training and education based on single class iterations. The POI is prepared for each version of a course, including peacetime/ mobilization training and education programs that are developed and conducted by TRADOC service schools, training centers, NCOAs, and USAR/ARNG training institutions. The POI is built from the requisite TSPs/LPs.



### ***What does this mean?***

THE POI IS SIMPLY A RESOURCE DOCUMENT THAT PROVIDES THE USER WITH A SINGLE SOURCE TO REVIEW ACTIONS, CONDITIONS, AND STANDARDS, AMONGST OTHER THINGS. The primary trainer (drill sergeants) has almost no use of it because the TSP/LP is a better reference for what they have to do. It costs money to train Soldiers and the POI documents: what the trainer needs, how much they need, and when the resources are needed based on training events. The POI (submitted no later

than 12 months before implementation) is one of the big three documents that generate funds for the training base. The other two are the Individual Training Plan (ITP) submitted 3-5 years out, and the Course Administrative Data (CAD) submitted 1-3 years out. All three, known as Training Requirements Analysis Systems (TRAS) documents, work in concert with each other to acquire the necessary resources in time and at the right place to accomplish the mission. I stated in my first paragraph that the documents used in training are often “misrepresented in definition” because it is confused with the TSP/LP as a primary teaching document. The POI is one of those documents because you will often hear leaders say teach the POI, or have you read the POI when discussing training. They are actually talking about the TSP/LP.



### Training Support Package

The TSP is a complete, exportable package integrating training products, materials, and/or information necessary to train one or more critical tasks. Its content will vary depending on the training site and user. The document is standardized and used by the instructor. It includes all the details required for the presentation.

### Lesson Plan

***The lesson plan is a detailed blueprint for presenting training by an instructor or Drill Sergeant. It prevents training from becoming haphazard and provides for training standardization.*** The product is built on the lesson outline and includes all the details required for the presentation. LPs are prepared in sufficient detail so that another

instructor who has a basic knowledge of the subject could present the lesson on short notice.

### What does this mean?

The TSP/LP is a packaged product that provides the trainer with everything they need to teach a given task. The TSP is normally the first 2-3 pages of the package and offers information that is useful to the instructor. All TSPs should have the following; TSP number and title, effective date, TSP users, security clearance/ access, foreign disclosure statement, purpose, and a table of contents.

The lesson plan makes up the majority of the package. I like to call this the “how to” document that lays out exactly what to train, and how to train our Soldiers. All of the resources referenced

in the POI come from the lesson plans. Within the lesson plan you will find useful information like: administrative data, course number, all courses associated with the LP, tasks taught or supported, academic hours, references, instructor requirements, and equipment required for instruction just to name a few. You will also find the important terminal learning objective (TLO), and all associated enabling learning objectives (ELO), and learning step activities (LSA). All BCT Soldiers are taught from the same documents. The idea is that Soldiers receiving SHARP training, for example, are taught using the same action, conditions, and standards at all training locations. A Soldier who is combat lifesaver (CLS) certified possess the same skill sets that all Soldiers receiving the same certification received, no matter where they attended training. Our Soldiers leave BCT

and disperse to many different AIT locations. The TSP/LP provides you with the means to meet this requirement. As stated earlier, the initial instructions lay the foundation that leads to success. After the foundation is built now is the time to get creative and put Soldiers under conditions that will challenge what they have learned, and build the confidence needed to survive under austere conditions.



Training products are not perfect so training developers rely on trainers, from all levels, to provide them with feedback to improve lesson plans and training support packages. Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028, recommended changes to publications and blank forms, is the vehicle to get your training ideas to the decision maker so our training remains relevant. The BCT POI was last reviewed from December 2009-January 2010 by leaders (stakeholders) from all training installations. These commanders, first sergeants, drill sergeants, and civilians, brought their ideas, and put in many hours to provide you with a product that is useful to

the trainer. The plan is to have another review in early FY13, which results in revisions that keep the training base in sync with the needs of the operational Army. The Training Support and Schools Directorate (TSSD), DCG-IMT cannot do this without leaders taking the time to fill out DA Form 2028 and sending the form to them for review and action.

BCT training products are accessed through Army Knowledge On-line (AKO). Simply log in; type basic combat training in the search box; click search, amongst the results you will see Basic Combat Training Doctrine and POI, click it and the training products will populate. This is the Training Support and Schools Directorate (TSSD) products site for BCT. When you have some time, please review the site. I can be reached through e-mail ([thriso.hamilton.civ@mail.mil](mailto:thriso.hamilton.civ@mail.mil)) or by calling 751-6698.

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# Female Combat Veterans with PTSD:

**What they wish you understood about their therapeutic journey.**

*Dr. Scottie Thomas*

Within the human health services there has been considerable debate about how best to deliver care to female combat veterans with PTSD. Almost 20% of women veterans of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have been diagnosed with PTSD. Clinicians across the country have previously provided care for a largely male population returning from war with PTSD, and it is for this reason that raises concern from female combat veterans about the capacity to provide high-quality care for them as they return from war with issues of PTSD. Understanding from their perspective the therapeutic needs and the response to the therapeutic environments during and after their deployment, will have important implications for informing program and treatment planning. Dobie et al. (2004) stated that many women in the military have suffered significant premilitary trauma that may predispose them to developing PTSD following a subsequent traumatic exposure. Given these facts, one may expect that the prevalence of PTSD would be relatively high among female combat veterans. The Department of Veterans Affairs, active military medical community and civilian clinicians have primary responsibility for addressing PTSD and other psychiatric disorders from war-zone exposure among female combat veterans. Accordingly, understanding from their world view lens the level of satisfaction with existing treatment plans for PTSD could indicate the need to explore their therapeutic environment, and develop strategies centered on any of their legitimate concerns.

One increasingly important resource for meeting women veterans' needs is the availability of appropriate healthcare (Street, Vogt, & Dutra, 2009)

To not do so could suggest that current treatment regimens are adequate, and how such an opinion could be extremely risky. While many studies have examined PTSD, few have examined female veterans' exposure to combat, and little is known about how different types of traumatic experiences, such as combat exposure, affect the likelihood of developing PTSD among female veterans (Zinzow et al., 2007). Captured below are results from my qualitative research where I interviewed female combat veterans from OEF and OIF that had completed their therapy with PTSD, and the thoughts that they wished everyone knew concerning their journey with PTSD.

### **The Female Journey through Past Wars**

Researchers and clinicians have questioned whether women experience distinct deployment stressors when compared with men, and whether deployment stressors have a different impact on the mental health of women and men (Vogt et al., 2005). More than 25,000 U.S. women served in Europe during World War I on an entrepreneurial basis, especially before 1917. They helped to nurse the wounded, provided food and other supplies to the military, served as telephone operators, entertained troops, and worked as journalists

(Goldstein, 2001). Over 150,000 American women served in the Women's Army Corps (WAC) during World War II. Some of the women assigned to the Ordnance Department computed the velocity of bullets, measured bomb fragments, mixed gunpowder, and loaded shells (Bellafaire, 2005).

About 10,000 U.S. female soldiers served during the Vietnam War (1965—1973). The majority, about 80 percent, worked as medical personnel in the Army or Air Force. But women were also deployed in non-medical positions, as secretaries for the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, which was located in Saigon, and on U.S. bases throughout the country. They also served as air traffic controllers, photographers, cartographers, with the Army Signal Corps, in intelligence, and in other jobs requiring security clearance. Nurses deployed to Vietnam who subsequently developed PTSD were studied decades after their wartime return (Scannell-Desch, 2005).

Bell, Roth and Weed (1998) examined numerous stressors both physical and psychological in a study of war time stressors and stress responses of women from the Persian Gulf War. The results of the study confirmed the call for more precise evaluation of wartime stressors in view of the changing gender composition of military forces and the subsequent increase of women in combat. In the past decade, women have come to play an increasing role in the U.S. armed forces.

Women in Iraq and Afghanistan have led convoys and faced improvised explosive devices on a daily basis. They have patrolled in cities and provided protection in areas that were unheard of for females in previous wars. They have been attacked and ambushed, received incoming artillery, rocket, and mortar fire, and have directed fire at the enemy. They have been responsible for the death of an enemy combatant, seen dead bodies or human remains, as well as seeing seriously injured Americans. They have seen ill or injured women or children whom they were unable to help, been wounded or injured, and have survived only due to the assistance of protective gear. They have had a buddy shot at or hit near them, cleared or searched

homes or buildings and have engaged in hand-to-hand combat.

These are all war-zone experiences that female combat veterans have lived through and that create risks associated with the development of PTSD. The combat experience of female veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars appears to be critical in identifying the therapeutic environment that would best address the experiences that led to the onset of PTSD. The lessons learned from the therapeutic experiences are not only relevant and fresh, but also offer valuable insights that can inform the treatment for future female soldiers who will follow in their footsteps in war zones around the world. Their stories can speak volumes, and their analysis of their therapeutic environment can contribute to the understanding of female combat veterans with PTSD.

### **The Journey through a Therapeutic Environment**

More than any other time in our history, women are coming home from war with PTSD. It is critical to understand from their own perspective, what therapeutic environment would best address their experiences that resulted in the onset of PTSD. Their therapeutic environment will have to be transformed in order to serve these women effectively. The healthcare delivery systems serving this population of veterans will be crucial in improving their mental status. Gaining a better understanding of the therapeutic experiences of this population will help the healthcare profession improve its ability to tailor treatment options for them. Iraq and Afghanistan female veterans diagnosed with PTSD have been shown to be in need of gender-specific treatment plans. Therefore, the element of treatment strategies is an important one to examine when considering this population.

### **The Initial Reception Experience**

The initial reception is defined as the first visit with a clinician at a VA, active military or civilian healthcare center. The initial reception and integration process has been characterized as contributing significantly to the female combat

veteran's impression of an effective therapeutic environment. The importance of an effective initial reception to this population of female combat veterans parallels with what they expect and what they are accustomed to when initially reporting to a new unit or location. The female veteran receives initial counseling that welcomes new members to a unit, thereby facilitating rapid adjustment to their new environment. This is probably the most important step in integrating veterans properly into a unit. Leaders make a strong effort to sponsor and receive veterans properly, set the standards, and make them part of the team. Female combat veterans thus expect to be welcomed and to have their needs addressed. Female participants in the study characterized their initial reception with clinicians as being very disappointing, and often evidencing a lack of interest by the clinician in establishing a treatment plan. Female combat veterans expressed discouragement about not having an understanding of the therapeutic environment and not being offered an introductory explanation of what was available to them in terms of individual treatment for PTSD.

The female combat veteran assumed that their initial reception into a therapeutic environment would include the chance to discuss their traumatic experiences with a clinician and to understand PTSD more clearly. Although the female combat veteran agreed that their subsequent visits were informative with regard to understanding the therapeutic plan and PTSD, their initial reception into the therapeutic environment was not effective. One important issue voiced by the combat veteran was that they were generalized and placed indistinguishably within a larger group of veterans with PTSD. The sense of being stripped of their individuality during the initial stages of the therapeutic process was of concern, as it related to how they expected their PTSD to be assessed. This concern may derive from the idea that each female combat veteran may require a different level of a specific intervention within a treatment program,

and at an individualized rate in order to yield positive change. Many female combat veterans arrived at the treatment facility carrying heavy emotional burdens and found that their attempts to share these burdens with clinicians fell on less than sympathetic or empathic ears.

“Some of the questions were kind of belittling, as if they didn't believe that I was there, or I was making it up, or certain incidents that was encountered. So it was really disheartening at first”.

The difficulty in understanding why their stories would not be embraced or believed appeared to have an impact on their therapeutic experience. It may be helpful for the VA, active military and civilian healthcare systems to review some general reception and integration techniques and explore and modify ineffective approaches used to receive female veterans into a therapeutic environment. Such an initiative may increase the likelihood of dispelling female veterans' negative perceptions of the initial reception

process. A aggravating point on which female combat veterans focus on when discussing the initial reception, is the overzealous attempt by clinicians to administer medication before any discussion of therapy.

There is a strong opposition to the immediate introduction of medication as a treatment for PTSD. An initial dialogue with the

prescribing clinician concerning the side effects, necessary dosages, and risks of medications and the proposed duration of treatment appeared to be important to the female combat veteran. They want their clinicians to enter an informative dialogue with them about both the medications and any alternative treatment options.

These female veterans also reported a hesitation to medicate themselves without having knowledge about their symptoms and other available treatments for PTSD. There was frequently a



sense of fear that they would become dependent on a drug that they knew nothing about. Their distaste for being rushed into medication during the introductory phase of the treatment process contributed to this uncomfortable feeling. Barber, Triffleman, and Marmar (2007) found that psychotherapy sessions take more time than typical medication-related examinations. The quickest approach may be to administer medication, but in the long term it may be better to psychologically assess female veterans with PTSD during the initial reception. Although recent guidelines suggest that psychotherapy should be initiated as a first-line treatment for PTSD before pharmacological options, medications are often necessary to palliate symptoms, and the pursuit of more effective medication is essential to developing a range of effective treatment options (Cukor et al., 2009). The initial steps in identifying PTSD in female veterans are critical to their therapeutic experience. This fact suggests that the initial assessment should include a complete psychiatric evaluation that specifically assesses for the symptoms of PTSD. As an effective therapeutic environment has great implications for future quality of life, effective initial reception by a therapist into the therapeutic process is crucial. An awareness of these veterans' initial experiences in the therapeutic process helps providers to understand and effectively establish an environment that focuses on physical, emotional, and spiritual health.

### Gender Specific Needs

In addition to understanding the initial reception and integration process for this population into a therapeutic environment, an evaluation of the appropriateness of gender-specific needs and the ability of clinicians to understand what works best for female patients is of interest to the female combat veterans as well.

Despite the advances across healthcare systems for female combat veterans, gender-related barriers to appropriate therapeutic environments still remain. As our understanding of PTSD evolves, it is imperative to re-examine the relevance of established therapeutic environments and modify

them based on descriptive information from research studies. For example, clinicians must consider the fact that female combat veterans desire gender-specific settings, and they should thus contemplate inclusion of a host of gender-specific factors that can create more relevant therapeutic environments. Washington et al. (2007) reported that women wanted their care providers to understand women's anatomy, women's diseases, and women's (especially women veterans') particular needs. They wanted to have confidence that their physician understood the implications for treatment and medication. Furthermore, given the increasing number of female veterans who seek help for PTSD, it is important to consider using different types of treatment approaches at different times within the therapeutic process, and to critically explore the optimal point at which various treatment techniques can be used.

“My first group was mostly men. In fact, it was just two women in there, myself and another young lady”.

These perceptions are consistent with prior studies that explored the experiences of other populations of female veterans in therapeutic environments. For example, in prior studies, female participants stated repeatedly and emphatically that they wanted gender-appropriate care and physicians who were sensitive to women's issues (Washington et al., 2007). Fontana, Rosenheck, and Desai (2010) found that gender-specific treatment environments in particular were a potent predictor of treatment use, supporting previous research that recommended program planning and design efforts to address every program treating female veterans on their return from war-zone service. Some female combat veterans indicate that the healthcare systems they visit often lack the characteristics that they would want in a comfortable therapeutic setting. Female combat veterans' perceptions of the healthcare systems available to them are often related to the level of knowledge of their availability. An educational or awareness-based approach is required to fill the information gap regarding

available female-specific services. Many military leaders outside the medical field are unaware of available services for female combat veterans with PTSD. An aggressive educational program within the leadership ranks concerning PTSD and the available healthcare needs for female service members could change outdated perceptions and fill problematic information gaps.

As a new generation of female combat veterans returns from war, it is critical that mental-health providers understand this population of veterans' war-zone experiences and readjustment concerns. Street et al. (2009) stated that another factor that may impact veteran women's homecoming adjustment experience is the "veteran woman" identity. Although this topic has received little empirical examination, the fact that women have not been extensively exposed to combat until recent wars may impact the general public's perception of women veterans. Comparison of female combat veterans from the current wars with those from previous conflicts may have important implications for informing treatment programs. These findings have important implications not only for the assessment of therapeutic environments, but also for treatment of female veterans with PTSD. Although treatment environments should ideally address all facets of PTSD female-focused treatment environments should especially emphasize gender-specific models. Many participants arrive at the therapeutic environment carrying heavy emotional burdens and find that sharing these burdens with an understanding female veteran, aided in the healing and recovery process. Some veterans think that therapists should understand the female body and the issues associated with it, as well as female emotions as they relate to the body and to stress. They want to have confidence that their therapist understand the treatment implications of these factors. They desire an environment where they could confide in one another and share their fears, their symptoms, their triumphs, and their pain in a female-only setting. Another issue raised in narratives related to gender needs was the group element of treatment.

These perceptions were linked to concerns about therapeutic environments that lack gender-specific settings to discuss their issues, and about

programs that seemed targeted at male veterans with PTSD. For instance, the female veterans often found themselves in the middle of male-dominated group sessions. As a result, many simply sat quietly during sessions, thus delaying their progress toward recovery. Specifically, the women wanted gender-specific group settings that catered to their particular needs. The female combat veteran reports that one of the most important factors contributing to their level of comfort in a therapeutic environment was the structured, specialized group therapy sessions.

"Men's views are totally different from a woman's view. And in that group women really didn't say much".

The female-only group intervention appeared to stimulate working together to solve problems, share effective coping strategies to better manage their symptoms, and depend on each other for support, suggesting its usefulness as an effective therapeutic environment for female combat veterans with PTSD. Interventions that may stimulate discussion related to female veterans' physiological and biological healthcare concerns are particularly notable in light of the vulnerability of these women, who may respond negatively to a male-dominated therapeutic setting. Given the expressed importance of gender-specific treatment needs, it may be that an increased focus on female-centered treatment environments would benefit female veterans. Many female combat veterans have experienced being part of male-dominated group sessions that had left them reluctant to discuss their issues. Some have said that, after one session, they simply stopped going to group sessions. This observation suggests that male-dominated group sessions can exacerbate a sense of isolation that works against therapeutic change for the female veteran.

### **Military and Combat Experienced Therapists**

Female combat veterans also are concerned about the availability of female therapists within active military healthcare facilities. Their concerns stem from the robust number of female patients and the relatively small number of staff members available

in these healthcare centers. Most believe that there were not enough staff members to consistently offer the option of choosing a female therapist. Most of them had experienced a rotation schedule that appointed therapists for patients as they came available, eliminating any chance of choosing a preferred therapist. In general, female combat veterans identified the understanding by clinicians of their journey as a female combat veteran as a characteristic that they most valued when participating in a PTSD treatment program. They stressed the importance of having a clinician who understands military service, including combat experience, as well as being female.

Although having knowledge and expertise were seen as important traits of a counselor, military and combat experience was most important to them. Many female veterans consistently value having a female clinician, but prefer one with military experience rather than one without it. Simply put, they preferred a type of counselor who understands the military culture. They often expressed that a clinician could not possibly understand their issues if she had not experienced the struggles of being female in the military and in a combat zone.

Problems persist with having clinicians who lacked a clear understanding of war-zone exposure trying to serve female veterans who had experienced traumatic events while in harm's way. They articulated emphatically the advantages of female counselors who understood the military culture, female personalities and their emotional responses to traumatic events. However, the desire for clinicians with military and combat experience could be difficult to satisfy, with the exception of the active component, as the number of therapists with this experience is quite low, especially in the civilian sector.



### Lack of PTSD Knowledge

Female combat veterans lack of own PTSD knowledge and their inability to recognize symptoms of PTSD appear to be a major concern. They often speak of recognizing and accepting their problems as the first step in the treatment process. They have expressed that the lack of PTSD knowledge as one factor preventing them from seeking help earlier. Although they initially lacked knowledge concerning PTSD, they often speak of knowing that something was not right with them, and ultimately they sought help due to these instincts. Returning female combat veterans expressed experiencing recurrent intrusive thoughts and images, as well as anxiety and panic in response to traumatic events witnessed during their tour of duty. Some struggled to identify their symptoms with PTSD, thus delaying their initial steps to address their specific problems.

"I knew that something wasn't clicking, something was seriously wrong with me. Because I was snappy all the time and mad all time. And I couldn't understand why little things would set me off."

Education concerning PTSD prior to deployment appears to be a key component of care for female veterans being deployed to war. Enlightening female veterans about PTSD symptoms should improve their understanding and recognition of these symptoms, reduce fear and shame about the symptoms, and spark greater awareness. With such understanding, stress reactions may seem more predictable for this population and fears about symptoms can be reduced. Additionally, PTSD symptoms may contribute to reducing the quality of life for these veterans by influencing

daily functional status and their perceptions of their current health. The concerns from female combat veterans regarding the lack of knowledge about PTSD have a number of interesting clinical and practical implications. For instance, they provide evidence that there is a gap in educating this population on PTSD symptomatology. It could be highly useful to enlighten members of the military concerning PTSD symptomatology prior to deployment and treatment options after deployment. Education is an important aspect of PTSD treatment. Persons with PTSD are often unaware of the cause of their symptoms. Just being able to understand that PTSD is a biological disease, often associated with irritability, insomnia, and other common symptoms, can help patients to understand the symptomatology and associated behavior (Ramaswamy et al., 2005). A military healthcare system that fails to educate its members about PTSD may place undue burdens on an already stressed cohort.

### Summary

There is a growing awareness among healthcare providers concerning the need for gender-specific treatment of female veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars who have been diagnosed with PTSD. Greater understanding of the therapeutic experiences of these veterans, in order to develop treatment plans conducive to their therapeutic

needs, is clearly a relevant issue. The growing number of females within the ranks of the armed forces and the projected continuing increase in those numbers during the next 20 years further justify the needed attention, as does the high prevalence rate of PTSD in female veterans. This new generation of combat veterans, who may be at risk for life disturbances driven by war experiences, will benefit from an investigation of the therapeutic environments provided to them upon their return. They want you to know their concerns. The therapeutic issues including their initial reception into therapy, the gender-specific needs of female veterans, and accessibility of care for future female combat veterans. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan offer a unique opportunity to examine therapeutic environments among female veterans with PTSD and consider whether those environments are adequate for today's female veteran. The relevance of therapeutic environments is important to consider as the healthcare profession seeks to serve a new generation of female combat veterans who live with PTSD.

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## **TRADITION**

Fort Jackson has had a vital role in preparing Americans to serve their country for over 95 years. When the installation was built in 1917, just like today, our nation was at war. Since then, numerous units have prepared for battle here—the 4th Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, and the 81st Infantry Division. More than 500,000 Soldiers trained here before fighting in World War II. The Soldiers who trained here before us leave us with a proud legacy and have inspired many to follow in their footsteps. Although the Army has changed tremendously over the years, we are all part of that lineage of brave Americans. All of us should be proud to be part of the tradition that defines this great installation.



## **TRAINING**

Training is our hallmark. With two Brigades, nine Battalions and 52 Companies focused solely on training Soldiers in Basic Combat Training (BCT), Fort Jackson, is the largest Initial Military Training Center in the U.S. Army. Roughly half of all Soldiers who complete Basic Combat Training in the United States Army do so at Fort Jackson, SC. We are also home to Advanced Individual Training units, the Soldier Support Institute, the Drill Sergeant School, Armed Forces Chaplain Center and School, TSSD, and the National Center for Credibility Assessment.



## **TRANSFORMATION**

Although we have a proud tradition on which to rely and inspire us, we must never lose sight of the future. To be effective, we must be willing and ready to accept change. Transformation means more than just modernizing our infrastructure. This means constantly challenging ourselves, our methods, and our means. Transformation is not a new concept here. Our responsibility as leaders hinges on our ability to continually evaluate and improve training. It is only by providing the best training that effective transformation from civilian into Soldier can occur.



# Mission Information Technology Staff in a New Era

Margaret Good and Jeff Blackwell



If there's one thing that Army leaders can agree on, it's that the way we work in the Information Technology (IT) field is continuously changing. Thanks to a combination of technological advances, cloud technology and division of responsibilities defined by Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information Management (C4IM) services list (Version 3.0); we are at the center of change once again. The utilization of time, services, and technology in the most efficient and effective manner needs to be analyzed by each organization. To remain static or "status quo", will not enable us to achieve BG Roberts' vision for Fort Jackson. IT is being utilized across a broad spectrum of training programs and will require advanced knowledge of automated solutions, as it plays such an integral part in Fort Jackson realizing its vision. Therefore, the transformation needs to be understood and embraced in order to succeed.

The C4IM services list is the primary document that defines the responsibilities of the Network Enterprise Center (NEC). This document is dynamic and continuously changing as technology changes and roles and responsibilities evolve. The NEC responsibilities are defined as baseline services. This includes maintaining common user systems. Common user systems are systems used for common functions with the standard operating system and software. Just a few short years ago the primary function of the unit S6 staff was to maintain the common user computer

systems. This meant upgrading the operating systems, troubleshooting and fixing any problems and installing mandatory security patches. The S6 shops were forced to stand up their own helpdesks and try to provide common user customer support while working to accomplish Commander's priorities at the same time. S6 staffs are normally involved in every event or project that goes on in a unit. Examples of S6 projects include: planning IT requirements for a unit that is going to move or have their building renovated; procurement of IT equipment to support upcoming requirements or an increase to the training load; classroom modernization; automate processes in order to decrease the amount of paper and ink used in the unit; install smart board technology in order to have more interactive meetings and save the digitized notes afterwards; replace bulletin boards with digital signage; procure and install unit video teleconference systems; acquire Virtual Battle Space 2 and military gaming to enhance training; utilize tablet technology for the staff and students; develop an internal continuity of operations plan, audio visual (A/V) support for balls, going away dinners, Dining In/Out; the list goes on and on... and on.

*There is no doubt that there is a tremendous amount of work placed on the shoulders of the S6s. However, with the NEC providing baseline services to maintain end user systems, S6s are postured now, better than ever before, to complete the project management responsibilities of their positions. If*

*we demonstrate the discipline necessary to align tasks appropriately, we can leverage technology to help Fort Jackson become the preeminent training center in the Department of Defense.*

G6 / S6 (not all inclusive)	NEC (not all inclusive)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In and out processing, account requests and resource access</li> <li>• Advise the command on Information Technology (IT) and tactical communications</li> <li>• Assist units with all aspects of IT functions</li> <li>• Cellular contract</li> <li>• End user training</li> <li>• Copier contract</li> <li>• Classroom Enterprise requests, coordination and maintenance</li> <li>• IT procurement, new requirements and life cycle</li> <li>• Organization Inspection Program (OIP) Inspectors</li> <li>• Support mission specific applications (Victory Block Leave, Safety Inspection Automated Record System (SIARS), Smartrack)</li> <li>• Tactical communication procurement and installation</li> <li>• Taskings from TRADOC</li> <li>• Track and plan Information Assurance training and certification</li> <li>• Unit VTC support</li> <li>• Visual support for major events</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Approve software and hardware for network use</li> <li>• Access to bridge for unit VTCs</li> <li>• Create and maintain user network, email, blackberry accounts and group access</li> <li>• Install, configure, troubleshoot and repair end user hardware and software (non-mission specific)</li> <li>• Upgrade systems to Windows 7</li> <li>• Provide and maintain shared file servers and access control</li> <li>• Provide Email services and support</li> <li>• Provide Land Mobile Radio (LMR) and frequency support</li> <li>• Provide Network services and support including infrastructure maintenance and planning</li> <li>• Post video teleconference (VTC) center</li> <li>• House server farm for mission and common user applications</li> <li>• Taskings from NETCOM</li> <li>• Telephone support including, new and change requests, line outages and voicemail</li> </ul>

Often times S6s and their IT staffs remain entrenched in providing baseline services even though it is no longer their responsibility. S6 personnel generally have a deep sense of commitment to “fixing” a computer, peripheral, or network related issue. Unfortunately, this can be a detriment to mission accomplishment when an individual gets so caught up trying to repair, reload or troubleshoot a problem instead of referring the user to get assistance through the Enterprise Service Desk (ESD). IT Personnel are all too often caught between their own desire to provide a service as they previously have, versus making a timely judgment call to transfer the service problem to the appropriate NEC personnel by means of an ESD work order. The loss of precious man-hours can often be attributed to this. Since the Army has joined the enterprise and standardized many services, some changes are made or pushed down from the distant end that the S6 IT staffs are unaware of. With no knowledge of the changes that were made, they may spend hours trying to fix a problem beyond their control. All the while, the NEC may be able to fix the problem quickly, as they are aware of current configurations and security settings being pushed to the system. It is difficult for leaders and cadre when their S6, who used to fix their computer at their beck and call, is now their staff officer. In order to get their computer fixed, they now have to go through the ESD work order process.

In the past, the NEC was not structured (manned) to perform touch labor. That is no longer the case. The NEC has significantly increased their IT staff to provide much of the break/ fix services that used to fall under the S6 purview. In most cases, the NEC is able to address critical work orders quickly, with

the reliance of solid communication from the unit S6 to the NEC customer service representative and use of the ESD work order process.


It can be difficult for a technical manager, who is used to being hands-on in nature, to be transformed into a staff officer. As a master technician, they are usually in full control of the issues at hand, where as a staff officer, they must utilize their skills as a coordinator and communicator in order to be successful. Below is a list of do’s and don’ts that may provide insight into how an S6 can accomplish success during these challenging times and avoid common pitfalls.

### **Stay focused**

**Do** assess the severity of the problem that has been brought to your attention. Is it mission critical, is it time sensitive, and is this covered under baseline services? After you have made the assessment you can refer the requester to the enterprise helpdesk, recommend a work around or schedule a time to address the problem and assign it to the appropriate personnel in your shop. Have the discipline to stay mission focused.

**Do** use technology that will allow you to remote into systems to assist users on mission specific software or user level configuration. This will save countless hours and allow you to assist more personnel faster. It is good to get out of the office to see what is going on in the units and how you might be of assistance, however these visits should be planned and you should not have to stop what you are doing and leave your office whenever you receive a call.

**Don’t** let others manage your time. It is very



important to provide good customer service, however there is an art to balancing pleasing others and getting your assigned tasks complete. Don't be derailed by bad time management. You can't always spend a large amount of time to address inconveniences. Be able to make the determination between what is an inconvenience and what is mission critical and dedicate resources appropriately.

**Don't** run an internal helpdesk.

**Don't** feel bad or make excuses when directing people to place work orders with the enterprise service desk (dial 15). This is the way the Army is structured for several reasons previously mentioned.

**Do** keep lists of all projects and tasks; choose what you will concentrate on each day. Close out each day with a list of what you worked on, have your staff do the same. Sometimes we do so much and are moving so fast, we fail to inform our bosses of what we've accomplished. This will help us capture our accomplishments. Additionally, it will allow us to self assess and see if we are spending time on the right tasks.

**Do** find your value in enhancing your unit's ability to perform its mission by leveraging technology and training. Concentrate on how we can enhance training, automate processes, and make things easier and more efficient.

### **Coordinate and Communicate**

**Do** concentrate on effective coordination. Classroom installations require a lot of close coordination between the unit, contractors and the NEC. You will need to insert yourself into the process and coordinate with all parties to ensure a timely delivery of service without interruption of the unit's mission. Identify potential show stoppers ahead of time so you can prevent them from happening. Good coordination is an art, not everything is black and white as far as who should do what and when. Coordinating tactfully and keeping the team approach is important in order to keep all parties working toward a common goal.

**Do** meet with your staff every morning. Since the pace of an S6 office is fast and missions often change it is important to get your team focused daily.

**Do** communicate with your command and customers on the status of requests and projects. Even if you can't meet their desired suspense it is better to tell them the status than for them to have to ask for a status. This will show that you are responsive and care about their requests.

**Don't** place a work order and then wait for weeks or months for the work to be complete. This goes for work orders to the NEC as well as Classroom Enterprise work orders. If the work is critical or if you have waited for a reasonable amount of time, then additional communication is required. The work order information will need to be brought to the attention of the G6, NEC customer service representative or classroom programs manger. Don't wait until something has been down for months and has become a Commander's issue.

**Do** understand why certain IT initiatives are under way. If you have concerns, address them to the right people. If the decision has been made, get everyone on board and start the information campaign early. Attitude can make such a difference in perception, which can be the difference in users fighting change or embracing it.

**Don't** be a naysayer. Talking bad about the NEC, other Army IT agencies or initiatives does not help Fort Jackson move forward.

### **Empower your leadership and end users**

**Do** educate leadership and end users. Educate people on the proper procedures to receive end user support. Educate your users on setting up email, mapping drives, configuring applications, and on the newly installed classroom technology just to name a few. Some IT professionals like to keep information to themselves because it makes them feel needed and people think they are smart if they can "work their magic". It is much better to empower your users by teaching them how to work

the magic on applications themselves. They will still think you're smart.

**Do** develop a more self sufficient workforce. Create user guides that reference commonly asked questions and procedures. Recommend specific advanced training for personnel. Local SharePoint, PowerPoint and Excel classes are available. This way the end user can also be the subject matter expert on the applications they need do their job.

**Don't** look for a way to say no.

**Do** look for a way to understand the intent of a requirement or request and come up with a plan to support that intent within regulation and resources available.

**Do** explain technology in layman terms. It's not impressive to talk in techno babble to someone who doesn't understand it. An effective communicator is capable of explaining things in a way that the average user can understand. This is easier said than done, the first step is to fully understand the technology yourself.



**Utilize resources available**

**Do** utilize personnel resources available. The Warrior Transition Unit (WTU) sometimes has personnel available to work while they are assigned at WTU as long as they can be released to make all of their medical appointments. They may not be signal Soldiers but there are a lot of functions they can accomplish for an S6 office, such as keeping the Army Training and Certification Tracking System (ATCTS) up to date and distributing and configuring blackberries. More information

about WTU personnel can be requested through the WTU office. Interns from the SC Vocational Rehabilitation Department are available for up to 12 weeks at a time. They are highly trained and certified and are value added to the team. You may request an intern through the G6 office.

**Do** stay current on technical training and the Civilian Education System (CES) training. Share ideas with other IT professionals by attending G6 and NEC meetings, vender exhibits and conferences to learn about new technology that might help Fort Jackson achieve its vision.

At a glance it is quite obvious that the Army has increasingly turned toward an information-driven, technologically delivered set of resources that relies heavily on a responsive system of technology available 24/7. With the proper alignment of duties, disciplined IT professionals and leadership, we can fully utilize the resources available to enhance technology on Fort Jackson and become the preeminent training center in the Department of Defense.

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***Margaret Good, G6 and Jeff Blackwell, Deputy G6 have previously served as Brigade S6s in the 171<sup>st</sup> Infantry Brigade and 193<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Brigade respectively.***

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**The person on top of the mountain  
did not fall there.**

**Unknown**

# Keys to Leadership



By CPT Douglas Cruise

***“A true leader has the confidence to stand alone, the courage to make tough decisions, and the compassion to listen to the needs of others. He does not set out to be a leader, but becomes one by the equality of his actions and the integrity of his intent.”***

**General MacArthur**

General MacArthur spoke wise words of what it takes to be a great leader. Not only does it take courage, compassion, and integrity to be a leader, but it also takes great communication skills, motivation, and honesty. Although there are many attributes and competencies that make a great leader, this article will focus on the important role communication, motivation and honesty have in an individual leader's development.

What do you think of when you hear the word leadership? You may think of significant individuals that impacted history, whether it is General George Washington, President John F. Kennedy, or Dr. Martin Luther King. All these leaders had something in common; they utilized the necessary characteristics General MacArthur spoke of in developing their leadership abilities, therefore providing the inspiration necessary to make a change and to use their strength to make a difference to impact others. In general, leadership can be stated as someone influencing others to achieve a goal, it just depends what attributes and competencies that leader utilizes that determines how successful they are at achieving their goal. Everyone has the potential to be a great leader; you

may not become a well known or a famous leader, but you will definitely influence an untold number of Soldiers throughout your career.

So how do you become a leader? Before you can lead others, you must be able to lead yourself. If you are confident and have self-awareness you are more likely to be a successful leader. In Ray Davis' book 'Leadership Starts With You', the author says:

*“Having the ability to lead yourself independently and authentically (self leadership) regardless of your career or position in the company is an essential quality that each leader should develop in order to become effective. To lead yourself, accept yourself, and be yourself. Leaders who develop self-awareness have more positive self-image, find it easier to accept themselves and be their own independent person, authentic in every regard.”*

As Ray Davis states, an individual must first develop them self before they can effectively

and successfully lead others. A key part of that development is focused on effective communication. Communication is an essential competency of a successful leader. To influence and lead Soldiers you must know how to effectively communicate. Communication is vital; you need to insure your Soldiers effectively accomplish the mission or task and your superiors are properly informed in order for them to make effective decisions.

For any task or process, there has to be feedback for communication to be successful. If a leader just demands Soldiers follow orders without knowing the intent of those orders or assigns a task without guidance; they have failed in influencing others. In essence they have created an environment that breeds potential for an immoral or unauthorized act to occur. Therefore, if a leader explains their intent their Soldiers about what they want or expect done and communicates to them a level of understanding, the leader will provide their Soldiers with the proper guidance that will allow for the successful accomplishment of the mission or task.

Motivation is another trait that builds a great leader. Leaders should encourage and inspire their Soldiers by leading from the front and providing them with an example to follow. James Hodges, retired Vice President of Merrill Lynch wrote an article in the New York Times titled "The Leadership Genius of George Washington" that highlighted how General Washington lead by example and motivated his Soldiers during the Revolutionary War.

*"One bitterly cold morning I (Washington) rode by a small group of men sharing a bottle. I greeted them affably and proceeded on. One called out, 'General, won't you have a drink with us?' I turned back, accepted the bottle, returned it with thanks and started to ride on. It warmed my heart to hear him shout, 'Sir, because you have shared yourself with us, we are willing to shed our heart's blood for you.'*

That being stated, a Soldier who feels appreciated and respected will work harder to uphold and even improve such acknowledgment. George Washington believed that being beside his men during the fighting was an act of motivation. In the same article by Hodge, Washington says:

*"I was loyal to my men's welfare by caring deeply for them. By my every deed and word I conveyed my concern for them. During the long and exhausting years of warfare, I did not take a day of furlough. Except for the time I was away on official business, I was with the men every single day but eleven days when I was too sick for duty. Seeing me out in the miserable cold and wet with them they knew I was not back at headquarters warming my hindquarters before the fire. My loyalty to the men paid off for they remained true to me and to the cause we represented"*



A leader that stands and works besides his Soldiers, leading from the front, demonstrates to them that he respects and cares for their well being and also recognizes the importance of their duties to the success of the mission. George Washington proved this by working hard beside his men; his troops were motivated and gained courage and strength to fight hard during the long war.

Honesty is another attribute essential in the development of a leader. A leader should create honesty and trust with his Soldiers and superiors to establish a positive environment. Building trust can be accomplished simply by holding to your commitments and your word. This sometimes will require you to go beyond the limit but in the end will create a positive environment for everyone. As long as you keep those commitments and promises, respect will be in place and trust will continue to grow.



Honesty will not only build strong relationships and a strong environment, but it will also teach your Soldiers and superiors that you have the utmost trust and confidence in their ability to accomplish the mission. It is essential to maintain this honesty and trust. If a leader misleads or discourages his Soldiers, that relationship can crumble and all their goals of being an effective leader can be destroyed. Usually, people lose trust in their leaders due to the fact that they were not completely honest with them.

There are many attributes and competencies in the Leadership Requirements Model in the new ADP 6-22, Army Leadership that can assist a leader to become successful. You are never going to be strong in all of the attributes and competencies listed in the LRM, but through self-awareness you can identify your strengths and weaknesses. Once identified, you can develop a plan for self-improvement and development.

In summary, I believe you can build a solid foundation as a leader by focusing your self-development on improving your communication skills, how you influence, inspire and motivate your Soldiers and by building trust and being honest with them.

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***CPT Douglas Cruise is the Commander of Delta Company, 2nd Battalion, 13th Infantry Regiment, 193rd Infantry Brigade.***

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**WHAT REALLY COUNTS: MEN WHO WILL FIGHT  
GENERAL MACARTHUR'S ORDER TO GENERAL EICHELBERGER**

"Bob," said MacArthur in a grim voice, "I'm putting you in command at Buna. Relieve Harding. I am sending you in, Bob, and I want you to remove all officers who won't fight. Relieve Regimental and Battalion Commanders; if necessary, put Sergeants in Charge of Battalions and Corporals in charge of Companies --- anyone who will fight. Time is of the essence. The Japanese may land Regiments any night."

General MacArthur strode down the breezy veranda again. He said he had reports that American Soldiers were throwing away their weapons and running from the enemy. Then he stopped short and spoke with emphasis. He wanted no misunderstandings about my assignment.

"Bob," he said, "I want you to take Buna, or not come back alive." He paused a moment and then, without looking at Byers, pointed a finger. "And that goes for your Chief of Staff too. Do you understand?" "Yes Sir," I said.

# *Jackson Journal* **Articles Needed**

The Jackson Journal is always in need of articles for publication. Topics for articles can include any aspect of training or leading Soldiers in Initial Military Training (IMT). If you are unsure whether a topic is suitable, please contact us.

Feature articles are usually between 2,000 and 4,000 words (but those are not rigid guidelines). We prefer clear, correct, concise, and consistent wording expressed in the active voice. Also, please spell out all acronyms and abbreviations the first time you use them.

Photographs or graphics that support your article are encouraged when you submit your article, please include the original electronic file of all graphs (jpeg, power point, etc).

Submit articles NLT 1 December 2012 for the January 2013 issue by email to: michael.ryan9@us.army.mil or john.d.philibert.civ@mail.mil


“A good company idea in tactics is likely to remain confined to one company indefinitely, even though it would be of benefit to the whole military establishment”.

*S.L.A. Marshall*

*Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command, 1947*

Add to your

# Reading List





***Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest***  
Stephen E. Ambrose // New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001

Historian Stephen Ambrose tells the story of the men of Company E, 506th Parachute Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, from recruitment through the end of World War II in Europe. The author compiled hours of interviews with many of the veterans themselves and poured through journals and letters as well. The book is a story of sacrifice and heroism by a unit that suffered a 150-percent casualty rate and that considered the Purple Heart a badge of honor.

***The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us and What We Can Do About It***  
Joshua Cooper Ramo // New York: Back Bay Books, 2010


This book challenges conventional assumptions, world views, and thinking in an increasingly complex world. The author proposes controversial ways of considering global challenges, such as studying why Hezbollah is the most efficiently run Islamic militant group. Ramo uses economics, history, complexity theory, and network science to describe an ambiguous reality that has many innovative possibilities.



***Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam***  
H. R. McMaster // New York: Harper Perennial, 1998

In a masterful study of military strategy gone awry, the author (a professional Soldier) argues persuasively that President Lyndon B. Johnson wanted to fight the war on poverty, not the war in Vietnam, and that the president made decisions he believed would allow him to do both. The result was a recipe for disaster that the Joint Chiefs of Staff exacerbated by failing to provide the president with their best advice. *Dereliction of Duty* is a cautionary tale about how military and civilian leadership failed at the highest levels and stumbled into a war that appeared to have no logical culmination.


Early on 7 December 1941, six aircraft carriers of the Imperial Japanese Navy brought some of Japan's most skilled pilots and hundreds of well-equipped aircraft across the Pacific Ocean with the intent of disabling the US Pacific Fleet before it could enter the fight. After two hours of bombing and strafing by "Val" dive bombers, "Kate" torpedo planes, and "Zero" fighters, nearly 2,400 American lives had been taken and a country of isolationists clamored for war.



**PEARL HARBOR**

**12.07.41**

**0755 HOURS**



The USS Arizona Memorial is built over the remains of the sunken battleship USS Arizona, the final resting place for many of the 1,177 crewmen killed on December 7, 1941 when their ship was bombed by Japanese Naval Forces. This loss of life represents over half of the Americans killed during the worst naval disaster in American history.