



INITIAL ENTRY TRAINING JOURNAL

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USABCTCoE Commanding General's Comments

By: BG Bradley May
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The Army is a learning organization. As we become more sophisticated and more comfortable about the lessons of history, we always strive to improve on the potential future of our Army—to sustain those things in history we have done well and improve those that need refinement. It is with this thought in mind that I welcome you to this addition of the *IET Journal* where we focus on the our Army's progress with understanding the many dimensions of what makes a Soldier ready: physically, mentally, emotionally, and spiritually.

Soldiers and civilians understand what it is to be physically ready. Physical readiness is something we can see and feel. However, the other human dimensions encompass so much of what we consider to be a Soldier, yet we often don't or can't measure the effect of mental focus, emotional stability, or spiritual resolve until after those factors have been stressed to damaging levels in combat or other situations. The BCTCoE has taken a leading role in preparing our new Soldiers for the possible rigors of combat beyond the physical domain with the end-state of a better prepared Soldier, able to fight and win on the modern battlefield and return home healthy and safe.

Training the Full-Spectrum Warrior: Battle-Focused Mental, Emotional, and Spiritual Readiness

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The U.S. Army currently faces a multitude of challenges in modern operational environments. New and unprecedented threats seem to emerge daily from regions that have been adversely affected by economic globalization and political unrest. Increased demand for energy and natural resources has further created a climate of desperation for some, only to be exacerbated by oppression from corrupt and failing governments. These marginalized populations, lacking opportunities for work, education, and basic subsistence then become fertile recruiting grounds for violent extremist groups. Furthermore, the proliferation of cheap weapons, as well as information and technology, has added a new array of capabilities that these potential adversaries can exploit with devastating impact.

In addition to the automatic rifle and improvised explosive device, today's conflicts are fought with the cell phone and laptop computer. Insurgents may use internet chat rooms and forums to coordinate activities, audio and video messages to sway public support, and cheap electronic devices to detonate explosives. In fact, we can, and should, expect that our adversaries will employ a full range of options, including every political, economic, technological, informational, and military measure at their disposal, to defeat us (FM 7.0, 2008). This multi-dimensional operational capacity, termed 4th-Generation Warfare (4GW, Harper 2007), represents our enemies' adaptation to traditional military power as well as the Army's recognition of using innovation and agility to seize and maintain the initiative in operational environments.

"In the past, we generally knew who we were up against: our enemies wore uniforms, fought according to a doctrine, and were for the most part willing to engage us on battlefields. All of that has changed, and so have we," (Brown, 2007, p. 33).

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In response to these changing threats that confront us, the Army's operational concept has adapted as well. Full-Spectrum Operations (FM 3.0, 2008) requires flexible mission command that is capable of rapidly responding to changing situations as they develop. In this environment, subordinate Soldiers and leaders exercise considerable initiative and judgment in order to shape events. In addition to combat expertise, Soldiers and leaders must develop the skills necessary to transition between types of operations, relying on their own creativity, imagination, and critical thinking in order to be successful. Thus, Full-Spectrum Operations require the capabilities of Full-Spectrum Warriors – those individuals who are both physically fit and mentally agile. This requirement exists because “no matter how much the tools of warfare improve, it is Soldiers who use them to accomplish their missions,” (p.1, FM 1, 2005) or to quote military strategist COL John Boyd (USAF), “Machines don't fight wars. People do, and they use their minds.” Despite all of the optimization and proliferation of technology within the military, the actions and judgment of the individual Soldier remains the foundation for everything that occurs in an operational environment. No weapon is fired, no vehicle is driven, no task completed, and no plan is executed without the direct involvement of a Soldier.

Optimal Combat Performance

“Untutored courage is useless in the face of educated bullets,” General George S. Patton.

Because modern operational environments include multiple dimensions of activities and require the fluid synchronization of joint resources, Soldiers and leaders must be mentally agile and adaptive in order to be successful (CALL Interview with LTG Freakey, 26 Feb 2007; FM 7.0, 2008). This concept is as much a truism as is the necessity for Soldiers to be physically fit in order to be successful. Yet it is still relatively poorly understood. Operational success involves more than reliance on advanced weapons systems, battlefield equipment, communications capabilities, or military strategy. Rather, success is dependent upon the decision-making capacity of the individual Soldier. This decision-making capacity is, of course, predicated upon Soldiers' mental functioning, just as Soldiers' athletic capacity is derived from their physical functioning. Therefore, if one were given the theoretical task of building a “better” Army, the biggest return-on-investment would obviously come from building a better Soldier.

But, what are the characteristics of a better Soldier, and just as importantly, how does one measure those characteristics? Does “better” represent a continuum of development or a threshold of achievement? Certainly, “better” is a difficult term to define or measure given the complexities and broad challenges Soldiers must confront in modern operational environments. Rather than “better,” it is possible

that “optimization” is a more accurate concept as it refers to a most desirable or enhanced state. In this event, *Optimal Combat Performance* would be a useful descriptor of an individual Soldier's highest performance level, and be distinguished from the ubiquitous Army standard *Combat Ready*, in two key ways. First, the concept of Optimal Combat Performance addresses only the inherent capabilities of the individual Soldier, rather than some composite measure of training, equipment, and organizational elements that may impact the operational performance of the Soldier. Second, Optimal Combat Performance implies continued development of ability rather than a minimum threshold, as does the term *Combat Ready*.

A defining element of a Soldier's Optimal Combat Performance is his or her *competency* – the totality of that Soldier's knowledge, skills, abilities, and associated attributes (*KSAA's*; see figure 1.). Knowledge, skills, and abilities represent the tangible tools Soldiers apply to their craft and are developed from the Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills they learn during Initial Entry Training (IET); examples include: reacting to




Figure 1. Optimal Combat Performance.

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contact, moving under direct fire, providing first aid, and navigating from one point to another. Attributes are intangible — defining characteristics of Soldiers that have an indirect impact on their performance. Attributes include concepts that have always been associated with military service such as: values, personality, temperament, and character. They also are products of *Soldierization* and examples include: pride, confidence, adaptability, and motivation. So, Soldiers acquire knowledge, skills, and abilities through the content of training, while developing attributes through the process of training. Together, these accumulated KSAA's comprise core competency domains of a professional Soldier and are included in the outcome criteria for IET developed at the Directorate of Basic Combat Training at Fort Jackson with United States Army Accessions Command (USAAC) units.

However, Optimal Combat Performance is not derived from the core competency domains of a professional Soldier alone. A Soldier's ability to recall and utilize information may be impeded by the effects of combat or operational stress (See Note 1). Therefore, an additional defining element of Optimal Combat Performance is a Soldier's state of preparedness to act, referred to as *Combat Fitness*.

Combat Fitness can be thought of as a global measure of a Soldier's suitability to surviving and thriving in an operational environment. In this regard, the term *fitness* encompasses both the connotation of readiness to perform as well as the biological concept of being adapted to an environment. Further, the term refers to the state of development of the internal characteristics of a Soldier that contribute to overall performance in an operational environment. This state of development indicates a preparedness to act using the elements of Soldier competency (KSAA's). For the deployed Soldier, KSAA's alone would be insufficient for Optimal Combat Performance because the Soldier, while technically proficient, would be unprepared to execute or sustain the tasks his or her mission requires. Therefore, Combat Fitness is necessary to ensure Soldiers are able to utilize their faculties to the best of their ability. On the other hand, suppose that a Soldier possessed a readiness to act, but lacked competency. It is easy to understand how, without competence, that willing Soldier might readily perform activities that have little effect or even prove detrimental to the mission.

As stated before, Combat Fitness is a global measure. It is comprised of four unique domains: Physical, Spiritual, Emotional, and Mental readiness (see Figure 2.). Like pillars, these four domains each support a different aspect of a Soldier's state of preparedness and are equally important and interdependent upon one another. Weakness in one pillar will surely lead to the collapse of the others and, overall, contribute to a weakened, ineffective Soldier. Whereas, strengthening each pillar will increase general fitness, and contribute to an agile, resilient, and capable Soldier. Thus, the four domains of Combat Fitness, which are comparable to the three dimensions of the American profession of arms (physical, intellectual, and moral) embedded in our Service's heritage (FM 1, 2005), are necessary elements of preparedness that ensure each Soldier is capable of meeting the diverse and changing demands of an operational environment.

Historically, the Army has focused heavily on Soldiers' physical readiness for good reason; despite centuries of steady technological advancement, the nature of combat remains an endeavor of brute force, struggle, and long suffering, whereby strength, toughness, and speed often directly contribute toward survival. Since the Army has a multitude of available resources on this subject (FM 3-22.20, 2009), physical readiness will not be discussed in detail here, other than to briefly note that, in recent years, research has indicated the interdependence of physical and mental readiness (Dunn, Trivedi, & O'Neal,



Figure 2. Combat Fitness.

Note 1: Note that this is a different phenomenon than the natural deterioration in information retention that occurs as a function of time, for which the Army has long recognized the value of training in sustaining fighting capability (FM 7.0, 2008).

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2001; Salmon, 2001). Instead, the other three domains of Combat Fitness: Mental, Emotional, and Spiritual Readiness, will be reviewed, as they are, perhaps, understood with less clarity.

Battle Focused Mental Readiness

“Men are disturbed not by things, but by the view which they take of them,” Epictetus.

Note 2: A natural caveat to this relationship is the variation attributable to factors such as the nature of the task at hand and the personality factors of the individual involved. Leadership and training are other examples of moderating variables (Britte, Davison, Bliese, & Castro, 2004).

All humans are constantly in some varying state of physiological arousal – or activation. Even while asleep, small amounts of brain and muscle activity occur. Generally speaking, however, an individual's state of arousal will increase with the situational demands of his or her environment (stress; Selye, 1956). This process makes good sense, as one would expect that increased activation of bodily systems will usually result in increased performance and, therefore, improved chances of success or survival. This dynamic is reliable, however, only up to a certain point. Beyond that point, as physiological arousal continues to increase, performance will begin to decline, resulting in a curvilinear or inverted “U,” relationship between stress and performance (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). The physiological arousal an individual experiences consists of a variety of processes in the Central Nervous System, including activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical (HPA) axis and release of substances such as adrenaline and cortisol. These processes prepare the individual for emergency action. Collectively, this bodily activation is referred to as the “fight or flight” response and produces an increase in physical parameters associated with survival: heart rate, blood pressure, respiratory capacity, and muscle tension. While these reactions are occurring, individuals are also simultaneously making interpretations of the meaning of the stress they are experiencing as well as an estimation of their available coping resources (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). If these individuals conclude that they are capable of meeting the situational demand, they are likely to perceive the situation as challenging and thus, experience diminished or moderate arousal. On the other hand, if these individuals perceive that their capabilities do not meet the situational demand, the stress response will likely continue or even increase.

In general, the result of persistently elevated physiological arousal is the deterioration of complex motor skills (e.g., tracking, aiming, shooting) and cognitive processing (See Note 2) (e.g., judgment, critical thinking, decision making; Harris, Hancock, & Morgan, 2005; Hatfield & Kerick, 2007; Landers, & Arnt, 2006; Siddle, 1995; Weinberg & Hunt, 1976). For the Soldier in an operational environment, this means a reduction in combat effectiveness and possibly increased risk due to decreased performance. Normally, repetitive training tends to increase performance through psychomotor efficiency, or “automaticity” (Fitts & Posner, 1967). Thus, the more an individual practices a series of actions, the more economical their cognitive-motor processing becomes, to the point of being seemingly effortless and habitual. However, in stressful situations (such as combat), smooth psychomotor processing is hampered by limbic system activity, producing physiological arousal as well as competing cognitive activities, such as rumination, self-talk, and fear-based expectations (Kerick, Hatfield, & Allender, 2007). Therefore, more than repetitive training is required to overcome this degradation of performance.

Note 3: This is referred to as “approach-oriented behavior” associated with activation of the left frontal lobe of the brain. Left frontal lobe activation has also been associated with positive affective states.

Mental skills training is needed to enable an individual to shift attention away from competing and distracting thoughts and toward task oriented thoughts (See Note 3). Mental skills training, such as goal setting, positive imagery, distraction control, and confidence building involves concepts of Cognitive Psychology and has been widely used for decades by a variety of professionals (Williams & Straub 2006) to hone mental focus in order to achieve peak performance. In the past, this type of training was used almost exclusively by elite athletes seeking to maximize their abilities. More recently, other professionals, such as corporate executives, have used such training to improve management and organizational skills. The Army has also used this type of training in limited populations through the services of the Army Center for Enhanced Performance (ACEP). The Army shares at least one thing in common with the world of professional sports or business – all are competitive arenas in which there are clear winners and losers, and the difference between the two sometimes comes down to a fraction of a second or a momentary lapse in focus. Obviously the stakes can be much higher for the Soldier than for the Olympic athlete or Fortune 500 executive. For the Soldier, enhanced performance in an operational environment means better mental, emotional, and behavioral control while under pressure – thus, increased odds of survival and completing the mission successfully. *Battle-Focused Mental Readiness* refers to this state of preparedness.

Training the Full-Spectrum Warrior cont...

The mental skills training discussed here helps improve psychomotor performance and cognitive processing. It also has beneficial effects for reducing the detrimental effects of stress. Yet the arena a Soldier operates in is vastly different from the ball field or the boardroom. The range of stressors in an operational environment is considerable. Furthermore, Soldiers must endure hazardous conditions for long durations and be capable of multiple exposures over the course of a career. The capacity to be exposed to this type of adversity and to adjust positively to its effects is referred to as *psychological resiliency* (Luthar & Cicchetti, 2000). *Battle-Focused Emotional Readiness* is a Soldier's state of resilience to the stress and trauma experienced in an operational environment.

Battle-Focused Emotional Readiness

"dulce bellum inexpertis – War is sweet to those who have no experience of it," Pindar.

It has long been understood that Soldiers experience a variety of psychological problems during combat that, left untreated, may eventually impair their ability to function. Currently, we refer to this type of disturbance as Combat Stress. In the 18th Century, military physicians referred to "Nostalgia," in the 19th Century the term, "Soldier Heart" was used, while in the 20th Century, the terms "Shell Shock," "Combat Exhaustion," and "Battle Fatigue" were coined (See Note 4. Regardless of the terminology or time-period, the effect of Combat Stress has debilitated many Soldiers on the battlefield and is a universal phenomenon (Marlowe, 1993). In their famous article, Swank and Marchand (1946) described how healthy Soldiers during World War II would begin to experience insomnia, tremors, and generalized anxiety after 25 to 30 days of continuous combat operations. After 40 days of continuous fighting, the health of these Soldiers tended to deteriorate further with the display of emotional exhaustion, characterized by slowed cognition, apathy, and listlessness. By 60 days, the authors reported that approximately 98% of all Soldiers would become incapacitated due to stress (the remaining 2% were identified with "aggressive psychopathic personalities" and apparently did just fine; See Figure 3).

More recently, the significant effects of combat stress on our current force have been noted. In 2004, Hoge, Castro, Messer, McGurk, Cotting, & Koffman, indicated that approximately 17% of Soldiers deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) developed Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a figure that is consistent with the level of Acute Stress Reactions described by the Mental Health Advisory Team Four (MHAT IV) report (2006). Furthermore, deployment in support of OIF has been shown to be associated, at least transiently, with altered neuropsychological functioning, including reduced proficiency in attention and memory as well as increased negative emotional states, such as confusion and tension (Vasterling, 2006). In their book, *On Combat*, Grossman and Christensen (2004) provide a detailed discussion of how and why the operational environment is emotionally toxic. This discussion is particularly relevant as more and more Soldiers are having multiple exposures to combat over the course of their careers. While it is true that combat stress can have adaptive qualities (FM 4-02.51) and even provide the benefit of post-traumatic growth (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004), it is only the case if Soldiers experience combat stress at an exposure rate and level that is tolerable. Improving Soldiers' psychological resiliency helps to increase their tolerance to combat stress.

One well-researched method for increasing psychological resiliency is Stress Inoculation Training (SIT; Meichenbaum, 1976, 2007). SIT is a brief form of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy that increases an

Note 4: For a thorough review of the history of Combat Stress, read "Steeling the Mind: Combat Stress Reactions and their Implications for Urban Warfare" by Todd Helmus, or "From Shell Shock to Combat Stress: A Comparative History of Military Psychiatry," by J.M. and Hans Binneveld.




Figure 3. Combat-stress relationship, (Grossman & Siddle, 2000).

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individual's repertoire of adaptive coping responses. It does this in a comparable manner to regular medical inoculations – through exposure to a small amount of toxin in order to increase resistance to a greater disease process. Thus, exposure to mild stress raises an individual's psychological defenses and bolsters adaptive coping responses as well as the confidence to use such responses. The Army's SIT program is called "Battlemind." Initially developed for use by deployed Soldiers, Battlemind is now being offered as a product across a Soldier's lifecycle in order to foster emotional preparedness and represents another component of Combat Fitness.

Beyond the mental focus that enables mental, emotional, and behavioral control, and the psychological resiliency that fosters healthy coping responses in chaotic, stressful environments, there is another pillar of preparedness: *Battle-Focused Spiritual Readiness*. It is in this domain, the moral dimension of the profession of arms, one is reminded that wars are fought for ideas (FM 1, 2005).

Battle-Focused Spiritual Readiness

"He who has a why to live can bear almost any how," Friedrich Nietzsche.

Human beings are meaning-seeking creatures capable of enduring incredible hardship and tragedy, provided they can make some personal sense of their experience (Frankl, 1963). This personal sense comes from a belief system, whether religious or secular, that serves as a framework to put life events into a context that is understandable. As Grossman and Christensen (2004) have noted, interpersonal violence is an anathema to most humans. When Soldiers fix their weapon's iron sight on an enemy combatant and squeeze the trigger, they are engaging in a significant and irrevocable act of human aggression. The moral authority and responsibility to employ such violence is derived from a Soldier's belief system and is predicated on the ideals of the Constitution (FM 1, 2005). The Army's value system, in which every Soldier is inculcated, provides the basis for contextualizing a Soldier's use of force, and therefore, promotes a spiritual resolve to continue fighting. In short, as part of their duties, Soldiers may be called upon to kill another human being. They will do so understanding that their actions are grounded in a moral framework and, therefore, their behavior is righteous. Spiritual resolve, or dedication to purpose, serves as a sustaining force for every Soldier in the field who must endure incredible hardships and make difficult choices.

More than at any time in history, the individual Soldier in today's Army has the capacity to make decisions with staggering ramifications. A well-focused and emotionally stable mind ensures that a Soldier will have the potential to make an accurate decision, but not necessarily the right one. Often, making the right decision requires a Soldier to rely on his or her sense of ethics. The spiritually-ready Soldier is one who is firmly rooted in purpose and well-versed in the Army Values and Warrior Ethos. Despite the consequences, these Soldiers are able to make moral and just decisions on the battlefield. In contrast, the morally ambiguous Soldier may be uncertain in beliefs, confused about the mission, or lacking in character. These Soldiers are easily uprooted by the changing situations in an operational environment and are left to wander directionless.

Conclusion

The challenges currently confronting our Soldiers are considerable and even daunting. In order to meet these challenges, Soldiers will need to rely on every facet of their abilities to ensure Optimal Combat Performance. This peak level of efficiency is a combination of preparedness and training. Combat Fitness refers to a state of preparedness comprising mental focus, psychological resiliency, and spiritual resolve. When these elements are combined with the tangible and intangible competencies acquired through training, Soldiers are best able to make full use of their potential.

Transformation and modernization of today's Army has greatly improved our technological capabilities and refined our doctrine. However, the individual Soldier remains the focus of our fighting capability and source of our greatest strength. Battle-Focused Mental, Emotional, and Spiritual Readiness ensure that Soldiers are able to optimize their skills and abilities to perform at their peak capacity. Training Soldiers in skills that promote this type of readiness during IET has the potential to enhance their success in training. Embedded or recurrent training across Soldiers' lifecycle will have the potential to comprehensively affect their health as well as performance.

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DBCT Launches Initial Military Training Lessons Learned Section

By: Mr. Johnny Cobb
Initial Military Training Lessons Learned Analyst

“You must learn from the mistakes of others. You can't possibly live long enough to make them all yourself.” -Sam Levenson (1911-1980)

Do you ever have problems finding the answers you need? Have you ever wanted to find someone who has done the job you're in and could give you some pointers? Do you ever think there has to be an easier way to do something? How much time have you spent looking for a document on the web and not been able to find it?

The Directorate of Basic Combat Training (DBCT) launched a new section this quarter, the Initial Military Training (IMT) Lessons Learned (L2). The IMTL2 section's goal is to create an information sharing culture within the IMT community in which every Soldier sees himself or herself as a collector of positive (sustain) and negative (improve or change) information. Success in this culture is defined as the continuous collection and submission of observations, insights, and lessons (OIL) from every unit level; from the individual Soldier to the most senior leaders.

What is a Lesson Learned? A lesson learned is some piece of information gained through experience that an organization should retain for future use. Depending on the lesson, it could be a valuable technique or an outcome that you wish to repeat or it could be an undesirable result you wish to avoid. Often, identifying your lessons learned is as simple as asking the question, “What worked well or what didn't work so well?”

Why are Lessons Learned Important? Synergy is the interaction of two or more agents or forces so that their combined effect is greater than the sum of their individual effects. When we learn from our successes and mistakes we save lives, money, time, and it just may make sense. It also prevents: REINVENTING THE WHEEL!


Why don't people share? The difficulty of collecting lessons learned is normally people do not want to share their successes or weaknesses in a competitive environment. The Army is a team; however, the competition for promotion, duty position, awards, recognition, or time-off is very real. Sharing an observation, insight, or lesson takes time and may not fit into the busy schedule we all maintain. Bottom Line: Your knowledge and feedback is needed!!

What kinds of knowledge do we need? There are two types of knowledge, explicit and tacit. Explicit Knowledge is information that is written down or recorded. It is information that is easily given to another or shared. Think of a math book; all the information required to perform math problems is in the book, but the reader must have the skills to read and understand the book. Tacit Knowledge is information that is inside minds and is not easily explained or given to other people. Think of a math teacher; they know how to do math, they know when to do particular problems, they can adapt specific techniques and general foundational concepts to new problems, but that knowledge can not simply be handed to inexperienced or unskilled people for them to start performing math; that tacit knowledge must be converted to explicit knowledge and transferred.

Put simply, IMTL2 needs your observations, insights, and lessons in order to train smarter. IMTL2 will collect OIL through various methods which include:

- Unit After Action Reviews (AAR) / Cycle After Action Reviews (CAAR)
- Exit interviews with commanders, school commandants, senior NCOs, and instructors
- Discussion forums on the IMT KM site (coming soon on Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS))
- Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
- Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities (DOTMLPF) changes

Mr. Johnny Cobb is the Chief of Initial Military Training Lessons Learned. He has extensive experience in the IMT arena as a former Drill Sergeant, Drill Sergeant Leader, USMA Tactical NCO, and most recently as the Chief, BCT Proponent Office.



“Fools say they learn by experience. I prefer to profit by other people's experience.” - Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898)

Outcome-Based Training and Education: Art vs. Science

By COL Craig J. Currey, Mr. Wayne Marken, and Mr. Johnny Cobb
Directorate of Basic Combat Training

Outcome-Based Training and Education (OBTE) is at a critical crossroads in Initial Entry Training (IET). Units have been directed to implement OBTE approaches across IET by LTG Freakley, the US Army Accessions Command (USAAC) Commander. Brigade commanders have moved out on this initiative but have experienced difficulties with bureaucracy and naysayers even while others who want to help are unsure on how to help. This article will lay out the Directorate of Basic Combat Training's (DBCT) latest efforts to outline what the training community is articulating and the desired future of OBTE in IET.

Current State

Desired Outcomes of BCT:

- Is a **proud** team member possessing the **character** and **commitment** to live the **Army Values** and **Warrior Ethos**.
- Is confident, adaptable, mentally **agile**, and **accountable** for own actions.
- **Is physically, mentally, spiritually, and emotionally ready to fight as a ground combatant.**
- Is a **master** of critical combat skills and proficient in basic Soldier skills in all environments.
- Is **self-disciplined, willing**, and an **adaptive** thinker, capable of solving problems commensurate with position and experience.

Outcome-Based Training and Education Definition:

Outcome-Based Training and Education (OBTE) is a philosophical approach to military training that seeks to target the Soldiers' developmental end state. Soldiers will acquire skills, mental intangibles, and attributes required by the Command for Full Spectrum Operations. The training is guided by Commander's intent to obtain the greatest effectiveness and the enable Soldiers to learn better.

The Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) has continued to teach the Combat Application Training Course (CATC) at Fort Sill and Fort Leonard Wood, spreading their leadership training across the ATCs. This course is typically the first practical application of OBTE that most trainers experience. AWG has also hosted OBTE conferences as well as participating in speaking engagements across the Army. Their efforts have gained support at senior levels across TRADOC and have assisted commanders at individual installations with the implementation of OBTE.

Having been given the authority to modify the outcomes by LTG Freakley, some brigade commanders have adjusted the five approved outcomes to better fit their command philosophies and unit capabilities and strengths. Advanced Individual Training (AIT) commanders are free to add to the basic five outcomes with additional outcomes related to their Military Occupational Skill (MOS) development. However, their development is hampered as there is no single set of defined outcomes that AIT leaders can use as a baseline product.

The original November 2007 OBTE conference at Fort Jackson developed measures of effectiveness for each specified outcome two levels deep. These additional levels defined observable traits and characteristics that cadre could use to assess improvements in their Soldiers. Unfortunately, the sheer number of measurements was intimidating to some users; commanders continue to improve ways of measuring intangibles and attributes inherent in the outcomes in ways more easily incorporated into the day-to-day activities of their organizations. Commanders that modified their outcomes must also develop their own measures of effectiveness and implement their measures accordingly.

Development of these metrics is very difficult and often a point of contention between different units. The easier the metrics are for the cadre to measure definitively, the more consistent and precise the assessments will be. However, intangibles and mental attributes do not lend themselves to easy, neat measurements that can be precisely assessed. As a result units often have to choose between clear measures that have little meaning and relevant measures that are subjectively gauged. Units must continue to work the development of metrics and assessing of those metrics to prove that the Army is improving the effectiveness and capabilities of our Soldiers.

FM 7-0 Paragraph 3-8: *“Education, in contrast [to training], provides intellectual constructs and principles. It allows individuals to apply trained skills beyond a standard situation to gain a desired result. It helps develop individuals and leaders who can think, apply knowledge, and solve problems under uncertain or ambiguous conditions. Education is associated with “how to think.” It provides individuals with lifelong abilities that enable higher cognitive thought processes. Education prepares individuals for service by teaching knowledge, skills, and behaviors applicable to multiple duty positions in peace or war. Educated Soldiers and Army civilians have the foundation needed to adapt to new and unfamiliar situations.*

Outcome-Based Training and Education cont...

Forge Ahead

The training community first needs to adopt a common definition, language, and terminology for this program. For the past two years this effort has been referred to as Outcome-Based Training (OBT); however, the new FM 7.0 doctrinally requires that the education aspects of training be considered. It is education that leads to the Soldier and leader development of mental attributes and intangibles while training supports skill acquisition, development, and improvement. The new term agreed upon by both the AWG and the BCTCoE is Outcome-Based Training and Education (OBTE).

Our doctrine also allows for trainers to develop the approaches and ideas needed to accomplish their mission. OBTE is not a shedding of the past; rather, it is an improvement in the IET environment (or any other) to train our Soldiers to a higher level that includes mental intangibles in addition to their task-based skills instead of focusing solely on the skills. OBTE is designed to enable our Soldiers to learn better. However, to reach this higher level we need to provide our NCOs better training on how to train using multiple approaches.

Direct instruction that involves excessive PowerPoint slides and sterile classroom lectures will not get our Soldiers to internalize values, cause them to think, or promote problem solving. Unfortunately, such

instruction is the primary method of teaching information the Army has advocated for over 30 years. While this method of instruction is still appropriate for many topics, it is hardly the only method available. However, changing this mentality means that we will not have a checklist for every event with carefully scripted words to enable the drill sergeant, platoon sergeant, or instructor to say just the right words; leaders at all levels will have to accept more responsibility and greater risk in development of their training methods.

We need to allow our commanders to exercise the art of training. We have plenty of science that we need to apply and that is readily available to trainers through developed lesson plans and Training Support Packages (TSPs), but we need to emphasize training and learning activities that enable our Soldiers to develop to the desired outcomes. Even though the task/condition/standard approach is still viable, that approach does not mean a lecture or scripted, step-by-step learning activity has to be used. We can elevate Soldiers to learning activities in which they use their knowledge and solve problems on their own commensurate with their rank and experience.

This approach is most evident in training events such as Situational Training Exercise (STX) lanes, the Teamwork Development Course (TDC), land navigation courses, Modern Army Combatives, and Army Values scenario training.

As users have gained experience with teaching and applying OBTE, certain common principles and characteristics have begun to emerge and a model for OBTE development and execution presents itself; a model that can be useful for explaining this philosophical approach to training subordinates. Starting with the desired end-state, unit commanders identify the required training tasks and begin linking which outcome(s) to work on for each training event. The task itself, which is linked to a combat requirement, has a provided action, condition, and minimum Army standard from the TSP. Trainers can follow the TSP lesson plan, particularly if they are unfamiliar with the topic or new to teaching, or develop a different method of instructing the material that emphasizes thinking skills or other outcomes.


The selection and development of a learning activity that is creative and enables the Soldiers to learn better is the real art in training. Before beginning training, the trainers also plans for which intangibles and mental attributes they will target during the training. Questions to consider may include:

- How will the Soldier's confidence grow?
- How is personal accountability being promoted?
- Do the Soldiers learn Army Values and Warrior Ethos in the training?
- Does the importance of initiative receive emphasis?

You cannot engage and emphasize every intangible for each event, but targeting some for each event will encompass all the intangibles and outcomes over time. Do not make learning mental attributes a second thought or chance learning; instead, focus on the outcome as a critical component of the training.

***FM 7-0 Paragraph 3-9:** Traditional training and education may not meet all the needs of an expeditionary Army. The Army is adapting training and education as appropriate to meet the conditions of today's operational environments. Develop new approaches may be necessary to ensure Soldiers and Army civilians are confident in their ability to conduct full spectrum operations anywhere along the spectrum of conflict with minimal additional training.*

Outcome-Based Training and Education cont...



As the training is completed, Soldiers will develop and internalize the attitudes, thought processes, and mental attributes that come out naturally from training. If the cadre is stressing, teaching, coaching, and mentoring the correct aspects in the training, the Soldiers will learn and adopt the desired outcomes as their own. However, if the correct aspects are not stressed in training, the Soldier will still internalize *something*; but, the trainer will not be in control of what that *something* is.

The trainers must then assess how well the Soldiers are displaying and internalizing the outcomes in addition to their ability to perform the task or skill. The Army is better at doing this assessment with skills that can be evaluated by some sort of physical or mental test. This approach is still appropriate for many skills but such tests rarely assess the mental attributes.

A successful approach that units should be using to address this gap is peer evaluations. This type of feedback provides a quantifiable measure to the Soldier on where their squad or platoon thinks they are in terms of attitude and performance. These forms also provide the cadre confirmation of their personal observations and direct feedback that can be incorporated into developmental counseling.

Commanders can also make use of this program as an additional tool to assess the effectiveness of their training. Peer Evaluation Forms riddled with negative comments and low opinions of everyone point to intangible issues for a large portion of the unit, perhaps necessitating changes in subsequent cycles to fix training and counseling approaches.

Another recommended approach is the use of a unit goals book. Soldiers develop personal goals and track their own progress throughout IET. This planning places the responsibility of development on the Soldier instead of the trainer; this action itself can lead to better self-reliance and initiative. The book

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can challenge the Soldier to obtain the highest possible goals for each individual Soldier. It can also target intangibles and be used as a tool for the cadre member to track a Soldiers' progress. Again, effort has to be taken to develop the intangibles. They will not be developed by accident or only achieved in many as a minimum if no active effort is pursued to teach and mentor them.

All training should have an After Action Review (AAR). This feedback develops Soldiers, trainers, and leaders and allows the cadre to see where planning and execution may need improvement. Because of the repetitive nature of IET, or any institutional training, units have the opportunity get it right the next time. Your art may be off a little the first time around, so adapt and improve it. When you find the right training scenario or learning problem that really works, share across your battalion. You can use OBTE without having to develop every learning activity yourself. The lesson plans online even provide basic outcomes and measures or effectiveness for every training event in BCT. Talk to other cadre. Share ideas and best practices. Teaching our Soldiers how to think will only save lives in future combat.

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OBTE remains an evolving and improving program and concept. We are interested in unit feedback on what OBTE-based initiatives they have worked on, what has been successful, what has not worked, and what could be improved. If you would like to share your unit insights into implementing OBTE, we encourage you to submit an article to the IET Journal using the instructions on the final page. Thank you,

-Wayne Marken

The Gold Nugget

By: Johnny Cobb

This article is based on an interview conducted 8 April 2009 with LTC John Calahan, Commander, 1-13th Infantry, a unit responsible for Basic Combat Training on Fort Jackson.

This quarter's *Gold Nugget* comes from the 1st Battalion, 13th Infantry Regiment, "First at Vicksburg", Fort Jackson, South Carolina. This particular battalion's cadre attended a self-developed two-week training course instructed by their best Drill Sergeants on specific tasks taught in Basic Combat Training. LTC John Calahan, Commander, 1st Battalion, 13th Infantry Regiment stated that, "there are certain skill sets that are not taught at the Drill Sergeant School that certain MOSs either do not possess or are not proficient in which puts certain drill sergeants, company commanders, and first sergeants at a training disadvantage." The many benefits of this training course include:

- A consolidated unit effort in training Cadre, which is transferred to Soldiers
- Ensuring training and education conducted is doctrinal and outcome-based
- Hands-on and Performance-Oriented
- Instructors "Find the Passion"

LTC Calahan described the intent behind the Cadre Training Course:

"The course is one half of the battalion cadre training and certification program. All cadre must have a basic level of proficiency and competency in various Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills in order to teach and train effectively. If the cadre is not knowledgeable and comfortable in their level of knowledge, they cannot answer the second and

The Gold Nugget cont...

third order questions that Soldiers will ask as a result of training. This is critical when we try to influence the intangible factors of living, thinking, and fighting as Soldiers; particularly thinking as a Soldier.”

NOTE: As discussed in this issue’s article on OBTE, the brigade commanders have the authority to develop their own, unit specific, outcomes to support their training philosophy. The 193rd Infantry Brigade’s desired outcomes for Soldiers in Basic Combat Training are:

Live As a Soldier

Motivated team-players who are accountable, have the character and sense of duty to accomplish any mission, and have adopted the Army’s values as a way of life

Think As a Soldier

Confident, self-disciplined men and women who are adaptable, flexible and are willing to take the initiative

Fight As a Soldier

Men and women who are confident, competent and proficient in critical Soldier skills and possess the physical and mental toughness to defeat the enemy

LTC Calahan continued to describe the advantage of conducting this training and the benefit of using peer-to-peer instruction and the passion that this training promotes:

“You can pretty much teach a private anything and you will not be questioned. The question, ‘Do you understand Private?’ always results in a ‘Yes Drill Sergeant,’ answer. However, when you are teaching your peers, you are going to get the hard questions, sharpshooting, and professional discussion that nearly everyone benefits from. This exchange results in everyone walking away with more knowledge than when they started.

When I ask the cadre why they are doing things a specific way, I was often told, ‘that’s how we’ve always done it’ or ‘they said.’ One of my primary objectives was to instill in cadre that ‘THEY’: external organization, support personnel, installation functions, etc’ don’t control the training. There are more myths and rumors floating around the IET environment than you can shake a stick at. A training company shouldn’t adapt training to the training resources; they should adapt the training resources to the training. Getting the cadre to understand that they are executing their training rather than [just] the TSP/POI, got them excited about what they are doing because they realized that they could tailor the training and add to the POI, which is a huge benefit of OBTE.”

Another benefit of the Certification Training Course is opportunity to develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). LTC Calahan stated, “The intent of the SOP isn’t to tell people the ‘right way’ or ‘only way’. The areas we covered during training are then transferred into chapters or paragraphs in the SOP. The individuals who were primary instructors are also responsible for writing that portion of the SOP, and they will incorporate the feedback and assessment from the training.”

There were challenges and drawbacks to conducting this training. The biggest drawback according to LTC Calahan was predictability. He stated, “The likelihood of a basic training battalion getting enough time without Soldiers-in-Training to conduct this type of event is rare. The other consideration is getting the intent of the training course completely understood during the planning phase because the frequency is not there, and many cadre are not familiar with unit training management.”

In closing, the 1-13th Infantry’s training course allowed them to all be on-board, develop team building, instill ownership of training in cadre, and graduate a Soldier that meets Army standards and desired outcomes.



To submit a story, please send to the editor:
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We are looking for articles of interest to share with the IET community. If you have a lesson learned, interesting story, or training idea that you would like to share, please submit your article to the DBCT at the e-mail address above. Include related graphics. Please submit images as separate attachments in the same e-mail. The DBCT reserves to the right to perform editing for format and clarity without notification of the author.

<http://www.bct.army.mil>

DBCT MISSION: The DBCT will develop, refine, and support Basic Combat Training (BCT) across USAAC through doctrine, education, research, training support, and act as the proponent for BCT, Drill Sergeant Program, IET Reception, IET Leader Education and Training (Victory University) Courses, Army Physical Readiness, and Warrior Transition Courses (WTC) to ensure BCT is as effective and world class as possible. Achieve outcomes from strategic and critical thinking that determine the right tasks, drills, and support systems for BCT.

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In Brief: Notes and Notifications...

Lesson Plans and Training Support Packages are being continuously updated. You can always get the most recent copy of the Basic Combat Training Program of Instruction and its associated lessons and support documents at our AKO Site:
<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/kc/6544544>

A Task Analysis Review Board (TARB) for the Warrior Transition Course (WTC) has been scheduled for the final week of April at Fort Sill. Contact your chain of command and submit consolidated recommendations to the WTC Proponent if you have feedback about this courses that you want covered at the TARB.

The revision to FM 21-20, FM 3-22.20, is currently being edited and updated to include all submitted feedback and for clarity. No non-concurrences were received and no future staffing rotations of this document are planned. Thank you to all who took the time and effort to review this new manual and submit your comments.

The new IMTL2 section will be contacting BDE Commanders throughout the IET community to schedule interviews and to begin gathering lessons learned over the summer. For those commanders rotating out of command this summer we would like to emphasize the importance of this exit interview process; this is our last opportunity to learn and share your experience before you take on new challenges.

The new Family-oriented website initiative, commonly referred to as Family Communications Project, is scheduled to begin testing and deployment at Fort Jackson over the next 2 months. The DBCT will be contacting installations with planning guides to help expand this program to other locations once we have gathered the issues and solutions from our testing and deployment. There will be more information in the next IET Journal.