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# INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING JOURNAL

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## USABCTCoE Commanding General's Comments

By: BG Bradley May  
Commander, USABCTCoE

Welcome to the final edition of the IET Journal. Don't worry, we're not leaving, we will simply be changing the name to the IMT Journal starting with the next edition as part of the creation of the new IMT Command under LTG Mark Hertling. Keep sending in those stories and training ideas.

It is always impressive to see the vast number of ideas, strategies, and directions leaders are taking as they try to improve the quality of Soldiers training in their units. From comprehensive combat operations to fighting hand-to-hand, leader innovation and Soldier adaptability can only result in a better outcome...Soldiers prepared, ready, and able to support their first unit of assignment.

A critical part of readiness must include the health and welfare of our Soldiers. We open this edition with an article discussing the historical impact of the H1N1 virus and the difference that leadership makes. I encourage all leaders to take the lessons of the past to heart as they take the necessary steps to protect their Soldiers and Family during this dangerous flu season.

Victory Starts Here!

## The 1918 Influenza Pandemic: A Historical Vignette

By: CPT Eric Marshall  
Commander, B/1-48 Infantry

On April 6, 1917 the US declared war on Germany with an Army only 110,000 people strong. The Army and Marines would recruit or draft over 2 million men before engaging in combat in the spring of 1918. This surge of troops from across the geographic and social spectrum, through cramped domestic cantonments, and up to the front lines in France, created a "tinderbox" for the influenza virus to ignite. The virus exploded in September 1918, ultimately infecting one third of the earth's population and killing 10-20% of those it infected. In the US alone 675,000 people died, more than American combat-related deaths in WWI. 21 million people died worldwide. The most horrible characteristic of the disease was that it targeted those in their twenties and thirties. Eight to ten percent of young adults worldwide died, consumed by the virus with exceptional rapidity.

The influenza pandemic of 1918 is a sobering lesson on the lethality of the H1N1 strain of influenza and the particular vulnerability of IET Soldiers to the strain. The purpose of this vignette is to allow history to provoke military leaders to embrace their responsibilities in disease prevention, control, and response. It is not intended to contribute to the excessive alarmism that may be apparent in the popular press. Unless otherwise noted, all facts and statistics were drawn from John M. Barry's book and *New York Times* bestseller, *The Great Influenza* (2005).

### Origin and Spread

The virus that caused the 1918 pandemic was H1N1 influenza. The virus acquired the misnomer of "Spanish Flu," not because it originated in Spain, but because Spain, being neutral in WWI, did not censor its press and was therefore the first nation to publically acknowledge the epidemic. Indeed, most epidemiologists track the origin of

### Why Do Flu Viruses Occur in Waves?

Viruses demonstrate a phenomenon known as passage, an ability to adapt to the environment. As a virus passes from animal to animal, it may undergo rapid mutations that increase its virulence or lethality. A virus may kill too efficiently and, as a result, recede back to a more mild form. Hence, the influenza virus typically occurs in waves, tending more to a stable form until enough fuel is available to consume relentlessly.

## The 1918 Influenza Pandemic cont...

the disease to Haskell County, Kansas, where dozens of people in isolated farms across the county were diagnosed with a “severe type” of influenza in February 1918. By late-March the intense symptoms disappeared. With its sparse population, the disease may have been confined to Haskell County, except for the war.

Inside the Fort Riley reservation, 300 miles from Haskell County, Camp Funston provided initial entry training to 56,000 Army recruits (second largest at the time). Hastily constructed to train the draft’s expected surge, the camp’s inadequately heated barracks were overcrowded and its hospital unfinished, under-resourced and understaffed. Recruiting buses maintained a constant flow of traffic between Camp Funston and Haskell County. In March 1918, over 1,100 Soldiers required hospitalization from the flu, 38 died. Though a high number by today’s standards, this relatively mild form



Figure 1 – Camp Funston, Kansas

of the virus brought no alarm and Camp Funston continued its substantial flow of men to other American bases and Europe unabated. In total, 24 of 36 Army camps, and 50 adjacent cities experienced a flu epidemic that spring. This initial wave spread internationally to France, Germany, Britain, and Spain. Germany’s Erich von Ludendorff postponed and ultimately abbreviated his last great offensive on account of the flu debilitating his army’s ranks. Generally, symptoms were mild compared to the suffering and decimation that would come in the fall. After several days the pestilence passed and seemed to disappear. The virus, however, did not disappear.


The second wave came almost simultaneously to three different continents in late-August – Brest, Sierra Leon, and Boston. These three major ports dispersed the virus uncontrollably, now with a significantly higher death rate. Camp Devens was an IET cantonment near Boston that received and trained two divisions of selectees. In a single day, 1,543 Soldiers reported ill with influenza. On September 22, 20% of the camp was on sick report and 75% of those were hospitalized. When pneumonia accompanied the flu, the death toll often soon rose. The camp averaged about 100 deaths a day including nurses and doctors. The 1,200-bed hospital could not contain the more than 6,000 patients (figure 1). The camp was not effectively quarantined and asymptomatic carriers quickly spread the lethal disease into Boston and anywhere else Soldiers were shipped.

Camp Grant near Rockford, Illinois was also a training base over capacity. On September 21, ignoring ample warning against overcrowding and calling it a “military necessity,” the camp commander permitted Soldiers to move out of the overflow tents and into the barracks where they would be warmer and more comfortable. Within six days of the order, 4,102 Soldiers required hospitalization due to flu and pneumonia. Ten barracks had to be converted into hospitals. Training ceased in order to focus on the logistics associated with dealing with so much sickness and death. By October 8<sup>th</sup> more than 452 Soldiers had died. On the day of the first death at Camp Grant, a train departed carrying 3,108 Soldiers to Camp Hancock near Augusta, Georgia. 10% of those Soldiers eventually died. At Camp Custer, located near Battle Creek, Michigan, 2,800 troops reported ill with influenza in a single day.

Of course civilians throughout the country and world were not impervious to the second wave of 1918’s influenza. Crowded factories, high traffic port cities, shortages of doctors and nurses, and a press reluctant to publish negative material due to the war all added to another tinderbox in the American civilian sector. In Philadelphia on October 1, three days after a huge parade to encourage the purchase of war bonds, the epidemic killed 117 people—a fatality number that sextupled in two weeks. In San Antonio, 53% of the population became infected. New Orleans, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York City all received heavy blows from the disease, as did cities in Britain, France, India, China, Japan, Ethiopia, Australia, and the Pacific Islands. Entire villages in Alaska and southern Africa perished. Historians often compare the effects of the 1918 flu to the Black Death of the 1300s. The bubonic plague killed a larger proportion of the population – more than one third of Europe across a century. But in only 10 weeks the flu killed more in terms of raw numbers. The flu killed more people in 1918 than AIDS has killed in 24 years as of 2005.

### Pathology

Space does not permit even a cursory overview of virology to help understand influenza’s different strains, mutation tendencies, symptoms, and the body’s immune response. It suffices to understand that the vast majority of infected people eventually recovered from the 1918 H1N1 but, when it did kill, it killed via three modes. First, viral influenza alone could kill within hours, rapidly devouring enough cells in the



## The 1918 Influenza Pandemic cont...

lungs to block the flow of oxygen. Second, H1N1 caused Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS, aka viral pneumonia), killing its hosts in a brutal two to four days. Third, as is still often the case, influenza was accompanied by bacterial pneumonia and probably killed a majority of its victims through those secondary complications in two to three weeks.

The second mode of death from influenza is the most germane to military populations. When the virus arrives in the lungs, white blood cells attack en masse and emit proteins called “cytokines” that raise the body’s temperature and stimulate the marrow to produce more white blood cells (hence the fever and aching bones associated with the common flu). If the immune system cannot fight off the virus before it gains a firm foothold in the epithelial cells of the lungs, white blood cells will continue to swarm and a “cytokine storm” will have a toxic effect on the alveoli and capillaries exchanging oxygen. Eventually, this virtual burning of lung tissue causes ARDS, leading to irreversible and rapid organ decay and death. With H1N1, the more robust the immune system, the greater the cytokine storm, the more likely the disease will be fatal. This is why the disease targeted the otherwise healthy, ages 15-42, and why IET units face exceptional risk in an H1N1 epidemic (See Figure 2).

### The Cure

No cure has ever been found for influenza. The chief investigator at the time, and later director of the American Cancer Society, George Soper concluded that the only effective measure against influenza in Army camps was to isolate the individual victims and even an entire command. He said these efforts “failed when and where they were carelessly applied,” and “did some good when rigidly carried out.” Nothing else changed the disease’s destructive course except the disease’s own natural attenuation over time. The difference between the two was the leadership. Leaders either heeded medical warnings and took appropriate action or treated the prevention and response to diseases as someone else’s mission.

TRADOC Regulation 350-6 (dtd July 1, 2009) prudently places the primary responsibility of preventing communicable diseases on the individual. Personal hygiene and deliberate sanitization absolutely reduces the survivability of viruses that typically pass via water droplets and can remain contagious on hard surfaces for several days. However, IET leaders must train these behaviors as well as enforce thorough cleansing of living environments and linens. Ultimately, IET leaders must thoughtfully consider all potential hazards for illness transmission in their span of influence and take ownership of preventive medicine as an essential aspect of their mission.

*CPT Eric Marshall serves as a Basic Training Company Commander for B/1-48 Infantry (“Bulldogs!”), Fort Leonard Wood, MO.*




Figure 2 – the “W” depicted by the 1918 line shows how the H1N1 strain proved fatal for ages 15-45, making IET populations especially vulnerable.

### Second H1N1 Surge Underway

TRADOC recently started a significant initiative to prevent and contain the spread of H1N1 (Swine) Influenza under the leadership of GEN Martin E. Dempsey and the TRADOC H1N1 Task Force. The goal of this effort is to prevent large outbreaks at TRADOC installations prior to the wide-spread availability of the H1N1 Vaccine. The H1N1 vaccine, expected to be available in mid-October at Army Medical Treatment Facilities, is 80-95% effective 8-10 days after a single dose in adults. Children between the ages of 6 months will require 2 doses, spaced 21 days apart.

The TRADOC H1N1 initiative primarily focuses on prevention, with an emphasis on frequent proper hand washing and the use of alcohol-based hand sanitizer when water is not available. Other highly effective techniques include sneezing and coughing into the sleeve of your shirt, social distancing, and early identification of people with Influenza-like illness (ILI) so that they can be separated from healthy individuals. All guidance on H1N1 preparation has been released via TRADOC Campaign Plan FRAGOs. The IET population has historically experienced significant outbreaks of illness during previous influenza pandemics.

Information on H1N1 Flu is available at <http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/> and H1N1 prevention tools are available at <http://chppm-www.apgea.army.mil/>.

## Tactical Combat Care in IMT

BY: COL Karen O'Brien  
TRADOC Surgeon

The responsibility for medical care under fire belongs to Combat Arms leaders. Most combat deaths occur prior to accessing medical treatment facilities. The care rendered at the point of wounding is paramount; up to 20% of combat deaths are potentially preventable. TRADOC recently conducted a review of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and determined that revision of the Combat Life Saver (CLS) program to better align the Program of Instruction (POI) with the principles of Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) could improve the number of survived injuries on the battlefield.

In 2007, CLS training and certification was started for all Soldiers in Basic Combat Training. Since the start of the Global War on Terror, the principles of TCCC have emerged as a key enabler resulting in the prevention of over 1000 potential fatalities from combat wounds. TCCC has enabled this through the providing of tools to Soldiers such as the Combat Application Tourniquet, hemostatic bandages, and other improved tools to sustain and stabilize breathing. Additionally, the implementation of the Joint Trauma Registry has allowed, for the first time ever, accurate data from the point of wounding to final outcome. This data has allowed the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish highly improved medical policy that the civilian trauma community is now adopting. In August 2009, the Defense Health board submitted a memo to the military services requesting that all combat trauma training be aligned with TCCC.

Recent studies on the usefulness of establishing a saline lock and initiating an IV infusion on the battlefield, from both civilian and military experts, have shown disadvantages to these procedures. The saline lock and IV infusion tasks have been part of the CLS course for approximately 25 years. These tasks were adopted on the basis of subject matter expertise from the experience and equipment of that time. Current research has determined the following:


- For extremity wounds that can be compressed (compressible injuries) or treated with a tourniquet, the rescuer's focus on controlling bleeding is more important than initiating IV fluids. Data show that Soldiers can bleed to death in as little as 3-4 minutes and that the median time until application of a tourniquet is 10 minutes. Further emphasis on rapid control of bleeding will improve battlefield survival.
- For internal injuries that cannot be compressed (non-compressible injuries), infusion of IV fluids can interfere with the body's clotting mechanisms and interrupt the clotting process. Published studies show that in these patients, delay in IV fluid administration shortens hospital stay, reduces complications and increases chances of survival. IV fluids can also be harmful to patients with traumatic brain injury.
- Though not a CLS task, for dehydration and overheating, the rescuer's focus should be on providing drinking fluids and cooling the casualty's body (e.g., with iced sheets). IV fluids do not improve survival in heat strokes.
- In almost all cases, trained personnel (healthcare specialist, 68W) should determine and initiate IV fluid resuscitation.

IV training in CLS was suspended on 1 September 2009. After-action reviews and "lessons learned" in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have shown that Soldiers could benefit from additional formal training in TCCC (decision-making on rendering care while under fire, when not under fire, and in preparation for evacuation). Training will focus towards mastery of hemorrhage control, which is the most effective method of preventing death. Additional formal training that is scenario- or simulation-based will improve on individual and case-specific lessons learned to manage casualty care, and will capitalize on the most current TCCC research available to improve survival on the battlefield. The new POI for CLS will take effect 1 Jan 10.

## The Gold Nugget: Capturing the Voice of the Operational Army

By: Mr. Johnny Cobb  
Director, IMTL2

Umbrella Week, a program coordinated by The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), fences off a block of time with Army units transitioning into the reset pool of the ARFORGEN cycle. This program provides Army schools, proponents, and outside agencies the valuable opportunity to learn lessons from units returning from theater. The lessons learned during Umbrella Week may lead to the development of new training or modify existing training in order to provide a better trained, more relevant Soldier to the operational Army. The first unit identified under the Umbrella Week program for a specific look at Initial Military Training (IMT) was the 4<sup>th</sup> Brigade Combat Team, 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division who provided an excellent start. The “Long Knife Brigade” recently returned from a yearlong deployment to southern Iraq.



**Leader Characteristics**

**Years in Service:** 10.63 (1 – 27 years)

**Number of Combat Tours:** one tour (34.7%), two tours (38.2%), three tours (22.1%), four or more (5%)

**Total Months in Combat:** 22 months (4 – 40 months)

**Location of Combat Tours:** Iraq (92% of the tours listed), Afghanistan (5% of tours listed), Saudi, Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, Columbia

**CIB/CABs Received:** 116

**Position:** Squad Leader (1, .5%), PLT SGT (73, 37%), PLT Leader/XO (72, 36%), 1SG (23, 11.6%), CO Commander (29, 11.6%)

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In order to make this an effective survey and data-gathering trip, Dr. Stephanie Muraca, a Social Psychologist from the Experimentation and Analysis Element (EAE) section of the Directorate of Basic Combat Training volunteered her specialized assistance as an expert at gathering statistical data for leaders to use in their decision-making processes that make training better. The target audience of the Long Knife Brigade was company-level leaders from Staff Sergeant to Company Commander and new Soldiers with less than two years military service. This level of leadership and Soldier was targeted as the level where “the rubber meets the road” in terms of receiving and training new Soldiers from AIT or OSUT. These leaders are the closest to the new Soldiers and best able to tell us what they need from their new Soldiers to accomplish the unit’s mission.


Face-to-face discussions highlighted some interesting feedback that was common in every company-level leader group during both day one and day two discussions and reflected in the surveys each group took. The Top 5 tasks/skills in which leaders want new Soldiers to receive MORE training in BCT are:

- **APFT Training:** 89.5% of leaders want new Soldiers to receive more training
- **Personal Finance & Family Care:** 87% ...
- **Communications:** 86% ...
- **US Weapons:** 80.5% ...
- **Mental Preparedness/Stress Management:** 74.5% ...

What are the most important attributes/skills new Soldiers need to have when they report? These leaders stated:

- **1st most important:** Discipline
- **2nd most important:** Physical Fitness
- **3rd most important:** Respect
- **4th most important:** Financial Skills
- **5th most important:** Right Attitude (“can do,” motivated, confident)

The most important issue, discipline, echoed in all groups during face-to-face discussions. While leaders state most new Soldiers are committed to the Army Values, nearly every leader asked for a Soldier with better motivation, discipline, respect, and Army Values. One can argue that they are all synonymous. Regardless, if this many leaders are stating discipline needs to be better trained, then the task is to address this issue.



**New Soldier Mental & Emotional Attributes**

When New Soldiers report to the Unit, are they **COMMITTED** to the Army and its **VALUES**?

% of leaders who believe that most New Soldiers...

Are NOT Committed to the Army/Army Values	Neutral	Are Committed to the Army/Army Values
13%	36%	51%

**New Soldier Army Values Rating (on low-to-hi 5pt scale): 3.29**

When New Soldiers report to the Unit, are they **DISCIPLINED**?

% of leaders who believe that most New Soldiers...

Are NOT Disciplined	Neutral	Are Disciplined
48%	26%	26%

**New Soldier Discipline Rating (on low-to-hi 5pt scale): 2.88**

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## Capturing the Voice of the Operational Army cont...


The linkage of discipline and Army Values is in every task we perform as Soldiers. By far the most common remark was most new Soldiers lacked the basic knowledge and ability to be fiscally responsible. Company commanders, first sergeants, and platoon sergeants all stated the time devoted to getting Soldiers financial assistance was enormous, which had an adverse affect on collective training and other unit activities/ events. Problems highlighted included:

- pay issues were not addressed by OSUT/ AIT units
- Soldiers lacked the knowledge to read an LES or manage a checking account
- Soldiers lacked the knowledge of Army agencies that exist to assist families (ACS, Lending Closets, Housing, etc)
- Soldiers lacked the ability to act fiscally responsible by getting themselves and their families financially over-extended in automobiles loans and leasing contracts before they even sign into the unit of assignment.

Another thread of commonality was the issue that leaders needed Soldiers knowledgeable in their basic individual Soldier skills. For the most part, leaders agreed the institutional Army is providing Soldiers that meet basic skills requirements. However, many leaders stated they do not need a Soldier that is able to execute complicated battle drills flawlessly using someone else's SOP or TTPs, yet cannot manage their own money. Some may argue that we must go beyond the basics, and rightfully so, as a new Soldier could be placed into a unit that is in any one of the three pools within the ARFORGEN cycle. Regardless of the ARFORGEN cycle, the customer (the operational Army) is stating they need Soldiers able to perform the basics well: "Teach them the basics, we'll take it from there" was one remark.

Since many OSUTs train collectively, focusing only on individual skills is not an option. Soldiers must be trained in drills and MOS skills, individual and collective, to meet the needs of the Operational Army. However, 39% of the leaders surveyed stated Soldiers did NOT report with adequate MOS-related skills compared to 35% that say they do. 26% remained neutral. Most leaders agreed that Soldiers understood and are able to execute MOS-related tasks but they did not have the appropriate knowledge, skills, and training on MOS-related equipment. This sentiment highlights institutional leader difficulty in procuring some equipment for institutional training. The result being that here is sometimes just not enough to go around, particularly with weapons and communication equipment. Some of the equipment specifically mentioned by the leaders (M4, PAQ-4, and CCOs) have been in use in operational units longer (more than 11 years) than the average time these leaders have been in the Army (10.63 years).

All groups took highly fervent and strong stances regarding physical fitness. Most were happy with the physical fitness of the Soldiers they received. However, more than just a few Soldiers arrived either not able to pass an APFT, arrived so injured that they were already non-deployable, or




**New Soldier Mental & Emotional Attributes (con't)**

Biggest Problems with New Soldier Discipline: % of leaders agreeing/disagreeing that most New Soldiers...

	Agree	Neutral	Disagree
...are disrespectful to NCOs	34%	24%	42%
...are disrespectful to Officers	32%	25%	43%
...are disrespectful to each other	32%	41%	27%

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**Basic Skills**

Overall, did New Soldiers report to your Unit with appropriate Basic Skills?  
% of leaders who believe that most New Soldiers...

Did NOT report with adequate Basic skills	Neutral	Reported with adequate Basic skills
46%	8%	46%

**New Soldier Basic Skills Rating (on low-to-hi 5pt scale): 3.31**

Biggest Problems with New Soldier Basic Skills: % of leaders agreeing/disagreeing that most New Soldiers...

	Agree	Neutral	Disagree
...are INCAPABLE of providing basic first aid.	18%	31%	51%
...do NOT know/understand basic Warrior Tasks & Battle Drills.	31%	34%	35%
...CANNOT execute basic Warrior Tasks & Battle Drills.	28%	34%	38%
...CANNOT perform basic Soldier tasks.	16%	28%	56%
...are UNWILLING to perform basic Soldier tasks.	12%	23%	65%

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## Capturing the Voice of the Operational Army cont...

could not meet Army body fat standards. Like taking care of a Soldier with financial problems, this takes time away from focusing on more complicated, collective training.

Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM) was another topic passionately discussed. While Soldiers know how their weapon works, can hit their target, and can clean their weapon, they lack the ability to employ their individual weapon in a variety of conditions (e.g., night-fire, shoot/no-shoot scenarios). The new BRM program developed by Fort Benning may address these issues and will take time for the training to have an impact across the

### New Soldier Physical Attributes

When New Soldiers report to the unit, are they PHYSICALLY FIT for duty (able to pass APFT and meet height & weight requirements)?

% of leaders who believe that most New Soldiers ...

Are NOT Physically Fit	Neutral	Are Physically Fit
37%	11%	52%

**New Soldier Army Value Rating (on a low-to-hi 5pt scale): 3.07**

Biggest Problems with New Soldier Fitness: % of leaders agreeing/disagreeing that most New Soldiers...

	Agree	Neutral	Disagree
... <u>lack</u> necessary strength to perform duty.	26%	48%	26%
... <u>lack</u> necessary stamina to perform duty.	31%	39%	30%
...arrive at unit <u>too injured</u> to perform duty.	20%	60%	20%

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Army.

In summary, it is vital that the voice of the operational Army continues to be sought out regarding the performance of the Soldiers provided to them. The goal is to make training better by hearing from the folk that has the greatest impact when they receive new Soldiers. Timely acquisition of information, observations, insights, and lessons provided by programs such as Umbrella Week gives the institutional Army the ability to add, remove, or revise training so that we can provide a better trained Soldier to our Army.

Mr. Johnny Cobb is the Director of the Initial Military Training Lessons Learned Division.

### MOS Related Skills

Overall, did New Soldiers report to your Unit with appropriate MOS-related Skills?

% of leaders who believe that most New Soldiers...

Did NOT report with adequate MOS-related skills	Neutral	Reported with adequate MOS-related skills
39%	26%	35%

**New Soldier MOS-related Skills Rating (on low-to-hi 5pt scale): 3.04**

Biggest Problems with New Soldier MOS-related Skills: % of leaders agreeing/disagreeing that most New Soldiers...

	Agree	Neutral	Disagree
...did NOT know/understand basic MOS-related tasks.	25%	32%	43%
...were UNABLE to execute basic MOS-related tasks.	18%	29%	53%
...were NOT appropriately knowledgeable in the mechanical operation of MOS-related equipment.	36%	32%	32%
...were NOT appropriately knowledgeable in the maintenance of MOS-related equipment.	41%	28%	31%
...were NOT appropriately knowledgeable in the tactical operation of MOS-related equipment.	40%	34%	26%

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### Basic Rifle Marksmanship

Overall, did New Soldiers report to your Unit with appropriate BRM skills?

% of leaders who believe that most New Soldiers...

Did NOT report with adequate BRM skills	Neutral	Reported with adequate BRM skills
37%	20.5%	42.5%

**New Soldier BRM Rating (on low-to-hi 5pt scale): 3.16**

Biggest Problems with New Soldier BRM: % of leaders agreeing/disagreeing that most New Soldiers...

	Agree	Neutral	Disagree
...CANNOT effectively engage targets with M16/4.	26%	23%	51%
...are UNABLE to employ M16/4 in a variety of conditions (e.g., night-fire, shoot/no-shoot scenarios)	36%	29%	35%
...are NOT knowledgeable about M16/4 maintenance.	20%	41%	39%
...are NOT knowledgeable about M16/4 mechanical operation.	27%	27%	46%
...are NOT knowledgeable in the tactical operation of the M16/4.	36%	29%	35%

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## Canadian Basic Training

By: COL Craig Currey  
Director, Directorate of Basic Combat Training

### *“Warrior First/Guerrier d’Abord”*

As the Initial Military Training (IMT) enterprise expands as directed in the TRADOC Campaign Plan (TCP), it is worthwhile to examine what our friends to the north do in their basic military training. Despite the differences between the US and Canadian cultures, it is amazing to see the similarities in IMT; study of their approaches to the common problems provides insight to solving those issues that are universal to all IMT environments.

Because Canada’s entire military is small in number relative to US forces, basic military training is executed jointly with all three services (Canada does not have Marines) at Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu in Quebec. The Soldiers wear the same camouflage uniforms with different colored berets appropriate to their respective service. The newly arriving trainees are called warriors instead of sailor, airman, or Soldier with the initial training experience focusing on all warriors learning rifleman skills. Military leaders cited many examples of airmen and sailors performing different roles in Afghanistan and the positive impact a common basic training experience had with new missions. Naval and air training become like an Advanced Individual Training (AIT) experience for them. All services are represented in the cadre but the majority is Army because of the nature of basic training. Similar to U.S. Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard basic training, swimming training is required for all recruits.



Another immediately obvious difference is the bilingual nature of the training. Platoons are formed by language so instruction is in one language to a given class. All the instructors are bilingual with both English and French used interchangeably—you hear dialogue and instruction in both languages everywhere. Signs are bilingual and warriors accept the differing language as a part of Canadian culture. Around 75% of the instruction is in English and about 25% in French.

Officer training is also conducted at St-Jean. All services and branches go through basic military training in an officer platoon headed by a captain. The course is very similar to enlisted basic training with instruction tailored to officers. The officer course is 15 weeks with no reception week and field problems focused on providing students leadership opportunities while enlisted basic training is 14 weeks long with one week used for reception. The size of their military lends itself to this consolidation of enlisted and officer training. The small numbers of entrants (about 1500 officers and 4500 enlisted a year) require centralized execution as multiple sites like the U.S. model would create a

large overhead to teach only a handful of Military Occupational Specialty/branch students per year.

Canada recruits 17 to 54 year olds; recruiters are part of regular units (they do not have a USAREC equivalent) and are not allowed to ask weight for legal reasons. As such there are no weight limits for recruiting, and some warriors arrive extremely overweight (21.3% of Canada’s population is categorized as obese), washing out of training quickly. Recruiters only do limited medical screening as there is no MEPS equivalent in Canada. Physicals are given in reception week after warriors arrive at St-Jean-sur-Richelieu.

Enlisted warriors are placed in platoons of 60. Men and women are in the same platoons along with all services. Women comprise 14.7% of the Canadian military; all IMT is gender integrated since it is all conducted at one site. Two platoons form every Monday morning, and two graduate every



## Canadian Basic Training cont...



Thursday afternoon. Warriors in the platoons wear distinctive armbands that allow cadre to know exactly where they are in the cycle. These small entering numbers are consistent year round, avoiding any surge. St-Jean's leadership has been working hard to reduce attrition which was 16.3% in FY05 and 23.2% in FY06. Platoons are led by an E-8 Warrant Officer (Platoon Commander) and a Second-in-Charge (E-7). Five to six other cadre are assigned per platoon to reach a desired leader to led ratio of 1:10. Enlisted attrition has dropped to 15.9% (Officer attrition is less than 5%). They have no Battalion Commanders—they have Division leaders who are majors and company commanders who are captains (3 IET companies in total). The presence of few officers is similar to the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard in their NCO-heavy ap-

proach to IET.

Reception is conducted in a blended manner. The actual training unit cadre pick-up the warriors at the end of the reporting weekend. All new military arrivals report through the same doors and receive a key to a temporary room and a meal card from the civilian manning the reception desk. On Monday of reception week, they form the two platoons and begin in-processing, similar to U.S. reception battalions. However, there is no reception unit. Training units know how to in-process warriors with the help of medical and civilians experts. Usually about 70 new warriors arrive to fill a 60-man platoon. Some are held for medical reasons or go to a Warrior Preparation Company (WPC) to improve their PT conditioning before entering basic training. This program lasts 4 weeks, but the chain-of-command can make decisions to adjust that timeline based on the warrior's development. Since warriors receive their first physical at reception, they continue training until the physical determines that something is wrong with them.

Warriors settle their travel claims to St-Jean and do a personal will. New warriors receive around 150 dollars of advanced pay for purchasing and must bring a pair of running shoes with them from home. They conduct a beeper running test in which warriors continue to run back and forth on a 25-meter path in a gym to an ever-quickening beep tone. The longer that they can stay with the tones, the higher their physical fitness score. The new warriors in reception attend the graduation for that week and visit the Wall of Remembrance co-located at the graduation site. The wall commemorates those Canadian Soldiers killed in Afghanistan that year. Since all the military members have attended training at St-Jean, the pictures drive home the personal sacrifice and importance of the training they are about to undergo. It also lets the new warriors visualize the end goal of their 14-week experience, reducing initial stress.

St-Jean has civilian PT experts (college athletes, coaches, Olympians) to man their civilian PT staff. They work with Soldiers just like coaches and are experts in designing all PT. They actually conduct platoon PT an average of 3 times a week. The PT cadre meets with the NCOs and works out the PT plan based on training and availability of weight rooms, pools, and tracks. They tend to do a wide variety of PT activities as the Canadian Army does not have a defined PT program with CD1, CD2, etc. Units have the opportunity to run a supplemental PT session but tend to defer to the experts rather than generate their own programs. Centralized PT holding platoons exist for hurt and weak PT warriors. If hurt but able to train, warriors are assigned to Adapted Warrior Training (AWT) with separate barracks and training cadre. If they are hurt with an estimated recovery of 90 days or more, they are sent home or to another military base to recover. Leaders prefer to have the long-term hurt trainees away from the installation and at another military hospital where they are not overloaded. If warriors are weak they go to Warrior Fitness Training (WFT). The remedial and profile PT programs both use extensive weight equipment led by the civilian PT experts.

Training events are similar to American BCT. Knowing that they receive large snow amounts and can experience extremely cold weather, large training facilities that allow some traditional outdoor events to be conducted indoors are critical to training in the winter. Temporary frame construction and large steel-frame warehouse-type buildings are prevalent. Drill and Ceremony are stressed year round.

General Military Training-Instructional Techniques (GMT-IT) is a 4-week instructor program that is the Canadian equivalent to Drill Sergeant School (DSS). This course prepares cadre to lead the warriors with special emphasis in drill, counseling, platoon roles, leadership, physical conditioning, and tactical

## Canadian Basic Training cont...

exercises. The goal of the training is to develop cadre from different services into a consistent teaching staff. Like the US DSS, most of the students are TDY en route. Their class size is around 48 broken into 4 sections with the course executed 10 times a year.

They are like the US Navy with Quality Assurance—it has substantial authority at the site. The Canadian Forces (CF) routinely assess training being presented by their instructors during both enlisted and officer training, in the classroom or in the field. At St-Jean, they are very concerned with Air Force, Navy, and Army (under various regimental systems) that the standard being trained will vary too much. With a short

DSS equivalent, many of the cadre learns on the job. If the Standards Division shows up and critiques you poorly as an instructor, you will have a bad day and have to redo your warriors' training.



For medical training, all warriors are certified in CPR using civilian ambulance standards. CPR (not AED) is stressed significantly to include babies and older individuals; warriors receive a civilian certification card when done. They also use a scenario at the site that has a vehicle crashed into a checkpoint—they run them through it at the end of the medical training day to let them practice what they have learned. They do not stick anyone for a saline-lock, and they lack some on the combat side of medical application.

The Canadians are developing some potentially useful BRM training techniques. Installing a sliding garage door with windows and slits (also smoke and shooting rubber ball mechanism) in their EST-2000 equivalent allows trainers to lower and raise a panel in one of their EST-2000 rooms [they use Small Arms Training Simulator (SATS)], so warriors/cadre can experience shooting in an urban environment. They can leave the panel up for BCT Soldiers and lower it for cadre units. The smoke machine was a very simple mechanism that used cooking oil to make smoke. The rubber ball shooter was pneumatic and could move to each slit/window and shoot back at the shooters—EST cadre controlled it with a remote joystick. (Some cadre members were afraid to get in the window for fear of being pelted by a marble-sized rubber ball—cadre wore NBC masks when shooting to protect their faces—could wear other masks or maybe just ballistic eye armor). They were trying to use these with new Soldiers to make the EST-2000 experience more challenging and realistic.

Their field training is done off St-Jean-sur-Richelieu at a site known as Farnham. A dedicated OPFOR platoon (known as the FED Platoon) sets up IEDs and has civilian role players that act out scenarios in the final field problem. Much of the platoon personnel were paid civilian role players due to insufficient military slots. The FED platoon can do anything the unit desires for maximum training effect using appropriate enemy/civilian clothing and weapons. If the unit lacks ideas, the FED leadership provides

many good ideas to challenge the new warriors.



## Canadian Basic Training cont...



Warriors must stay until week 5 before quitting becomes an option. However, at week 5 they can quit without any repercussions. Not coincidentally, warriors also start off-post privileges at week 5. Their BCT Soldiers go off-post to bars, and they struggle with what our AITs do in terms of some values shortcomings. They can also smoke cigarettes from day 1. Their concepts on separate and secure were more liberal than ours. They also receive cell phones when privileges start.

The dining facility was excellent with healthy options. Warriors could go to different lines for meal options in addition to a good salad bar. Their issue was one of throughput as all warriors ate in the same facility except for those who were field training at Farnham.

Finally, leaders host a graduation meal/social after each weekly graduation (2 platoons with families) in the enlisted mess (not the same as the dining facility). A large hospitality fund pulled out of operations money pays for the event—free to families. Families are clearly emphasized during the graduation visit. A booklet is provided (with advertising) that provides an excellent guide to the post and surrounding area. The graduation is indoors and provides an experience similar to a U.S. Navy Great Lakes graduation. After the ceremony families can look at the Wall of Remembrance too—a sobering reminder of the journey their loved one is embarking upon. The Wall also has a book that chronicles those who have been killed in recent years beyond those most recent heroes that are posted on the board. Both the family and warrior receive a final values lesson in the Canadian military values of duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage before departing St-Jeans for the final time.



*COL Craig J. Currey is the Director of the Directorate of Basic Combat Training.*

## Developing Soldier-Leaders in IET through OBTE

By: LTC Richard Pratt and CSM Douglas Padgett  
Command Team, 31st Engineering Battalion


Transformation of our war fighting doctrine has cascaded to changes in the way we train Initial Entry Soldiers. Most of the training events and tasks are the same, but a lot of what we do in the training base is focused on preparing the Soldier for immediate deployment to the current fight. There is a real focus to refine training through the implementation of an “Outcomes-Based” training model, and this has greatly transformed how we in the 31st Engineer Battalion view the training of Soldiers – not only in basic skills including Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills, but in the development of Initial Entry Training (IET) Soldiers as future leaders – prepared to accept the challenges of evolving warfare across the Full Spectrum of Operations.

**As a Command Sergeant Major, I am truly impressed by the Soldiers that come through this battalion. I believe that they are extremely smart, innovative, and flexible. This excites me because I believe they are the future leaders who will win the Global War on Terrorism. The battle that our Soldiers will face is asymmetrical warfare and not the conventional fight. The enemy is strong, smart, and adaptive. To win this battle, we must produce Soldiers that are innovative and ready to contribute immediately to their first unit. The Outcomes Based Training model fits directly into MG Martin’s vision to build great Engineers with Full Spectrum capabilities. – CSM Douglas S. Padgett, 31st Engineer Battalion**

The process of developing leaders in the Army (at all levels) is fairly straight forward. We allow them to:

- (1) Develop a plan
- (2) Prepare to execute the plan
- (3) Conduct the operation
- (4) Assess and evaluate the results through self-analysis and external feedback

We see this formula as every Lieutenant takes charge of his first platoon. We also see it in every rotation at the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Joint Maneuver Readiness Center (JMRC) where the Observer/Controllers allow Soldiers to take chances and calculated risks in a controlled environment. They teach and test leadership by allowing leaders to act, succeed, and make mistakes – then assess their strengths and shortfalls which in turn build confidence, esteem, and self-discipline. This proven model of developing leaders trains and evaluates Soldiers in all five of the categories of learning. We find that in the IET environment, we can teach the Soldiers to be leaders at the same time that we are teaching them the basics of Soldiering. In fact for many Soldiers, the additional stress of being placed in a leadership position helps them to perform at their peak level.



Center for Army Lessons Learned No. 09-12 JAN 09,  
The Drill Sergeant Handbook

As Soldiers enter Initial Entry Training, they are immediately given tasks to build teamwork and instill a sense of accomplishment and confidence. This is the first step to building leaders. We believe that on Day One of training, Soldiers should be given missions to accomplish and be evaluated on their ability to participate as a member of a team. This is definitely a paradigm shift from the days of being told step by step what to do and how to do it. Several Soldiers are selected by the Drill Sergeants to serve as Squad Leaders and/or Platoon Guides (Platoon Sergeants) immediately. The newly-selected leaders have only their ‘brevet rank’ and the innate leadership traits they brought with them to lead their peers effectively (many who possibly outrank them with PV2 or PFC rank earned while serving at their home station) through the trials of Engineer One-Station Unit Training (OSUT.) The Soldiers serving in leadership position quickly learn additional leadership skills through observation and individual training from their Drill Sergeant on how to direct the actions of their newly assigned unit. It is exciting to see the Drill Sergeants

## Developing Soldier-Leaders in IET through OBTE cont...

working with the student leadership to accomplish the mission, and it is a process that develops “followers” and “leaders” concurrently. In fact, as the Drill Sergeants rotate the student leadership positions, the Soldiers see the real value in being a good team member and supporting the current Chain of Command – especially as they hope to have the full support of their peers if/when they are put in charge.

“When I was a Drill Sergeant” is a common phrase often heard among senior Noncommissioned Officers. The phrase refers to a time when Soldiers were told where to be, how to get there, how to accomplish the mission, and who had to do it. This old tradition didn’t allow Soldiers to understand the process of problem-solving which leads to mission accomplishment. It didn’t allow the Soldiers to take initiative or develop their own leadership skills. A common cliché heard among training platoons now is “lead the way Drill Sergeant and we will follow.”

We have challenged our Drill Sergeants to look at their Soldiers not as “trainees,” but as the members of their operational squads and platoons. Drill Sergeants give Warning Orders, Operations Orders, conduct Troop Leading Procedures, Pre-Combat Checks, and Pre-Combat Inspections. They teach the students to use these techniques and then they watch the student leadership execute the mission. Soldiers are given the mission of assisting with morning accountability and reporting, monitoring training schedules and timelines, leading After-Action Reviews, and leading the Battalion Commander and Command Sergeant Major through inspections. Leader actions demonstrated during the “Red Phase” of OSUT (first three weeks) look distinctly different from the “Blue Phase” (weeks 6-8). By the end of Blue Phase, student leaders are conducting combat patrols during a Field Training Exercise which culminates with combat operations through the Night Infiltration Course (a simulated raid conducted under direct enemy fire with M240B machine guns live-fired directly above their heads). Student leaders take charge by directing fire and maneuver, calling for status reports and directing aid and litter teams with a level of confidence expected from a Noncommissioned Officer. It is a daunting task, but our success rate is high, resulting in greater pride and confidence in these young Soldiers as they accomplish complex tasks while serving as leaders of these formations.

As Outcomes-Based Training is fully implemented, we will see Soldiers that are ready to contribute immediately upon assignment to their first operational unit; it pushes young Soldiers to learn several different concepts at the same time including basic Soldier tasks with the underlying theme of training Soldiers and developing them as leaders. Beginning the process of leader development early during Basic Combat Training provides our Army with better trained, confident and proficient Soldiers.

*CSM Douglas S. Padgett is the Battalion Command Sergeant of the 31st Engineer Battalion at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He is a former Drill Sergeant and Senior Drill Sergeant Leader at the MAN-SCEN Noncommissioned Officer Academy and Drill Sergeant School. He holds a Bachelors Degree from Excelsior College and is a graduate from the USASMA Class 57.*

*LTC Richard A. Pratt is the former Battalion Commander for the 31st Engineer Battalion Commander at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He is a certified Professional Engineer and holds a Bachelors of Science degree from Norwich University and a Masters Degree from Long Island University.*



**I will never forget my first Platoon Sergeant who saw my leadership potential and maximized every opportunity to make me successful. He provided the purpose, motivation, and direction; that was all I needed. I was given the task to ensure the platoon’s Area of Responsibility was always in a high state of readiness. Then it was my responsibility to request the resources, plan and coordinate the tasks, and follow-up and evaluate. I was in charge of some seniors, peers, and subordinates. A daunting task, but it really developed my leadership skills. -CSM Padgett**

## Combatives Level 1 Certification in BCT

By CPT Jason Sanchez  
Commander, C/2-46 Infantry

The mission of the U.S. Army Combatives School is to train leaders and Soldiers in close quarters Combatives in order to instill the Warrior Ethos and prepare Soldiers to close with and defeat the enemy in hand to hand combat. There are currently four levels to Modern Army Combatives (MAC). The first level, Level 1, develops the instructor base necessary to get Basic Combatives to every Soldier. Essentially, students of Level 1 are training to become instructors themselves. It is a 40-hour course that culminates with students demonstrating fighting proficiency as well as the ability to instruct the course material to future combatives students. Once students demonstrate that proficiency, they are deemed Level 1 certified, allowing them to instruct Level 1 material. At

that point, they can further their knowledge base with a Level 2, 3, and 4 certification.

The Charlie Company, 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion, 46<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment of the 194<sup>th</sup> Armor Brigade story begins in November 2008. The battalion wanted to achieve something that had never been done on Fort Knox before: certify Soldiers in Training on Combatives Level 1 techniques and procedures.

All the appropriate coordination was made and everything was falling into place for this historic event to occur. But, things are never that easy.

January 2009: Kentucky was adversely affected by the worst ice storm in over a decade. Training events needed to be rescheduled, and the first to be thrown to the wayside was combatives. The combatives training was taken off the schedule, but the will to conduct the training remained strong. Given the first opportunity, through the hard work and dedication of a few Drill Ser-

geants, Charlie Company reorganized a 40-hour Combatives Level 1 Certification Pilot.

Drill Sergeants Martavus Westbrook and Tristan De Los Reyes were the main proponents to getting the program off the ground. Both Drill Sergeants are Combatives Level Three Certified giving them the credentials to instruct Level 1 candidates. Along with their Level Two Certified Drill Sergeants Jason Elemen, Maurice Harmon, Roderick Ellis, Curtis Manley, and Kindu Delaleu, they were able to instruct 189 Soldiers in Training. One of the keys to success of this operation was the robust amount of Level 2 certified cadre. At any given point in time, there were at least five certified cadre members present during training. The level of Soldier proficiency displayed during drills increased as the number of cadre present for instruction increased.

Of the 189 Soldiers in Training, only 40 were distinguished to be Level 1 Certified. The 40 Soldiers in Training selected showed the highest military aptitude in the company through various tasks such as basic rifle marksmanship, physical fitness, discipline, and motivation. The certification requires Soldiers to not only be proficient in various body positions, holds, chokes, and escape techniques, but to also achieve the clinch. Although mostly thought of as a "right of passage," the clinch is a drill that allows the Soldier to fight through a punch from an instructor and continue to



## Combatives cont ...



close with the enemy, gaining a dominant body position.

Why is this unique training important to today's Soldier? According to Charlie Company Executive Officer 2LT Jake Bagwell, "Combatives Level 1 is about teaching knowledge. When these Soldiers get to their units, they will be able to teach others. Sharing the knowledge they've learned here will make the Combatives commu-

nity that much stronger." To put that another way, 1SG Ralph Stith says, "Some of these Soldiers have never gotten into a fist fight. Combatives Level 1 training allows them to face and conquer that fear."

Drill Sergeant Westbrook echoes that sentiment. "Combatives is about building confidence. It also brings about esprit de corp. This training is fun for them and for me. Plus, if they ever get into this predicament on the battlefield, they will be confident in their skills to destroy the enemy. These Soldiers will be ahead of their peers when they arrive at their units. Their knowledge will help build the modern Army to be much stronger than when I was in their shoes."

During their training, Soldiers in Training have the opportunity to engage in weight class bouts. PV1 Christopher Cargill from Maryland won the 135 lbs weight class. He defeated his opponent by using the rear naked choke he learned in training. When asked about his thoughts on the training program, he was very proud of his accomplishments: "I've never done anything like this before. I've wrestled my brothers before, but that was just for fun. After learning all the techniques, everything just started to come together for me. I was pretty nervous, but confident. It all happened at a surprisingly fast pace, but my training kicked in allowing me to use the moves to my advantage. I learned that if I use the moves taught to me correctly, I don't have to use as much strength. That allowed me to defeat bigger guys than myself." PVT Cargill was quick to mention that his training will not stop here. He said, "I am glad I had this opportunity, I'm excited about what I've learned, and I want to learn more."

It's amazing the adversity Soldiers are able to overcome. Soldiers train hard. They never accept defeat. Most importantly, they strive to live by the Warrior Ethos. They certainly don't let something like a weather storm impede on quality training.

*CPT Jason Sanchez is the Commander of Company C, 2nd Battalion, 46th Infantry Regiment at Fort Knox.*

### LEVEL 1 DRILL EXERCISES

#### Drill 1:

- Escape the Mount / Arm Trap & Roll
- Pass the Guard
- Achieve the Mount from Side Control

#### Drill 2:

- Escape the Mount / Shrimp to the Guard
- Army Push & Roll to the Rear Mount
- Escape the Mount

#### Chokes

- Rear Naked Choke
- Cross Collar Choke from the Mount / Guard

#### Arm Bars

- Bent Arm Bar from the Mount / Side Control
- Straight Arm Bar from the Mount
- Straight Arm Bar from the Guard

#### Sweeps

- Sweep from the Attempted Straight Arm Bar
- Scissor Sweep

## Better Rifle Bayonet Training

By: SFC Stephen Novak  
NCOIC, Rifle Bayonet Training, Fort Sill

Since the founding of the U.S. Army in 1775, the bayonet has been a standard issue of the individual Soldier's arms. No one can dispute the simple effectiveness of this weapon. It never malfunctions or runs out of ammunition. The wounds created by it are more traumatic than a bullet and the psychological effect on the enemy is devastating. Soldiers have carried and used bayonets in every war the U.S. Army has fought in, and Rifle / Bayonet training remains as important as ever in instilling the Warrior Ethos and building today's Warfighter.



RB1-3 Individual Movements and Defensive Techniques

### *Bayonet Qualification Course*

The current BCT Rifle Bayonet training course is a 5 module training course where Soldiers gain proficiency in the use of the bayonet. During RB1 through RB4 Soldiers learn basic movements (RB1), basic attack movements (RB2), basic defensive movements (RB3), and individual pugil stick bouts (RB4).

The current basic training Bayonet Qualification Course (RB5) requires the Soldier to run through a series of obstacles and engage bayonet targets as fast as possible with a Drill Sergeant evaluating proper techniques, aggressiveness, and accuracy. Though challenging and physically demanding, upon completion the Soldier is left with the attitude of "Ok, now what? I got more out of the pugil stick bouts." The current Bayonet Qualification Course (illustrated below) hasn't changed in decades.

Leaders and Range Cadre of Charlie Company, 434 FA Detachment at Ft Sill are about to change that. Considerations and input at all levels from Basic Trainees to the entire chain of command conclude that incorporating Outcomes-Based Training and Education should have been implemented years ago.

RB5, the Bayonet Qualification Course, incorporates all techniques learned in RB1-4. The main shortcoming with the current Bayonet Qualification Course is that other than being a "smoker" there is no clear goal or motivator throughout the entire course. Current BQC does not meet its purpose of being a capstone culminating event that ties in RB1-4 together.


In July of 2009, the detachment initiated a pilot program tested various uniforms and modified versions of the BQC. The end result? 100% satisfaction in Soldiers, Drill Sergeants, and the chain of command. Everyone could agree that changing the BQC to the new format should be the way ahead for the future of rifle bayonet training.

#### **How the new Bayonet Qualification Course works:**

- Soldiers receive a safety brief and don the following uniform: ACH, IBA, elbow and knee pads, mouthpiece, ballistic goggles and rifle (rubber duck) with an M9 bayonet fixed.
- All bayonet targets on the course have been re-moved from the course—only the obstacles remain. Between each set of obstacles is a 15 foot diameter battle pit with 2 pugil sticks and either a Drill Sergeant or range cadre member present to referee and keep time.
- Soldiers up at the start point receive the command "GO!" in 2 min intervals. They negotiate the first set of obstacles and



## Better Rifle Bayonet Training cont ...



stop at battle pit #1. Once there, they drop their rifles, pick up the pugil stick and prepare to fight. On the command “FIGHT” they engage each other using techniques learned in RB1-4 for 30 seconds. Once the bout is over, they pick up their rifles and progress through the course en route to battle pit #2. Once there, they do the same as above and progress to battle pit #3 where they will fight for 1 minute.

### THE ENDSTATE FOR THE NEW BAYONET QUALIFICATION COURSE IS SIMPLE:

- Soldiers will build confidence in their ability to engage combatants using rifle and bayonet
- This training will identify and expose strengths and weaknesses of fighting skills
- Soldiers will build a fight to win killer mentality

After the pilot program AAR was conducted, the following advantages were learned:

- Soldiers responded better when fighting with their own ACH and goggles than with the “Football Helmet” traditionally used in pugil training.
- Soldiers negotiating the course in the prescribed uniform still get the same training effect as before, even though they are only carrying their rifles and not engaging targets with them.
- Soldiers now have a goal on this course as they now have to think more about how to pace themselves so they will have the energy to fight a thinking, reacting opponent rather than a training dummy, whereas before, there was no motivator—just a finish line.



RB4 Individual Bouts

Outcome-Based Training and Education (OBTE) Principles & Characteristics are fully implemented here. In addition to being proficient in RB1-4 techniques, Soldiers now have to collectively apply all that they have learned and more. Weakness in physical fitness, improper technique, and lack of aggression or decision making can and will prove costly in the battle pits. Soldiers and leaders can now assess these areas that the basic trainee need to improve on.

### Summary

As OBTE is becoming the standard approach to Army instruction, the new Rifle Bayonet Training Program at Fort Sill will definitely enhance the Soldiers awareness on the modern battlefield. Rifle Bayonet fighting is still an essential skill which is perishable and will be an asset to survivability in full spectrum of operations.

## Soldier Assisted Training

By: LTC Shawn Klawunder  
Commander, 3-47 Infantry

Soldier Assisted Training (SAT) is a concept that allows a basic combat training company to improve task execution and maximize retention by placing responsibility on Soldiers to coach the repetitions necessary for a task to become second nature. This concept also provides intangible gains in Soldiers' development, such as confidence, teamwork, and accountability.

The two most precious resources in Basic Combat Training are drill sergeants and time. The TDA authorizes 12 drill sergeants per company which typically has from 200 to 240 trainees. Under optimal conditions, this results in a 1:20 instructor to student ratio. At many training events, basic rifle marksmanship ranges for example, drill sergeants are primarily focused on running the range or training Soldiers on the firing line. The secondary focus is on concurrent training for Soldiers off the firing line. This secondary focus often includes up to half the company under the supervision of one drill sergeant. The drill sergeant in charge of concurrent training can attempt to conduct concurrent training by himself; however, this leaves a 1:120 instructor to trainee ratio. While he may be able to explain how to conduct some tasks, he is unable to observe and critique each Soldier's technique if conducted through mass execution. Alternatively, the drill sergeant may choose to have 3 or 4 of the 120 Soldiers execute tasks at a time, resulting in a massive queue. When different methods aren't used, a Soldier often leaves a range citing the "Disney World" scenario. "That range was like Disneyworld. I stood in line for two hours for a two minute ride." Ineffective use of time cannot be tolerated in Basic Combat Training, because we have 10 short weeks to train a multitude of tasks, while transitioning a civilian into a Soldier. Furthermore, many of the tasks we train are fairly well understood when initially introduced, but can only be mastered through numerous repetitions. A practical rule of thumb is that it takes 1,000 repetitions of a new behavior before it becomes automatic (Gordon, 2000). For example, a Soldier is able to understand how to correct a malfunction after a 30 minute block of instruction, but needs to practice this hundreds of times before he can perform SPORTS under duress. Finally, we want to develop Soldiers who are self-disciplined and accountable. If they simply sit back and wait for the drill sergeant to "feed them" with knowledge, they will never take responsibility for their own learning.

<h3>Learning New Tasks</h3>		
Affecting (Values)	Cognitive (Knowledge)	Psychomotor (Motor skills)
-Receiving • Listening -Responding • Asking questions; participates in discussion -Valuing • Ranges from acceptance to commitment	-Remembering • Memorize the words -Understanding • Understand what the words mean -Applying • Applying the words to a real situation	-Set • Talk thru the steps of a task • Demonstration of a task -Guided Response • Walk thru a task -Mechanism • Practices thru many reps -Overt Response • Task becomes natural -Adaptation • Task applied in situations
-Organizing • Comparing and relating different values -Internalizing • Values control behavior; self-regulated, self-disciplined	-Analyzing • Comparing different COAs -Evaluating • Justify a decision or COA -Creating • Developing a new training method	-Origination • Develops new sequences
<b>Legend</b> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: center; gap: 20px;"> <div style="width: 20px; height: 10px; background-color: #f8d7da; border: 1px solid black;"></div> Soldier Tasks                             <div style="width: 20px; height: 10px; background-color: #fff3cd; border: 1px solid black;"></div> Leader Tasks                         </div>		

(Figure 1)

Figure 1 explains how people learn new tasks. It is subdivided into the three areas by which people learn; the affective, cognitive, and psychomotor domains. The chart moves from the simplest form of learning, on the top, to the most complex form, on the bottom. It is further subdivided into the primary areas where Soldiers learn in BCT (red) and where our cadre should be learning (yellow). The affective domain includes the manner in which we deal with things emotionally, values, motivations, and attitudes (Krathwohl, Bloom, & Masia, 1973). In BCT, this refers to things like the Army Values, teamwork, and self-discipline. The cognitive domain involves knowledge and the development of intellectual skills (Anderson, 2001). This includes the recall or recognition of specific facts, procedural patterns, and concepts (Bloom, 1956). Many concepts in basic training, like first aid, fall in this area. Finally, the psychomotor domain includes physical movement, coordination, and use of the motor-skill areas. Development of these skills requires practice and is measured in terms of speed, precision, or techniques in execution (Simpson, 1972). These include tasks that must become intuitive over time like execution of battle drills or proper handling of an assault rifle.

This chart is particularly cogent in BCT because we touch all three areas. We teach the affecting in the inculcation of values and the Warrior Ethos, cognitive in the description of numerous concepts, and psychomotor in the

## Soldier Assisted Training cont...

development of fine motor skills like the fundamentals of marksmanship.


Soldier Assisted Training is specifically aimed at a portion of the Psychomotor Domain. We develop our motor skills through perception, an area not covered in figure 1. Perception deals with skills developed in childhood like hand-eye coordination. The next step, set, is the initial preparation for execution of a task. In BCT this includes drill sergeants talking through the steps of a task with a visual aid. Then Soldiers observe the task being properly executed with a drill sergeant demonstrating. Next, Soldiers learn through guided response, where Soldiers walk through the exercise with the drill sergeant coaching them every step of the way. Soldiers then proceed to mechanism, the step where SAT training is introduced. In this stage, learned tasks become habitual and movements are performed with confidence (Bloom). These tasks must be performed hundreds of times to become second nature. Furthermore, a Soldier must be critiqued on his performance, because conducting a task the wrong way will only reinforce bad habits. The culmination of these repetitions is an overt response where proficiency is indicated by a quick, accurate, and highly coordinated performance. Finally in the adaptation stage, individual tasks are combined and conducted in realistic scenarios.

The steps outlined in the psychomotor domain line up well with the Army's crawl, walk, run methodology for training. During the crawl phase (Set and Guided Response), we talk through a task with a visual aid, demonstrate execution, and then walk Soldiers through a task step by step. During the walk phase (mechanism and overt response), Soldiers refine their ability to execute a task by rehearsing over and over again. Finally during the run phase (adaptation) Soldiers master execution, applying what they've learned by linking individual tasks together in a realistic scenario, under changing conditions. For example, a battle drill is first taught with a drill sergeant talking through the steps with visual aids. The Soldiers then observe a demonstration on an open field where they can see it performed to standard. Next, a squad executes the task while their drill sergeant talks them through it. This squad then proceeds to the walk phase where they conduct the battle drill numerous times, refining their execution until it becomes second nature. Finally, this squad will perform the battle drill in a realistic scenario under different conditions while linking together other tasks.

True mastery of important individual skills cannot be achieved without the repetition required in the walk phase. Furthermore, the repetitions and observation needed to move through the mechanism stage are a drain on our two most precious resources, drill sergeants and time. A solution to this problem is SAT. Using this concept, drill sergeants are able to focus on the primary training task for the day, while Soldier-trainers are supervising reinforcement training on tasks already trained.

To ensure SAT is properly conducted, the Soldier-trainers must be prepared for their responsibilities.

First, drill sergeants take Soldiers through the crawl phase of a particular task. In this process, several Soldiers inevitably stand out as ones that quickly grasp the concept and are able to execute the task well. Possibly the most important step in certification is a drill sergeant selecting Soldiers from this group that are capable of coaching their peers. These select Soldiers are then taken through a certification process, certifying them as capable of being Soldier-trainers for that specific task. In this certification process, the Soldiers first demonstrate that they can execute the task properly without coaching. Second, they show that they are capable of teaching the task by talking a drill sergeant through the steps. In the final certification step, Soldiers prove that they are able to supervise the task by watching a drill sergeant execute the task, critiquing his execution.



(Figure 2)

## Soldier Assisted Training cont...

Soldier assisted training is planned by the company commander and duty drill sergeant for each specific training event. This is done by looking at high-priority training to be conducted in the upcoming weeks and identifying the key tasks that support this training. This reinforcement training is called "ramp up" training and serves to refine Soldiers skills in individual areas to be combined in a major training event. For example, during a company's BRM density, they may be ramping up to a buddy team live fire. Figure 2 represents a possible SAT scenario that reinforces specific tasks that will be combined in the live fire exercise. The majority of the drill sergeants, and about half of the Soldiers, will be on the firing line. The sole remaining drill sergeant is focused on supervising ramp up training. The company commander has selected BRM Fundamentals, Load/SPORTS/Reload, Barrier Fire, and Buddy Team Movement as Soldier assisted training stations. Soldiers from each platoon have been certified as Soldier-trainers for these tasks. As firing orders rotate on and off the firing line, they will rotate through the stations. Soldiers rotate through these stations in their squads. By doing so the groups are kept to a reasonable size, the instructor to student ratio is decreased, and Soldiers are more actively engaged in the learning. Meanwhile a drill sergeant is constantly rotating from station to station to ensure that Soldier-trainers are maintaining standards and not allowing poor techniques to be reinforced.

Using SAT, Soldiers are able to attain the task repetition, over an entire cycle, needed to increase retention. The spacing effect is an educational technique used to improve retention (Thalheimer, 2007). By repeating learning over a period of time (weeks) retention is significantly improved. This is certainly applicable to Soldier skills in BCT, because we should not be as concerned about what a Soldier knows the day he graduates as we are about what he has retained when he arrives at his first unit, after AIT. Using SAT, critical tasks may be reinforced on daily basis throughout the cycle, as opposed to the minimal exposure a Soldier gets when a particular task is initially trained.

While the intent of Soldier assisted training is for Soldiers to get increased repetitions at certain tasks, there are intangible byproducts gained as well. By increasing repetition, Soldiers are not only more competent in the execution, but also gain confidence in their ability to apply the task when it counts in combat. By assigning Soldier-trainers to train certain tasks we are building Soldiers that are more self-disciplined and accountable for their actions. This method also increases teamwork within squads. Most importantly, this gives the Soldiers a sense that they are responsible for their learning as opposed to simply waiting for the drill sergeant to fill them with knowledge.

Soldier assisted training is an approach that allows commanders to maximize training effect and task retention despite constraints like drill sergeant manning and time available. This concept nests well with the Army's crawl, walk, run teaching methodology. Finally, using these techniques we are able to develop some of the intangible attributes defined by the five BCT outcomes.

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# Combat Patrol Pilot

By: CPT Kyle Lippold  
 Commander G/1-79 FA

“I never teach my pupils. I only attempt to provide the conditions in which they can learn.”  
 -Albert Einstein

Training the basic warrior skills and ethos that Soldiers will need in combat is what we do in Basic Combat Training. While we do not teach our Soldiers subjects as lofty or complex as Albert Einstein might have taught, the proper training environment, resources, and other conditions must be present for effective learning to occur. Anyone attuned to the past seven years of U.S. Army conflict knows that the vast majority of Combat Operations in the OIF and OEF theaters involve mounted operations in which Soldiers at the lowest level must understand and be able to execute proficiently two primary tasks: drive or shoot. With that understanding, what we strove for in the Combat Patrol Exercise was to ensure that each of our Soldiers understood how to be an effective member of a Combat Patrol. The training involved the fundamentals of mission preparation, equipment familiarization and proficiency, security, communication and situational awareness. A desired outcome was for Soldiers to be familiar with combat patrol responsibilities and roles, TTPs, and WTBDs under full-spectrum operations. The training ultimately focused on building Soldiers’ tactical situational awareness, technical confidence in weapons and equipment, and adaptability to a combat scenario.

In April 2009 our Battery and Battalion leadership developed a proposal to improve the existing method of conducting the Convoy Live Fire Exercise (CLFX) with the intent being ultimately to transition the Combat Patrol pilot program into a live fire exercise. The training tasks found in the current program of instruction and training support package would still be trained and taught; however, we determined that a more realistic training scenario that reinforced those tasks and combined other common tasks found in a combat patrol could be developed. The reinforced terminal learning objective for the existing CLFX was to defend a convoy against ambush with supporting enabling learning objectives of 1) describe convoy defense procedures, 2) react to ambush (unblocked) - maintain movement, and 3) react to ambush (blocked) - forced to stop. The standard method of conducting this training was for drill sergeants to guide two MTVs with 12 Soldiers each (6 on each side with firing ports) through a rectangular course in which Soldiers would fire at static targets when given commands. We identified several deficiencies with this scenario with opportunities for improvement.

**Issues with Current Combat Patrol Exercise**

1. Targets provided no target feedback (target hit or miss to the firer).
2. Soldiers fired from moving platforms that are not typically used in any current theaters of operation (i.e. out of the back of a “hardened” 2.5 ton/ LMTV/MTV vs. HMMWV [M1114/1151/1025]).
3. The task was performed in isolation with little integration of additional Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills (WTBD) such as evaluating a casualty, CASEVAC / MEDEVAC operations, or conducting a vehicle recovery.
4. Limited communication was used, other than the drill sergeants giving commands to be echoed by Soldiers; radio and hand/arm signals not used.
5. Did not use best practices with regards to convoy security such as establishment of 360° security, issuing reports (ACE/SALT/SALUTE/UXO), and

In addition to mitigating or eliminating all of the above mentioned limitations, our Combat Patrol Pilot provided several other training opportunities. The pilot introduced Soldiers to the combat patrol orders process through basic patrol mission briefs, and Pre-Combat Checks & Inspections (PCC/PCI) were conducted along with rehearsals of TTPs and other battle drills (i.e. react to vehicle rollover / fire). The pilot also facilitated an eventual live fire certification, once dry and blank iterations were safety certified by our battalion commander. In interest of safety, the future live fire iteration would not involve the Soldiers dismounting or using crew-served weapons, but rather serve as a live fire familiarization in which Soldiers would fire at targets from the turret with their M16s with target feedback from automated targets. In addition to the existing training support package (TSP), terminal and enabling learning objectives (TLO & ELOs), the patrol consisted of four major training tasks with related events; 1) React to contact - IED, 2) Casualty evaluation and CASEVAC, 3) React to Contact - Far Ambush, and 4) Vehicle recovery operations with movement to a MEDEVAC landing zone.

The first task consisted of a combat patrol initially staged at

WED, 11FEB -- (Day 7): Sick-Call, [PT: CD 1, MMDs, 60:120s, SD]: CLFX								
Travel: LPY (BA) to CLFX - 0730-0900, 1730-1800								
DRY - BLANK (BN CDR CERT@ -1030HRS) - LIVE								
EVENT	LOCATION							
A	CO / PLT OPORD / Prep for Combat							
B	Bravo Team engages enemy targets							
C	Alpha Team engages enemy targets							
D	Alpha Team engages enemy targets							
E	Bravo Team engages enemy targets							
F	Teams react to IED ambush by dismounting and engaging enemy							
G	DS conducts Brass/Ammo shake down							
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A(0630-0730) -	A(1200-1300) -							
A(1800-1900) -								

## Combat Patrol Pilot cont...

an assembly area where the Soldiers received their mission brief, conducted rehearsals on react to contact (far ambush, IED), other patrol TTPs, and conducted final PCC/PCIs, and a communications check. The five vehicle patrol (four M1025R1 HMMWVs, one M1083 MTV) then departed (SP) on a combat logistics patrol mission to resupply a combat outpost. The patrol leader (with drill sergeant guidance) then issued the movement order, while drill sergeants ensured proper vehicle speed of no more than 15 miles per hour and spacing of 20-25 meters. Communication between vehicles was conducted by the Soldiers with the drill sergeants primary focus on driving. Range control personnel then triggered an IED detonation once the patrol reached a standard trigger point. The second vehicle was then considered disabled (but recoverable) with one litter-urgent casualty who sustained shrapnel wounds to his legs. After the patrol leader received initial reports (ACE, SALUTE), established security, and conducted 5-25 meter scans an aid and litter team was



### CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

1. React to Contact (IED) – 2nd vehicle disabled (1 casualty), Soldiers report contact (ACE), conduct 5/25s
2. Casualty evaluation and CASEVAC – Soldiers dismount, secure area, begin CLS treatment
3. React to Contact (Far Ambush) – SBF established, ASLT team moves to engage OPFOR (2 w/ M2, 4 w/ M16)
4. Vehicle recovery operations – Soldiers recover using tow-bar, move to MEDEVAC LZ

sent to begin casualty treatment.

The second task began once the aid and litter team arrived at the second vehicle and evaluated the casualty. The team initially treated to stabilize and prepared a 9-line MEDEVAC call. Simultaneous to the CASEVAC, the OPFOR NCOIC initiated a small arms ambush opposite the IED contact side. This attack consisted of a gunner and assistant gunner with an M2 that fired blank rounds as well as four roaming OPFOR in Arab dress who fired M16 blanks from two buildings in the training area.

The third task began when the two lead vehicles established a support-by-fire position, and the two trail vehicles maneuvered as the assault team. The patrol leader then received report of contact,

directed suppressive fires, and directed the third and fourth vehicles to flank and assault the enemy position. Prior to vehicle movement the drill sergeants ensured safety in and around the vehicle. The assault team then maneuvered to flank the OPFOR. When the assault team was within 50-75 meters of the OPFOR, drill sergeants directed suppressive fires via vehicle crew served weapons, and 'shifted' and 'lifted' support vehicles fires. When the 'shift / lift' commands were confirmed, the drill sergeants supervised the dismounted assault on the OPFOR position. The Soldiers used individual and buddy tactical movements (high crawl, low crawl, 3-5 second rush) to close with and destroy the enemy. Smoke grenades were used for screening in a safe area away from Soldiers and blank fire was not fired at or near OPFOR Soldiers closer than 10 meters. Once the assault team had reached their limit of advance, actions on the objective were initiated (search OPFOR KIA/EPW, secured OPFOR weapons) and the team returned tactically to vehicles. When actions on the objective were completed, assault team personnel and weapons were accounted for, and they returned to the main body of the patrol to conduct vehicle recovery and CASEVAC.

The fourth training task began when the patrol initiated the disabled vehicle recovery. The patrol leader submitted the 9-line MEDEVAC request while the casualty was stabilized in the second vehicle by aid and litter personnel. The assistant patrol leader and the drill sergeants supervised vehicle recovery by ensuring the tow-bar was applied correctly between the first and second vehicles. The patrol leader then directed the movement of the patrol to the MEDEVAC landing zone. Upon arrival the patrol leader then ensured 75 meter LZ security using available vehicles and the landing zone was then marked with VS-17 Panel and smoke was used to signal the landing. Four Soldiers then moved the litter casualty to the edge of the landing zone and the lane was called to an end when all personnel dismounted to clear weapons. The training lane was then followed by an after action review (AAR).

A basic AAR was conducted by the battery commander, first sergeant or executive officer, who had observed the patrol lane. Topics covered included 1) mission, orders process, rehearsals 2) what happened, 3) what didn't happen, 4) discussion of teams, special teams (support team, assault team, aid and litter, recovery, EPW, and landing zone teams) and three sustains and improves were drawn from each vehicle to share knowledge/experience. During the lane Soldiers were corrected on-the-spot for safety and essential training elements, but it was even more important to provide them time to analyze and think about the training they had conducted without simply critiquing them.

The AARs conducted with each patrol iteration were primarily qualitative in nature because of the fundamental exposure

## Combat Patrol Pilot cont...

to the training tasks at hand. We considered a quantifiable score sheet, and thus being able to objectively look at how each patrol was conducting tasks and sub-tasks; however, we found that during our AAR we could still cover the four primary training tasks and subjectively derive learning points from each patrol without making the lane unnecessarily cumbersome. This also allowed the cadre subject matter flexibility in answering Soldiers' questions without being tied to the forcing function of a rubric. We continue to improve our evaluation system for this exercise, while maintaining the ability to train 200-plus Soldiers and provide quality feedback. Our Soldiers learned a great deal from the situational nature of this training exercise.

A great deal of planning, preparing, resourcing and coordination was necessary to make this training exercise possible due to many of the required training resources not being a current part of our Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA), or part of the current Convoy Live Fire Exercise Training Support Package (TSP). Five M1025R1 HMMWVs were coordinated to be used from C Company, 434th FA BDE Detachment, and drill sergeants were licensed to drive these vehicles for rehearsals and training; the M1025R1 allowed crew-served weapons (M249/M240) to be fired with blanks from a ring mount. Additionally, Soldiers conducted crew served weapons training two weeks earlier during their U.S. weapons range in which Soldiers were familiarized (but not qualified) with stationary live fire of the M249, M240B, and M2 machine guns.

Ammunition was a key resource that had to be considered when conducting this training. It was important that re-allocated ammo was used properly to support the original training tasks. A logical blank ammunition withdrawal was taken from our U.S. weapons range allocation, and additional M249/M240/M2 ammunition was requested from the Brigade ammunition section. Each turret gunner was provided approximately 160 rounds of ammunition as a basic load for M249/M240. This "dual-use" ammunition supported both additional USW familiarization training as well as the intent for training in the combat patrol exercise. The original CLFX blank ammunition enabled us to utilize approximately 40 rounds of blank 5.56 mm ammunition for each Soldier in each patrol. The six OPFOR Soldiers used M2 blank and a similar portion of M16 blank ammunition to initiate their far ambush.

Other key equipment required was notably crew-served weapons pintle/mounts, M2 blank-fire adapter, fuel cans, tow-bar, litters, and radios to name a few. Drill sergeants and cadre conducted an initial leaders' reconnaissance and concept brief on the training site, and were rehearsed as to how the exercise would unfold. Additional coordination had to be made with range control personnel for the use of their IED simulator which would provide the notional IED blast and smoke when triggered. Once all of the resources were coordinated, the training exercise began in a cyclical fashion. Good continuity, communication, and rehearsals were key to each lane iteration taking no more than 30 minutes each (13 iterations for 200 Soldiers).

Many valuable lessons were learned from our Combat Patrol Exercise. Soldiers were able to learn valuable insights into combat operations based on this brief experience and learned how to think about a combat scenario. The extensive combat experience of the Soldiers' drill sergeants (12 of 12 who had prior OIF/OEF deployments) also proved to be a valuable tool because they could always have a question answered from an NCO who had actually conducted this type of training and these types of missions in operational units. The exercise served as a valuable culminating tool during our situational training exercise (STX) week because the Soldiers were able to adapt the tasks taught from STX I through VI into a scenario that would require them to utilize almost all of the skills they had learned so far in Basic Combat Training. The complex nature of reacting to an IED, evaluating a casualty, and simultaneously reacting to a far ambush built Soldiers' confidence in their weapons, their communication ability, and use of initiative to solve a complex problem under the stress of time and enemy contact. The conditions created through this training exercise have better prepared these Soldiers to fight and win as ground combatants. Our Soldiers will undoubtedly be a more positive asset to their first unit of assignment not because they know how patrol is conducted, but because they know how to effectively think about fighting and winning.

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To submit a story, please send to the editor:  
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We are looking for articles of interest to share with the IET community. If you have a lesson learned, interesting story, or training idea that you would like to share, please submit your article to the DBCT at the e-mail address above. Include related graphics. Please submit images as separate attachments in the same e-mail. The DBCT reserves to the right to perform editing for format and clarity without notification of the author.

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*DBCT MISSION: The DBCT will develop, refine, and support Basic Combat Training (BCT) across USAAC through doctrine, education, knowledge management, research, and training support. Serve as the proponent for BCT, Drill Sergeant Program, IET Reception, IET Leader Education and Training (Victory University) Courses, Army Physical Readiness, and Warrior Transition Course (WTC) to ensure training is current and relevant. Achieve outcomes from strategic and critical thinking that determine the right tasks, drills, and support to transform individuals and institutions effectively, while at the same time providing the highest quality of life and care for Soldiers, Civilians, and Families. On order, perform duties as directed by the Commanding General of the BCT Center of Excellence.*

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## In Brief: Notes and Notifications...

Lesson Plans and Training Support Packages are being continuously updated. You can always get the most recent copy of the Basic Combat Training Program of Instruction and its associated lessons and support documents at our AKO Site:

<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/kc/6544544>

The IET Clothing Board has been scheduled for 30 November through 4 December at Fort Jackson.

The AIT Platoon Sergeant Course (AITPSGC) has been directed by CG, TRADOC to consolidate all training operations at Fort Jackson effective 3 January 2010. If you have Soldiers scheduled to attend the AITPSGC at a separate installation after that date contact HRC, Drill Sergeant Branch to reschedule their training.